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Administrative Presidency and Reorganisation of Public Service Institutions and Administrators in Tanzania

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Abstract

Administrative presidency, which implies the use of presidential unilateral power to control bureaucracy, has emerged as an important instrument for presidential control over public service. In developing countries, the presidents have applied this strategy to expand their influence and control the quality of public service delivery. Nevertheless, these efforts have not yielded the expected results. Corruption and ethical practices are major obstacles limiting bureaucratic responsiveness to presidential priorities. This article investigates the current instruments for presidential control over public service in Tanzania and the way the context-specific factors, such as reorganisation of public service institutions and the change of rules, regulations and performance management systems, influence the power of the president to control the public service. The article employed a qualitative approach with conceptual and relational content analysis of government policy, guidelines, research reports, audit reports, and public service organisations to establish how politicisation and

centralisation of bureaucracy are used to control public servants and the influence of institutional and reorganizational reforms on the president's power to oversee the public service in Tanzania. The findings suggest that different tools, such as appointments and removal of public officials from office, together with centralisation of power to the president's office, are used by the president to control the behaviour of public servants, but also different institutional reforms engineered by President Samia and her administration influence the presidential power on public service control.

Keywords: *Administrative presidency, cultural factors, institutional context, public service, Tanzania*

Introduction

Globally, the administrative presidency has become a scholarly debate due to the pressing need for effective presidential control over the bureaucracy, curbing corruption, and meeting the dynamics of citizens' expectations for improved service delivery, coupled with a scarcity of resources (Moe1985). Conceptually, it implies the way the presidents organise and control the public service to promote their political agenda. The president directly commands and controls the performance of the bureaucrats (Rosenbloom, 2019).

The literature on the administrative presidency shows that the institutional context can influence the way the president interacts with bureaucrats, but also the way the bureaucrats respond to presidential priorities. The institutional context shapes the way the presidents appoint their subordinates, issue instructions, implement the policies, including centralisation and the reorganization of plans. The president can also use institutions to manipulate the budget and decide how much is approved or disapproved for public spending (Moe1989; Moe & Wilson, 1994; Jacobs & Shapiro, 2025). In developing countries, it is even more important because the effective policy implementation, which reflects presidential priorities, depends on the national and local institutional context, which defines and shapes the behaviour of the implementing officials (Allen 2004; Batista & Lopez 2020; Appiah & Abdulai 2022).

The Tanzanian government undertook concerted measures to reform public institutions to align them with efforts towards the realisation of the government's Vision 2025 (URT 2023c; URT 2024b). Despite these initiatives, the empirical literature shows that the lack of accountability among public servants in Tanzania is a leading constraint for public sector performance (Tima & Liu, 2024). This evidence is compounded by research and audit reports from the government, which have consistently confirmed that public servants are still corrupt. This consequently undermined the presidential priorities for improved service delivery (URT 2023 and URT 2024a). Therefore, this paper answers

the question: To what extent does the president use politicisation and centralisation of bureaucracy to control the public service in Tanzania, and how institutional reform and reorganisation of the public service institutions, together with the existing social rules, influence the presidential control over bureaucracy?

Literature Review and Analytical Framework

Administrative Presidency is a governance model where the executive power is exercised through administrative agencies and bureaucratic control rather than collaboration. It views the executive as a unified branch exclusively under the authority of the president (Neuman, 2020; Staff, 2019). Other public administration scholars, like Rubin (1985) and Sanders (1988), view this concept as an approach through which presidents attempt to alter the focus of the executive branch to expand executive power, centralise decision-making authority, exert bureaucratic control, or alter administrative procedures and partisan influence. Others like Durant (1992) and Clayton (1995), and Nathan (1983) view the term as a management strategy designed to ensure bureaucratic responsiveness to presidential priorities.

Reorganization, on the other hand, refers to the process of restructuring the administrative agencies and public service system to improve its efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. The actual practice of reorganization involves the creation of new offices, merging existing ones, or modifying their responsibilities and reporting lines (Grafton 1979; PWC 2020). With an attempt to achieve this, the presidents use various mechanisms including politicization, centralisation and budget cuts. About politicization, the president appoints and assigns politicians at different levels of government different roles to help them achieve their political agenda (Lewis 2007). The power of appointments and removal of public officials is given by the country's constitution. With this power, the president can appoint his subordinates within the executive branch and direct them to implement presidential priorities (Allen 2004, Batista & Lopez 2020). Presidents often use this strategy, but it can lead to issues like prioritizing higher-level leadership, resulting in politics-based performance rather than competency-based and professional public service (Lewis 2008; Roberts 2006). This suggests that the appointments in the public service need to be taken with care because they can make it harder for presidents to control bureaucracy if the appointed politicians are driven by politics that erode the professional public service (Allen 2004; Howell 2003).

Furthermore, the president may use centralization to shift public service functions from the wider executive branch of government to a few staff within the state house. These staff are given the power to control and regulate the entire public service. They decide at the headquarters, and their decisions are implemented at subnational levels of government with instructions and directives. In connection,

the presidents can use their unilateral powers to create agencies and structures which are acquiescent to presidential control (Howell & Lewis, 2002; Lewis, 2003; Bednar, 2024; Remish, 2024).

Finally, reorganization of government institutions involves merging or creating new public service institution to improve performance. Administrative goals of reorganization include, for example, improved program effectiveness, greater efficiency, reduced cost, and improved policy integration across related programs (Congressional Research Service 2017; Grafton, 1979). While reorganisation promotes administrative efficiency, such as reduction of unnecessary overlap, duplication and fragmentation, demoting the offices and programs that are not presidential priorities and promoting integration, it can also lead to complicated or expensive administrative problems such as decreased cohesion and increased fragmentation of agency mission (PWC 2020).

Analytical Framework

This article uses the rational choice perspective to analyse the dynamics of the president's unilateral power and his control over bureaucracy. This theory postulates that bureaucrats appointed in the public service are human beings who are driven by economic rationality. These bureaucrats strive to maximise their preferences ordered in line with their priorities. This suggests that the bureaucrats make decisions by weighing costs and benefits to maximise their self-interest (Ferris and Shui-Yan Tang, 1993; Hasan, 2025; Sidor and Dubin, 2025). Along this perspective is the principal-agent theory. This theory explains a specific social relationship, that is, delegation, in which two actors are involved in an exchange of resources. In this perspective, the principal is the actor who owns resources such as money and equipment but does not have the appropriate skills needed to realize the interests (Coleman, 1990). The bureaucrats in this case are the agents who are working on behalf of the principal. The principal is the president elected by citizens and working on their behalf. Therefore, taken together, the rational choice perspective and the principal-agent theory can explain the relationship between the president and the public servants. The president is the head of the administrative unit, and the bureaucrats are employed to serve the interests of the president. The presidents, therefore, act on behalf of the principal, who owns resources such as budgets and equipment. The goal of the principal is to implement his political agenda for improved service delivery. The principal can implement this goal through effective control of agents: the bureaucrats appointed in the public service. These bureaucrats must be willing to further the interests. The willingness of the agent to further the interest of the principal does not come automatically. The existing rules and regulation including the institutional structure determines the motivation of the bureaucrats. The rules can constrain or facilitate the actors' choices. The careful design of the institutions can help overcome this problem by creating institutions compatible with actors' interests

and goals. This is important because bureaucrats responsible for service delivery can be both selfish pursuers of status, agency size and salary (Campbell and Wilson's 1995).

The self-motivated behaviour of bureaucrats depends on the way they perceive their role and the agency-specific context. Second, the strong institutions of the administrative presidency provide a strong agency culture, which makes bureaucrats vulnerable to the tools of the administrative presidency. Understanding the conditions that produce a bureaucracy resembling the nightmare vision of the rational choice theorists as it pursues its self-interest and those conditions that produce a bureaucracy more attuned to national or public interests is therefore important for performing administrative presidency (Campbell and Wilson 1995; Golden 2000).

Methodology

This review article employs a conceptual and relational content analysis of various documents regarding the power of the president, organisation of executives, executive orders, policy guidelines, different directives for public service delivery, and social rules governing public service in Tanzania. For this purpose, the documents were selected based on the research question under investigation, and the search involved revisiting the websites of the president's office, the ministries and consultation with the key officials for some specific documents. The collected documents reviewed were in two categories: the first category was soft institutions, and the second category was hard institutions (the organisations of executives). The soft institutions included the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, the Public Service Act (revised version of 2019), the Public Service Regulations of 2022, and other government directives.

A second category of the documents reviewed was the organisation of public service or executive. These include the reorganization plan and the institutions that were subject to reorganisation. These organizations include the Public Service Planning Commission, the Ministry of Public Service, the public service enterprises, and the Controller and Auditor General's office. The main task involved the analysis of the structure, roles and responsibilities of these institutions and their relationship with the executive, the key elements of the reorganization plan and the new policies and guidelines for presidential control over bureaucracy.

Data Presentation

The president of Tanzania holds administrative power derived from the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, which allows him to appoint or remove public officials and oversee administrative agencies, supported by public service rules and regulations. The main legislation governing public service in Tanzania are the Public Service Act, the revised version of 2019, and the

Public Service Regulations, the revised version of 2023. This legislation defines the functions, obligations, and the establishment of different institutions for the Public Service, including the scope of presidential power regarding appointments of key officials in the public service. The president holds the power to appoint the Chief Secretary, who is the head of the public service. Regarding this, the chief secretary works as the head of public service but also as the secretary to the cabinet. The secretary, therefore, assumes the position of the chief executive officer of the service but also the head of public service. The secretary must provide leadership, direction and image to the service, but also the secretary is the highest-ranking disciplinary authority in the service (URT 2019). Apart from that, the Public Service Act establishes the key coordinating institution, which works under the guidance of a chief secretary. As a coordinating institution, the commission has a role to oversee the efficient and effective functioning of the public service by ensuring that public servants are well-trained, motivated, and free of corruption. This role, in principle, is important because it builds the capacity of the public service to deliver the policy in line with the presidential priorities (URT 2019; Didace 2023; Didace 2023).

The following section discusses the presidential power of appointment to influence the politicization of public service, centralisation of bureaucracy, institutional reforms, reorganisation of the public service and digitalized performance management systems and their influence on presidential control over the public service.

Centralisation of Appointments in the Public Service

In Tanzania, the president derives the unilateral power over appointments of political and administrative officials from the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977. This power is cascaded and interpreted in different legislations governing public service, such as the Public Service Act discussed in the preceding section above. Since these leaders are presidential appointees, they are required to ensure that the public policy is implemented in consonance with the presidential priorities in their jurisdiction. To make sure that the appointed leaders comply with the president's interests, the president issues frequent directives to guide the performance of appointed leaders in the public service. In the Tanzanian context, the appointment as a strategy for presidential control over bureaucracy has been in use since independence, and the elected presidents in different phases have been using it consistently to improve the performance of public servants and spearhead the presidential priorities. Unlike other presidents in Tanzania, the current phase of government under President Samia has been a champion in using appointments and removal of administrative leaders in public offices as an accountability mechanism, as seen in Table 1 (URT 2023c). This trend has raised a debate in public, especially regarding the impact of the frequent appointment and removal of

administrative leaders in public offices. While others think it was the best strategy, others argued that the frequent removal of some leaders in public office did not follow due process and procedures in consonance with the principles of good governance (Minde, 2024). Table 1, below, shows various administrative leaders appointed and transferred in the public service in the years 2022 to 2024.

Table 1.

Appointments and transfers of administrative and political leaders in the public service between 2022- 2024

Removal/Transfers	Appointments					
	2022	2023	2024	2022	2023	2024
Years						
Ministers			1			
Deputy Minister		3		2		3
Permanent Secretaries		2			4	
Deputy Permanent Secretaries	1		5			2
Regional commissioners		5			12	
Regional Administrative Secretaries	1	3			8	
District Commoners	1	5		8	27	
Local government Directors	4	13		16	25	
Head of Public Institutions	1	3				
Others	6	12	7			2

Source: (*URT, Presidential speeches 2022-2025*)

Most times, the public servants are forced to comply with public service rules. Compliance is not a culture but a strategy to avoid punishment, such as demotions and removal from public office. Overall, the president exercised his control over the public service through instructions and directives from the state house institutions. It was with great sorrow that the efforts to revolutionize and increase discipline in the public service suffered a setback with the passing away of the fifth president of Tanzania. Following his death, President Samia Suluhu Hassan was sworn into office as the sixth president. When she took over, the accountability of public servants had substantially improved, but the civil servants were demotivated by unfair treatment and remuneration (URT 2024; URT 2022). Since then, President Samia has undertaken various reform measures designed to improve the performance of public servants (URT, 2024).

Centralising and Reorganising Public Service Institutions

Regarding reorganization, the Tanzanian government has undertaken various measures to reorganise public service institutions to enhance accountability and efficiency in service delivery. One measure taken is the relocation of the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government under the president's office. This relocation was designated to increase accountability of this ministry under direct control by the President, but also to reduce corruption of public servants, especially those with a direct interface with service recipients and also increase the power of central government oversight and coordination of local government performance in service delivery (URT 2024c). Substantial achievement has been witnessed as now the president, through this ministry under her office, is in control of the delivery of basic social services like health, education and water. Her frequent visits to regions and audits of the basic social services, especially education, water and health care programs, are evidence. Now that the school enrollment and infrastructure have increased, different water for all programs has been implemented, and hospitals are now furnished with new health care facilities (URT 2025). Another reorganisation measures the government undertook was the reform of the governance system of parastatals to increase their efficiency and monitor the selection of board members. The board members were appointed through competition. This includes merging the public institutions and agencies whose operations are similar in order to increase efficiency, avoid overlaps and duplications (URT 2024a). The reorganisation of the public service institution has increased its efficiency and its capacity to contribute its share to the government every year. The dependence on the government budget has decreased, and the heads of the agencies have been able to align their priorities with the current government's mission and priorities. The reorganization has yielded significant benefits, such as more efficient and responsive services, but also strategic reallocation of resources and a reduction in operational redundancies, leading to the growth of a more dynamic and efficient public sector (Kilimo Kwanza, 2023)

Use of Digital Performance Systems

The Tanzanian government has undertaken various measures to reorganise public service institutions to enhance accountability and efficiency in service delivery. One measure taken is the relocation of the Ministry of the government has developed a new performance management system, which comprises a performance plan, implementation, and assessment. In the new system, the performance goals and targets are developed with the involvement of each staff member. The heads of sections approve the performance plan online. This includes monitoring implementation and assessment. The objective assessment has now taken its course. Those who perform well and those who cannot meet the targets are revealed by the system, and there is no room for favouritism or subjectivity. The most

important thing is the disclosure of the ghost workers. Now, ghost workers can easily be removed online. For improving its use, the PEPMIS system is now incorporated with other systems such as the new Human Capital Management Information System (HCMIS) and the online registration system by the National Identification Authority (NIDA), making it easy and efficient to access employee information, simplifying various processes, including promotions (PURA, "PURA 2024).

Employees in government institutions can submit their work in progress to their superiors through the system. This suggests that with a new performance management system, the president is empowered to control the entire public service. For example, in the most recent report, the president could discover that 40% of public servants were not performing to the required standards. Therefore, changing the institutions for performance management in the public service has increased presidential power to control the public service. With the new system, it is now easy to address the everlasting problems of the manual process of shuffling hard-copy documents from one office to another, but also sometimes across districts (Said, 2025; below 2025).

Some problems associated with the new system have been self-evident. One emerging problem is the salary transfer process after a change in duty station. Although the digitalisation of the performance management system increased timely transfers of salaries for employees changing their duty station, the process has been very slow, and the employees are transferred without their salaries, which remain stuck in their old stations. Worse still, the responsible employees struggle with phone calls and emails, the responsible human resources officers do not take necessary actions on time, and sometimes they do not respond to emails or phone calls. It is rare for calls to go through or for emails to get a reply. The employees, especially in the rural areas, find it difficult to use PEPMIS for performance reviews because internet services go down most of the time (below 2025; URT, 2025). Finally, the training workshop does not completely cover the required knowledge; it does not include the package, which offers knowledge on what employees with problems can do if the system does not work for them. All these flaws create room for a lack of accountability and corruption for employees who are looking for shortcuts (below 2025; URT, 2025).

Regional Administration and Local Government under the President's office

This relocation was designated to increase accountability of this ministry under direct control by the President, but also to reduce corruption of public servants, especially those with a direct interface with service recipients. It also increases the power of central government oversight and coordination of local government performance in service delivery (URT 2024c). Substantial achievement has been witnessed as now the president, through this ministry under her office, is in control of the delivery of basic social services like health, education and water. Her frequent visits to regions and audits of the

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Social Norms and Values vs Presidential Control

Over the past two decades, the Tanzanian government has implemented various strategies, including policy, institutional framework, and code of ethics, to combat negative social rules and values in the public service. One of these initiatives is the development of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP). The most recent form of this plan is phase IV, which is expected to run between 2023-2030. The plan is designed to engage various stakeholders, including public and private sector organisations and civil society, in the fight against corruption. Another initiative is the development of the Public Procurement Act and a Code of Ethics and Conduct for Public Officers and Tenderers Engaging in Public Procurement in 2021. The code of ethics is designed to ensure that the procurement systems are transparent and comply with the value for money. As an outcome of the code of ethics, the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) has digitalised the tendering process through the National Electronic System for Tendering (NeST) to enhance efficiency and reduce corruption (URT 2023b). But, in 2020, the code of ethics for public leadership was revised to ensure that all public leaders comply with moral values and principles in their conduct and they refrain from the conflict of interest and in the year 2023, the code of ethics for all public servants was also revised to ensure that they comply with ethical values and principles governing their conduct in the public service. Overall, all these efforts were to promote good governance principles and reduce corruption in the public service. Contrary to expectations, the government institution responsible for the prevention and combat of corruption investigated to uncover the trend of good governance,

especially for the public servants involved in the procurement process. The report revealed that in 2024, the scale of the problem of corruption for the officers involved in the procurement process was still large (URT 2024c).

Despite the anonymous efforts used consistently in different phases of government, the recent report by the Prevention and Control and Combat of Corruption Bureau shows that in Tanzania, unethical behaviours, corruption and fraud are still major obstacles for an effective public procurement system. For example, in the years 2018/2019 and 2022/2023, more than two hundred and fifty-five public officials were involved in corruption-related offences in procurement, and 71 of them were convicted. Others were given fines or imprisonment (URT 2024a).

Additionally, the unethical practices in local governments, the institutions that are closer to people and that are responsible for local-level service delivery and public service in general, are still a major pathology. This is associated with the violation of public service rules and procedures. The increased irregularities and public service officials guided by public service values extend to the extent of considering public service as a favour to service recipients. When citizens seek a service, they are compelled to exchange with things like lunch (Bakari, 2024; Mtanzigazya, 2024).

Discussion

This paper has examined how the president uses politicisation and centralisation of bureaucracy to control the public service in Tanzania, and how institutional reform and reorganisation of the public service institutions, together with the existing social rules, influence the presidential control over bureaucracy.

Politicisation and centralisation are prominent presidential control tools in any political system. In the Tanzanian context, the presidents have consistently applied these tools to make sure that the public service is under control both at the local and regional levels of government. Unlike the previous phases of government, the current government in power witnessed various appointments, transfers and removals of public servants from public office. The appointment and removal of public officials have been subject to discussion and criticism from the media and public. Some argue that the appointments have wielded presidential power and show that the president is in control of public service, while others argue that the appointments have not improved the performance of political appointments and the public service in general. While competing arguments come from both sides, the evidence from the review of government reports, the media-reported information and the audit reports has also shed light on some improvements in policy-specific sectors like transportation, communication, water and health service delivery. There is no doubt that these achievements are a result of the good

performance of public servants in those sectors under the supervision of presidential appointees. With regards to centralisation, the research shows that most decisions, especially in the current phase of government, are made from the centre. The national-level government issues directives and guidelines that the lower-level bureaucrats are required to follow. In the same vein, the research indicates some signs of the positive outcome of the centralized decision-making, including budgetary control and, to a certain level, the reduction of corruption to some extent. The digitalisation of revenue, budgetary systems and procurement systems helps to make centralised decision-making work better.

The political appointments have largely compromised the professionalism in the public service, and sometimes, the appointed politicians have undermined the presidential priorities through more emphasis on performance than competency in public service delivery, but also, some bureaucrats have failed to meet the intended targets through bending rules and failing to be accountable to their duties and responsibilities. These assertions are consistent with Lameck (2024), which shows that political interference in the public service has reduced professionalism of public servants, but also with the research by Wangwe et al. 2023), which shows that appointed politicians often interfere with the professionalism in the public service. According to Wangwe et al., the interference by political leaders serves the interests of the president who appointed them to those positions.

Regarding centralization, excessive centralisation of decision-making in public institutions has caused more harm than success in service delivery as central government officials influence local councils, limiting their autonomy to manage their human resources, finances and service delivery. The centralisation trend in the past five years has reduced the capacity of local government officials, who are close to people, to respond to presidential priorities, especially on the delivery of basic social services such as health and education, and the maintenance of local road infrastructure. The government has made various efforts, for example, the establishment of the Tanzania Rural and Urban Road Agency, but this agency (TARURA) is still under the control of the central government. The agency is not connected to local needs regarding roads and infrastructure. Most times, it works in isolation with directives from central government agencies and ministries. These findings are consistent with other government reports, which show that the capacity of local government has been diminished in the areas of human resources, financial management, and service delivery. This undermines the intended benefits of decentralisation and citizens-centred service delivery (URT 2024b), but also with Kessy (2023), which shows that centralisation trends in Tanzania have limited the autonomy and capacity of local government authorities to deliver goods and services in line with the preferences of the local population.

On the other hand, reorganisation and restructuring of public service institutions have appeared as a priority in the current phase of government. The goal of reorganising the public service institution has been to increase efficiency in public service delivery. Several reorganisations and institutional reforms were done at the centre of government. One mega reorganisation presented in the findings is the relocation of the regional administration and local government ministry to the president's office. This ministry is now reporting directly to the state house, and most of the activities of this ministry are directly managed by the state house. With the new arrangement, most of the basic services like education and health care are directly managed through directives and supervision from the statehouse. In this regard, many primary school classrooms and infrastructure have been constructed, and the president directly appoint the district executive directors and municipal directors. These findings are consistent with Howell and Lewis (2002), who argue that reorganization can be used to create new institutions or merge the existing institutions to increase government efficiency.

Nevertheless, the reorganization can also cause some problems, for example, although some signs of improved performance have been reported, including the increased enrollment in primary schools, increased health care services and dispensaries, the local level service delivery has not improved to the required standards, and some services do not reflect the preferences of the local citizens. Apart from that, the use of a digital performance management system has been coined as a panacea for controlling staff performance in the public service. With the system for managing performance, the shortfall of performance assessment has been reduced, and the performance plan for employees has now become easy with all records and plans conducted online. However, some challenges remain, including resistance to change and data privacy concerns, especially in institutions that lack a performance-based culture, but also lack of adequate training and infrastructure. These findings are consistent with the other research. They show positive outcomes in performance management including reduced ghost employees. The integration of digital platforms to evaluate public employees' performance in real time to make it easy to track individual performance indicators and integrates feedback mechanisms has significantly reduced manual reporting and improved civil service efficiency (Karlsson & Lepa 2024). Other scholars like Bakar et al. (2024), Tefurukwa and Ahafianyo (2025) reaffirmed that the introduction of the new system is likely to reduce the problem of ghost workers, which seriously harms the socioeconomic development of the country. The new system has improved transparency in assessment with digital tools, reducing unfair performance evaluations, promoting fairness, and enhancing employee motivation, particularly when accompanied by adequate digital literacy and managerial training. Other scholars also agree with the negative outcome, such as a lack of adequate resources and infrastructure for using the system, which is still

constraining the effective use of the system and realization of the intended goal, but also staff lack the necessary skills and knowledge. For example, the research by Bakar et al. (2024) shows that the implementation of the system has shown initial improvements in employee record keeping and performance-based promotions.

In the same vein, in Tanzania, the system has capacitated the employees to set their work targets, the supervisors to review and approve tasks, and the ministries to generate performance reports in real time (Athuman 2023). In Dodoma, for instance, a 2024 study revealed that departments using PEPMIS recorded faster task reporting and better alignment with ministerial work plans (Jilala & Nyoni, 2024). However, recurring issues such as poor internet access in rural councils, limited system training for supervisors, and inconsistent feedback mechanisms have created dissatisfaction among civil servants (Anosisye & Nyoni, 2024). Finally, social rules and regulations acceptable in a particular context are an important determinant of the behavior of public servants. The current phase of government has taken several measures to reduce unethical practices of public servants and to improve their performance. One of the measures taken to review the code of ethics for public servants and public leadership and now there is the code of ethics for public servants of 2023 and the code of ethics for public leadership of 2020. Additionally, the government has developed the national anticorruption strategy and action plan running from 2025 to 2030. Despite these initiatives, the government audit reports have consistently reported on unethical practices and irregularities in the public service. The public servants perform well when they have a positive perception of their role, and are protected by their professional norms. They work in an agency culture that emphasises ethical standards and a corruption-free zone (Kamugisha, 2019; Nivol, 2021), which shows that the ability of SLBs to implement policies effectively is frequently hampered by conflicting demands, limited funding, and political pressures.

Conclusions

Overall, the lack of adequate bureaucratic responsiveness to presidential priorities and agendas has been a major ill of the Tanzanian administrative system for public service delivery. So far, the government has undertaken various measures to address this problem. Some of these measures are the appointment and removal of public servants who are not meeting the expectations. In this way, the president appoints his representatives at different levels of government. The appointed politicians and officials must deliver the presidential priorities in their jurisdictions. Centralisation is another measure in which the President makes key government decisions from the headquarters. These decisions are implemented through directives and instructions to lower levels of government. Another measure is reorganization, in which the president reorganises the public service agencies to make sure that the

agency missions meet the interests of the president. Through these measures in Tanzania, the presidents in different phases have consistently reformed the public service, centralized the administrative system, and reorganized the public service institutions. In the current phase of government, reorganization and digitalizing the performance management system emerged as strategies in use by the president to control the public service. In this way, merging some organizations but also creating others, and enacting new regulations, was witnessed as a measure for increasing efficiency in public service delivery. Some achievements noted have been the improved governance system and participatory performance planning, monitoring, and assessment. While this is a good sign, unethical practices and corruption are still prevalent in the public service. This limits bureaucrats' responsiveness to presidential priorities. The mixed results are explained by anecdotal literature, which shows that human behavior is not always rational. This suggests that the behavior of public servants is regulated not only by formal rules and regulations, which are designed and implemented by the government, but to a larger extent by agency culture, professional norms, and role perception.

Therefore, government officials should be aware of the fact that public servants are driven more by a desire for self-interest than public interest. In order to address this problem, the government can take various steps. Firstly, centralization and appointment in the public service must be balanced with decentralization to avoid excessive centralization, which limits local autonomy to provide services in line with local preferences. Central government oversight should be limited to policymaking, supervision, and monitoring. Secondly, the reorganization plan must consider staff capacity in the new merged institutions or split institutions because capacity is important and a condition for responsiveness to presidential priorities. Thirdly, training, especially for the new performance management system, must be in progress to make sure that the complete package is provided to all employees and supervisors in the public service. Invest more resources and training to improve digitalized management systems. This includes improving supervisory engagement, training, and integration with broader human resource strategy factors. Fourth, the national-level government must develop an agency culture that promotes a performance-based culture through ethical leadership. In this way, the public service institution can promote exemplary leadership, which acts as a role model, and in that way, it can promote professional norms and develop a system for rewarding ethical culture. Sixth, the government must develop new guidelines for professional norms for public servants and public leaders to ensure adherence to ethical norms. Finally, the government must educate appointed politicians about the limitations of their jobs and the need to promote professional autonomy and competence in the public sector service.

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