Administrative Presidency and Reorganisation of Public Service Institutions and Administrators in Tanzania

Abstract

Administrative presidency, which implies the use of presidential unilateral power to control bureaucracy, has emerged as an important instrument for presidential control over public service. In developing countries, the presidents have applied this strategy to expand their influence and control the quality of public service delivery. Nevertheless, these efforts have not yielded the expected results. Corruption and ethical practices are major obstacles limiting bureaucratic responsiveness to presidential priorities. This article investigates the current instruments for presidential control over public service in Tanzania and the way the context-specific factors, such as reorganisation of public service institutions and the change of rules, regulations and performance management systems, influence the power of the president to control the public service. The article employed a qualitative approach with conceptual and relational content analysis of government policy, guidelines, research reports, audit reports, and public service organisations to establish how politicisation and centralisation of bureaucracy are used to control public servants and the influence of institutional and reorganizational reforms on the president's power to oversee the public service in Tanzania.  The findings suggest that different tools, such as appointments and removal of public officials from office, together with centralisation of power to the president’s office, are used by the president to control the behaviour of public servants, but also different institutional reforms engineered by President Samia and her administration influence the presidential power on public service control.