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The Impact of Criteria and Flexibility in Nepal's Rebel-Military Integration Program

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Abstract

The integration of rebel combatants into regular forces is often a political negotiation for power. Several examples from the past show how such pursuits have brought about mutinies and communal violence and pushed the countries back to instability. Current literatures do not provide success stories from which crucial elements of rebel-military programs can be extracted for implementation in future programs. The thesis statement presented by the study is that conflicting parties need to invent options for mutual gain, which can be achieved using flexibility and standard criteria when all other means to achieve an agreement fail. In this regard, Nepal's rebel-military integration process presents a unique case where former Maoist militias were integrated into the Nepali Army as individuals and after fulfilling the toned-down institutional criteria requirements. Using a qualitative design, the study of the rebel-military integration program in Nepal identified the areas within the program that adopted adequate flexibility and criteria fulfillment, and explored how those potentially led to the successful integration of ex-Maoist combatants into the Nepali Army. In order to analyze this information, secondary data such as the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007, the

Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), 2006, integration program documents, journal and news articles, and organizational reports were reviewed. For the cross-validation of information, Key Personnel Interviews were conducted with program executives and Nepali Army representatives, and Focus Group Discussions were conducted with regular as well as integrated soldiers.

Keywords: Rebel-military integration, Nepali Army, ex-Maoist combatants, reconciliation, Nepal's integration model, individual integration

Background

After a decade long insurgency from 1995 to 2006, the interim government of Nepal and the rebel group, Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) Maoists¹ signed a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) on 21 November 2006, which paved the path for a peacebuilding process in Nepal. As in most intra-state armed conflicts, the conditions for the re-integration of Maoist combatants quickly started to become a major matter of discussion within the peace building process. Moreover, the number of combatants to be integrated into the Nepali Army or the discussions for the possibility of a National Army, mostly brought

¹ Hereafter referred to as Maoists.

about by the Maoists, began creating tensions in the very beginning of the peacebuilding process (Bogati, 2015).

The management of rebel combatants is one of the most crucial pieces of a peacebuilding process. Internal conflicts resulting in civil wars or insurgencies always involve a sizeable number of militias who need to be reintegrated into the society in the post-civil war context. Often, the management of the militia involves integrating them into the security forces- mainly the military. This is primarily initiated by political interest and/or for power bargaining. The insurgent groups coming into any peace process do not have complete faith in the government, and thus, the inclusion of their militias in the security force, especially the military, becomes a viable option for them. The very same lack of faith may have been the case for the Maoists coming into the peace process. Therefore, they kept pushing for a new National Army, especially after the party came victorious in the 1st Constitutional Assembly (CA) elections, and even though the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (2006), annexed to the Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007), stated that only properly registered combatants would be eligible for possible integration into security forces (Nepali Army, Armed Police Force, Nepal and Nepal Police) after fulfilling their standard norms (Government of Nepal, 2006).

The Problems

The notion of a new National Army was unacceptable to the government and Nepali Army especially since it could compromise the professionalism and morale of a force that had successfully contained the insurgency. Although the push for a National Army settled

over time, the Maoist leadership insisted upon integrating their combatants only into the Nepali Army and not the other security forces as laid out in the CPA. This disconnect between the groups was a major hurdle in the peace process as the combatants needed to be managed quickly.

Another related problem centered on the number of combatants to be integrated into the Nepali Army. The problem was often fueled by incidents such as Prachanda's video footage leak via Image Channel, where he proudly boasted having fabricated the numbers of combatants to 35000 initially, and further explains that had he not done that, the final verified number would have been much less- only about 4000 (Image Channel, Jan. 2008). Regardless of the actual number, an "irregular" force would be coming into a professional organization, the management of which was going to be a concern for the Nepali Army. A significant concern was that any issue in the integration of the combatants could hinder the peacebuilding process and destabilize an already fragile peace process.

The Formal Beginning of the Combatants' Integration

After a series of homework by the Special Committee, a body of Political representatives of all major parties formed to facilitate the care, integration and rehabilitation of the verified Maoist Combatants, a seven-point agreement was reached between the political parties on 14 April 2012 (Baisakh 02, 2069 B.S.). This agreement led to the approval of Maoist Army Combatants Integration Procedure (MACIP) on 15 April 2012, which finally opened up the formal avenue for the integration of up to 6500 Maoist combatants into the Nepali Army (MACIP, 2012). Many ex-combatants opted for the Voluntary

Retirement Package thus reducing the initially estimated 6500 to the final integrated number of 1460. Many hardliner Maoists criticized their party's decision of prioritizing retirement package as an action of surrender since that would only leave a handful to be integrated into the Nepali Army (BBC, 2012).

Approximately eight years have passed since the 1460 Maoist combatants (71 Officers and 1389 Other Ranks), who fulfilled the basic agreed-upon criteria for integration were formally integrated into the Nepali Army (Ghimire, 2012). Fortunately, no significant issues or incidents were reported anywhere during this period. This is surprisingly contrary to many international examples from countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, etc. where integration of rebels/combatants into the army led to the resurfacing of conflict in the form of coups and communal violence. This led to the question, "What factors worked in the case of rebel-military integration in Nepal?" This research aimed to explore these key implementation factors of the combatants' integration model in Nepal and analyze how these factors affected the transition of the combatants.

Literature Review and Research Significance

So far, very little research has been conducted to analyze the degree of impact of militia integration process on their performance and greater security provision. While the aim of such integrations is to facilitate peacebuilding, these challenges often contribute to prolonged transitions and recurrence of conflicts. Thus, the case study of the relative success of the combatants' integration program in Nepal is important to put into context of existing literature on the

integration of rebels/combatants into security forces, especially the military.

Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) studied rebel-military integration agreements between 1945 and 1999 to understand how such agreements could help build peace, and to analyze conditions for successful implementation of such agreements. The study suggested rebel-military integration had not effectively contributed to peacebuilding and that poorly structured and incomplete integration agreements were associated with failures in peacebuilding. While this may be true, it cannot be denied that success of rebel-military integration is crucial for peacebuilding and to avoid the reoccurrence of conflict through the recently settled parties.

An empirical study on the integration of unregulated anti-Taliban militias (Arbakee) into the Afghan Local Police in 2011 and 2012 suggested a rise in the militias' performance and their improved perception in the eyes of the population (Gosztonyi, Koehler & Feda, 2015). The case of militia integration in Nepal is slightly different since the Maoist combatants were the rebel group in Nepal contrary to Arbakees, who were formed to resist the Taliban rebels locally. Therefore, the evaluation of the Maoists combatants' performance as a part of regular force and their perception in the eyes of the general public is expected to be different.

In a recent United States Institute of Peace (USIP) special report, Derksen (2019) explores the three potential models of military integration for the Taliban force in Afghanistan viz. full military integration (merging Taliban into a reconstituted national force), integration of intact groups (integration of intact Taliban units into existing state security forces), and reintegration of individual

fighters (integration of Taliban militias as individuals into the existing state security forces. Derksen argues that full military integration such as of Burundi would be the most viable option for Taliban and that the other two may not be as functional, especially the 3rd option for integrating militias as individuals as conducted by Nepal. The basis behind this argument is the potential loss of influence (political power) for the Taliban. While the influence may be a relevant factor, it is important to analyze the resurfacing of Burundi crisis of 2014 and analyze a broader sample of examples such as DRC and Ivory Coast where integrated former rebels became the cause of series of crises that followed.

Baaz and Verweijen (2013) argue that biased incentive structures promoted army desertions in the DRC that fueled inter as well as intra-community conflicts and led to the further unmaking of an already breaking army. The M23 rebels (formed out of formerly integrated militias) blamed the Congolese government for not living up to its terms. Similarly, the series of mutinies in Ivory Coast since 1990, and mainly the three events of 2017 illustrate the obstacles associated with the “*influence factor*” in rebel-military integration as loyalty of major mutineers (who too were former rebels) were found to lie with their leaders rather than the state (Schiel, Faulkner & Powell, 2017). Although financial consideration was the cause of initial conflict, influence factor seems to have fueled mutiny in Ivory Coast similar to DRC.

Despite the large number of civil wars settlements after WWII, the factors constituting an ideal military integration is still unknown. The practices of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR),

though highly endorsed by the international community for quite some time as a post-conflict peacebuilding mechanism, have not been able to avoid the reoccurrence of civil wars. In addition, scholarly studies on military integration have not only been limited, but they have made a general focus on the formal rules rather than the actual implementation of political agreements at the program level (Krebs and Licklider, 2015).

Most of the existing literature focus on the causes of the reoccurrence of conflict or violence after the integration of rebel forces into the military. Some highlight the financial incentives as the catalyst for rebel-military integration. However, there is a decent gap in the literature as to what aspects of the rebel-military integration program actually work. The literatures do not adequately address what aspects of the program fulfill the needs of those rebel combatants being integrated into security forces. The significance of this study is that it will analyze the key implementation aspects of the rebel-military integration program in Nepal, a deeper understanding of which might benefit the implementation of future rebel-military integration programs.

Research Design

This research primarily followed a qualitative design to identify and explore the key aspects of the Maoist combatants’ integration program in Nepal that applied criteria and flexibility. The primary data were collected using focus group discussions (FGDs), and key personnel semi-structured interviews, the details of which are given in the table below-

Table 1

Primary Data Source and Sampling

Primary Data Type	Sample Size	Sampling Units
FGD	12 (2 groups of 6 each)	Both integrated and regular soldiers 1 Different ranks 1 Genders
Interviews	4	1 Integration Special Committee 1 Integration Technical Committee 1 Situation Center 1 Military Organization Department

Note. The different ranks included Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs), Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs), and Officers.

With regards to the secondary data, the Comprehensive Peace Accord (2006), the Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007), the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (2006), the Seven-point Agreement on the Integration of Combatants (2012) and the Maoist Army Combatants’ Integration Related Procedure, 2069² were reviewed together with various journal articles, agency reports, online news portals, and Nepali Army reports as well as organizational data.

Findings and Discussions

The data analysis involved a qualitative exploratory approach in order to analyze the causal variables as discussed in the preceding research design section. The different sources of data allowed data-triangulation in order to better explore which elements of the program applied criteria and flexibility and to what degree, as well as how they impacted the integration process. The details are discussed in the subsequent sections-

Use of Objective Criteria

The Role of Integration Committees. The primary and secondary data both suggested that government had opened space for up to 6500 Maoist combatants of the total verified 19,602 to be integrated into the Nepali Army as long as they fulfilled the basic requirements of the security forces. The Maoists leadership, especially after being victorious in the first Constitutional Assembly Elections in 2008, tried to enforce the idea of a new National Army time and again, but weren’t successful. The data suggested that the Special Committee comprising of members from all major political parties of the time including the Maoists and the Technical Committee comprising of politically appointed experts to support the Special Committee played a vital role in the process. Participants in the Key Personnel Interview highly appreciated the role of the lead of technical committee, Retired General Bala Nanda Sharma in the overall process.

“Whenever the Maoists tried to enforce the idea of a National Army, we would present to them the terms and conditions of the CPA which clearly stated that eligible combatants would be considered for integration into the existing security forces fulfilling their

² The year 2069 here is per Nepali B.S. calendar format.

standard norms.” (Key personnel interview respondent, Special Committee Rep., April 09, 2021)

The enforcement of the objective criteria at the policy level by these committees was found to play an important role in the rebel-military integration process which ultimately led to the integration of 1460 eligible Maoist combatants into the Nepali Army.

The Requirement to Fulfill NA’s Criteria.

This requirement was also a part of the Comprehensive Peace Accord. Although the fulfilment of standard criteria seemed to create many tensions in the initial years of combatants’ integration preparation, mainly at the political level, the primary data suggested that majority of the integrated soldiers (former Maoist combatants) were happy with its imposition after eight years of the integration process.

“The reason it was so conflicted back then was because most of our cadres had 4th to 5th grade academic background. How would they have been able to perform basic official job if criteria was not applied?” (Respondent-6, integrated combatants’ FGD, May 09, 2021)

“You could perform without education as a rebel, but it would be a really uncomfortable situation if you could not perform basic tasks or trainings due to the lack of education.” (Respondent-3, integrated combatants’ FGD, May 09, 2021)

The above discussion helped narrow down two critical elements of the integration process, a) a political-professional committee structure facilitating the integration process, and b) the integration of militias as individuals fulfilling Nepali Army’s standard norms.

Flexibility and Trust

The review of primary and secondary data suggested application of good degree of flexibility in different areas of integration negotiations in order to facilitate integration of combatants. The overall process followed a unique format largely different from Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process. Unlike a DDR process, where a neutral third party would monitor the combatants and their weapons in assigned cantonments, Nepal’s process was unique. The program was inclusive of Maoist counterparts in all the program procedures through Joint Monitoring and Coordination Committee (JMCC) chaired by UNMIN, which was responsible for supervising compliance of Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, (Government of Nepal, 2006).

“The Maoist representatives held keys to the arms storage; a calculated risk taken to build trust since the Maoist political structure was not adequately controlling the Maoist combatants.” (Key Personnel Interview, Situation Center Rep., April 06, 2021)

Although Maoists senior leaders were initially rigid about the army integration numbers, the primary data suggested that they reasoned with the availability of more voluntary retirement package to the combatants in the second round of option selection. The interviewee representing Special Committee praised the role of development partners including the World Bank, for making the funds available for the voluntary retirement package. The review of “Final List of Maoist Combatants at First and Second Phase of Re-Classification” (See Appendix A) suggested that in the second phase, 6577 of the total 9705 (who initially opted for army



integration) opted for voluntary retirement, therefore leaving the remainder interested number for army integration to 3123 after deducting 5 combatants (3 no-shows and 2 death cases).

Flexibility in recruitment criteria was a critical step towards army integration. The review of the Maoist Army Combatants’ Integration Related Procedure, 2069 suggested alterations in the standards for education (1-level down), age (flexibility for up to 3 years over-aged), marital status, and training period as shown in the table below (See Appendix B).

Table 2

Training Period Comparison

Training Category	Regular Training Period	Integration Training Period
Officer’s Basic	18 months	9 months
Non-Commissioned Officer’s Basic	9 months	7 months

Note. The data reflects the regular training period as of 2012. (Source: Nepali Army)

The secondary data suggested flexibility in the recruitment process as well. Per the recruitment board’s integration exams report, three Maoist combatants who had applied for integration as Officers and failed to fulfill the criteria were accommodated into the interview process for Junior Commissioned Officers or JCOs.

This uniquely flexible structure seems to have positively influenced trust-building between the parties, which is one of the foundations for peacebuilding and reconciliation. The

above examples indicated significant efforts from both sides toward development of options for mutual gain, which Fisher, Ury and Patton (2011) lay out as one of the four important steps for a win-win outcome in a conflict together with ‘separate people from the problem’, ‘focus on interest, not position’, and ‘objective criteria’. It appears that the application of a trust-based, flexible, and situation-specific model can be identified as another crucial element of the rebel-military integration process.

Uniform Criteria for Welfare, Training and Appointments. The secondary data (See Appendix C) also suggested that only 477 integrated soldiers of all ranks remained to participate in U.N. missions, which would account for approximately 33% of the total 1460 integrated combatants. While U.N. mission participation concern was expressed by a good amount of focus group respondents, the Army seems to have made progressive efforts towards reconciling these concerns by phasing out the dual criteria and enrolling everyone into the regular (uniform) selection criteria as in any other military welfare.

“We have uniform criteria for all military welfare ranging from residential facilities, scholarships, loans etc. We had separate U.N. Mission selection criteria for the integrated combatants until 2018 (2075 B.S.). From 2019 (2076 B.S.) onwards, we integrated it to the regular selection process based on seniority.” (Key Personnel Interview, Military Organization Department Rep., April 13, 2021)

Similarly, regarding the day-to-day tasks, training and critical appointments, no deliberate biases were found in the data. The primary data from both the regular and integrated FGDs suggested that integrated

soldiers were assigned rank-appropriate appointments as assigned to any regular soldier and participated in regular training programs. At the officer's level, a training eligibility concern was identified. Integrated officers with Bridge Course direct appointment to a Captain or a Major was unable to attend the Army Command and Staff College (ACSC) course selection exams, because he/she did not fulfill the other training criteria at the junior level. The integrated officer participant confirmed that this was not the case for those integrated officers who were integrated at a slightly junior level and were able to fulfill the other training requirements leading up to ACSC course. In addition, the majority of the regular FGD participants agreed that the performance of the integrated group had enhanced with time and regular training.

"We don't get different treatment. We work as one. Group tasks, regular exercise, etc. all are done as a unit". (Participant-4, Integrated Combatants' FGD)

"I feel like we have reconciled well. I was a platoon commander during my U.N. Mission. I haven't felt any biased treatment. I too am as invested in the organization. Few incidents may be individual cases, but do not represent organizational action." (Participant-6, Integrated Combatants' FGD, May 09, 2021)

"We do not say regular or integrated anymore. Apart from a few that have some disability, everybody else is doing good in their respective appointments and assignments. (Participant-2, Regular Soldiers' FGD, May 09, 2021)

The key personnel interviews suggested that the transitional training called Bridge Course also fulfilled training uniformity in many ways. Regular soldiers go through intensive

training before they are promoted to various ranks. A direct integration to various ranks through the basic training would mean a great deal of risk in the performance of integrated soldiers. The interviews suggested that this risk was thoroughly assessed by program experts during program development thus requiring all integrating ranks to go through a flexibly modeled Bridge Course.

"We were aware that without a bridging course, the integrated combatants would not be able to perform their rank-appropriate duties. This was also a major concern for the army. Therefore, the Bridge Course was adopted as a program criterion." (Key Personnel Interview, Technical Committee Rep., March 23, 2021)

Both focus group discussions suggested that because of the Bridge Course, a sense of mutual respect prevailed. Therefore, the incorporation of the Bridge Course in the Maoist Army Combatants' Integration Related Procedure, 2069 (See Appendix B) was found to play a crucial role in a healthy reconciliation through professional development and empowerment.

Recommendations and Conclusion

The study suggested that the overall mindset of the integrated soldiers towards the organization and their colleagues was fairly positive and vice-versa, which was a crucial indicator of overall positive integration. While concerns such as promotions and mission participation remained visible at the individual level for the integrated soldiers, the same concerns applied to the regular soldiers as well. Moreover, these were procedural and general eligibility-based issues and did not reflect institutional bias against one party. The crucial elements of the rebel-military

integration program, which facilitated in the integration of ex-combatants into the Nepali Army, were found to have adequately incorporated the use objective criteria and applied reasonable level of flexibility in order to achieve the desired results without compromising the professionalism of Nepali army and the larger peace process.

Based on the findings, the key recommendation of the study is to include relevant experts (political, civilian, and security forces) at varying levels of rebel-military integration programs. Doing so would ensure that potential program risks are assessed thoroughly and standard criteria are applied as required. The experience of the experts would be the key to the identification of areas where certain degrees of flexibility can be applied without undermining the integrity of the program, the organization, and the entire peace process.

The other recommendation is that greater degree of flexibility on standard criteria be applied only at individual combatants' level and not when rebel-military integration is being done in intact units. Applying too much flexibility on the latter is likely to undermine the professionalism of the organization and more importantly, the overall peace process.

Though initially surrounded by several challenges and doubts, the rebel-military integration outcomes at various stages have reinforced the overall peacebuilding process in Nepal. The program brings about several crucial elements from eight years of program experience, which can be applied to future rebel-army integration processes by improvising them to the local needs. The findings suggest that criteria fulfillment and reasonable degree of flexibility were the foundations of Nepal's rebel-military

program and the application of the very same might bring about similar results in future rebel-military integrations.

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Appendix A

(Unofficial Translation)

Final List of Maoist Combatants at First and Second Phase of Re-Classification

S. N.	Cantonment	Number of combatants opting for adjustment in the first round of reclassification	Number of combatants opting for voluntary leave in the second phase of reclassification	The number of combatants currently in the Cantonment (Coming to adjust)			Remarks
				Male	Female	Total	
1.	Ilam	796	548	228	20	248	
2.	Sindhuli	805	446	325	34	359	
3.	Chitwan	2214	1589	570	55	625	
4.	Nawalparasi	1282	798	436	45	481	
5.	Rolpa	1287	763	500	23	523	
6.	Surkhet	1559	987	551	21	572	
7.	Kailali	1762	1446	303	12	315	
Total		9705	6577	2913	210	3123	

Note:

- a. Three combatants (2 from Nawalparasi and 1 from Rolpa) who opted for integration in the first phase have not come in contact so far.
- b. 1 died in Nawalparasi and 2 died in Kailali and the total number of combatants coming for integration is 3123.

Appendix B**(Compact Version Unofficial Translation)****Maoist Army Combatants' Integration Related Procedure, 2069**

Meetings of the Special Committee on Monitoring, Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist Combatants constituted pursuant to Article 146 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2063 BS. In accordance with the seven-point agreement reached between the political parties, a procedure has been issued for the integration of Maoist combatants in the context of bringing the combatants of the Maoist under the control of the Nepali Army and giving the responsibility of security of those Cantonments to the Nepali Army.

2. Formation of Directorate General

- a. As per the Seven-point Agreement, a Directorate General will be formed under the Nepal Army for the integration of Maoist combatants. Under the Directorate General, there will be National Development Directorate, Directorate of Industrial Security, Directorate of Forest and Environmental Protection and Disaster Management Directorate.

5. Trainings

1.2 The training phase will be as follows:

- a. Basic Training - After passing the selection phase, separate trainings will be conducted for officers and other ranks,
- b. Rank Specific/ Bridging Training - Training regarding appointment according to rank will be given.

1.3 The duration of the training will be as follows:

- a. For Officer's Basic Trainings - 9 Months,
- b. For Recruit's Basic Trainings – 7 Months,
- c. There will be 3/3 month rank special training for people of all ranks.

Appendix - 1

1. c. The Maoist combatants joining the integration will have to meet the criteria of the concerned security forces individually. But flexibility will be adopted in the criteria of age, education and marital status. Flexibility will be adopted in education up to one level and up to three years of age for the rank prescribed on the date of enlistment to Maoist Combatants.



Appendix C

(Unofficial Translation)

Details of Integration Troops' participation in the UN Peace Keeping Mission

Particulars	Rank			Total	Remarks
	Officers	JCOs	NCOs		
Troops participated in the peacekeeping mission	61	83	618	762	The total participated officers number includes 4 that have already retired
Troops not yet participated in the peacekeeping	10	-	467	477	This total only reflects the number of integrated soldiers currently serving

Annex 1

Focus Group Discussion Questionnaire- Regular Soldiers

1. How did you feel when you realized that the army integration was actually going to happen?
2. What were some of the initial challenges the former combatants faced?
3. What were some of your own initial challenges in coping with your former adversaries?
4. How has your relationship evolved over the years? How has the organization facilitated it?
5. How do you rate the work ethics and professionalism of the former combatants?
6. Are there any extra-curricular activities you mix-in together besides your regular duties?
7. Do you feel like either parties have forgiven each other and moved on or are there still some grievances?
8. Do you have any current concerns about the integration process? Is there anything that needs to be improved for the betterment of military functions?
9. Not a single bad incident has been public since the integration process started. What could be the reason behind this?
10. Lastly, are there any indicators that tell you whether they have integrated well or if they haven't?

Annex 2**Focus Group Discussion Questionnaire- Integrated Soldiers**

1. Given the available integration options, what were some of the factors that attracted you towards military integration?
2. What were some of the challenges that you faced in the initial days of integration?
3. How was your relationship with the regular soldiers initially and has it evolved over the years? How has the organization facilitated it?
4. Now that 8 years have passed since the integration, what is your current opinion about criteria fulfillment? Do you think it was a necessary means or a means of restriction?
5. Were there any difference in the treatment you had expected/ heard and the actual treatment you received during/after integration?
6. How do you rate the support you receive from your regular counter parts?
7. Are there any biases in promotions, assignments, and welfare?
8. Do you have any current concerns about the integration process? Is there anything that needs to be improved for the betterment of military functions?
9. Not a single bad incident has been public since the integration process started. What could be the reason behind this?
10. Lastly, do you feel integrated in true sense? If yes, what has facilitated this? If not, what are the reasons and what can be done about it?

Annex 3**Key Personnel Interview Questionnaire**

1. What was your role in the integration process?
2. What were the hopes of military versus then Maoist party out of the integration program?
3. What were some of the initial challenges in your role? Would you please mention how you went about tackling those challenges?
4. What are some of the decisions at different levels that you think were key to the initiation of the integration process?
5. What aspects of individual human needs were considered in the integration program?
6. Did the policy consider individual empowerment of combatants through army integration process?
7. How did the policy ensure short-term and long-term reconciliation?
8. Could you please give examples of the items that were most debated? What options were generated to resolve those items?
9. Do you have any current concerns about the integration process? Is there anything that needs to be improved for the betterment of military functions?
10. Not a single bad incident has been public since the integration process started. What could be the reason behind this?
11. Why do you think the 3rd option of integration (education, training, entrepreneurship package) was taken out?