The Theory of Fragmented Federalism: Explaining Authority Overlap, Institutional Competition, and Governance Outcomes in Nepal's Multi-Level Governance System

Abstract

Federalism, as an evolving framework of governance is a promising design to address the political diversity, deconcentrate power and deliver better public services. In the post-Constitution of Nepal 2015 era, a multi-level system of federalism with the intention of cultivating cooperation, coordination and collective accountability between and among the federal, provincial and local levels was created. However, its operation has been hobbled by sustained coordination failures, unclear jurisdiction, institutional conflicts and policy incoherence. Although, extant literature on cooperative federalism, competitive federalism, fiscal federalism, and multilevel governance provides illuminating understandings, these explain poorly the ongoing disintegration in the federal arrangement. Against this, in this article, the Theory of Fragmented Federalism is put forth as a new analytical paradigm to make sense of how authority overlap, institutional competition, and coordination deficits condition the performance of governments. Adopting a conceptual theory building strategy, the article weaves together the most recent studies on federalism, governance, institutionalism and intergovernmentalism, against the back-drop of Nepalese post-2015 federal governance practices. The study argues that by causing institutional competition and coordination deficit between and among levels of government, overlapping authorities condition the poor policy implementation, administrative coherency, accountability and service delivery outcomes. The article thus presents a theoretically unified explanation of fragmented governance with important implications for improving the functioning of federal systems, that necessitates to develop clear constitutional mandates, effective intergovernmental institutions, and solid mechanisms for coordinated decision making and action