

Approaches and Determinants of Intergovernmental Coordination in Nepalese Federalism

Raj Kumar Adhikari*

Abstract

This paper focuses on identifying and analyzing the major approaches and determinants that are critical for Inter-governmental coordination/relation between and among different tiers of government in the context of Nepalese federalism. This paper is based on the review and analysis of the findings of various researches which tries to incorporate some tested approaches and some valid determinants that are fairly responsible to trigger the effective coordination and relation between federal, provincial and local government. The paper tries to conceptualize two terms coordination and relation as mutually inclusive concept rather than exclusive, so appears interchangeably as overlapping concept. Classical hierarchical approaches advocate coordination based on some procedures and defined workflow prevail in most formal organization. But network approach relies on mutual needs and is basically horizontal. Whereas contingency approach is combination of both wherever situation demands. Determinants that can excel or impede coordination are resource dependency, legal or structural coordination, communication, trust, power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Finally the paper argues that to better up the intergovernmental coordination/relation formal/informal communication, level of resource dependency, legal and structural bindings, trust factors matters.

Keywords: Inter-governmental coordination, Inter-governmental Relation, Communication, Resource Dependency, Structural Coordination, Power Distance

1. Background

In federal state like Nepal, in principle, federal government, provincial governments and local governments are constitutionally authorized to make their own decision for which they are responsible to do. In other word beauty of Nepalese federalism is division of state power (political, fiscal, administrative, judicial) to federal, provincial and local government. Major essence behind this division grant autonomy to tailor policies as per local needs, circumstances and preferences so forth. Executing federal system in Nepal is still in early stage and long way to go for maturation. Event though, the division of power and existence of overlapping jurisdictional authority in federal system provides ample spaces for both opportunities and challenges for intergovernmental coordination. As far granting autonomy to government units are important in federal system,

* Director, Inland Revenue Department

Email: rkadhikari123@gmail.com

intergovernmental relation (IGR) in another word intergovernmental coordination (IGC) also have its crucial meaning at the same juncture. In this article intergovernmental coordination tries to widely cover coordination between and among the government organizations across the different levels of government. Why coordination between governments is important? Many studies revealed that coordination helps avoiding negative externalities (Kennett, 1998), harmful competition (Behnke, 2014; Braun, 2006; Wasserfallen, 2015), and intergovernmental conflict (Cameron and Simeon 2002; Parker 2015; Wasserfallen 2015; Watts 2008). It can prevent incoherencies, inconsistencies, fragmentation, redundancies, contradiction, and duplication (Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010; Jensen, Koop, and Tatham 2014; Peters 1998; 2015). By coordinating, governments can realize economies of scale (Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010; Painter 1998), engage in policy learning (Fußglistler 2012; Fußglistler and Wasserfallen 2014; Wallner 2014), and achieve equity in public service delivery (Thorlakson 2003, 16; Bolleyer 2006) (as cited in Schnabel and Hegele, 2021). Better coordination broadly relies on better intergovernmental relation which means better understanding of roles and responsibilities of each government unit, better interaction between and among different level of government organizations and be better in developing trust amongst the governments for the sake of improving their ability through effective relationship.

Never ending debate about intergovernmental relationship in federalism all over the world lies in “autonomy versus control and collaboration versus competition” (Radin et al., 1996). Intergovernmental relation and intergovernmental coordination are used often interchangeably and still relies on conceptual messiness. It is quite difficult to separate or draw demarcation between these two concepts from where intergovernmental coordination turns into intergovernmental relation and vice-versa, this is because these two concepts themselves are intertwined and entangled with each other. It is very hard to find commonly and widely agreed definition of both, even though both of these terms are widely used and wider spread day by day in various disciplines. Article 232 of constitution of Nepal states that “the relations between the Federation, Provinces, and Local levels shall be based on the principles of cooperation, co-existence and coordination.” Spirit of the Constitution as stated above emphasized coordination and cooperation as crucial tools of intergovernmental relation in the Nepalese federalism. Hence, there is no alternative to strengthen intergovernmental coordination and cooperation for the sustainability and political stability of federalism in Nepal. In this article author tried to illustrate determinants of interorganizational coordination across government units in the context of Nepal based on literature reviews, legal provision, institutional set up established for better intergovernmental relation and its approaches in practice in light of brief theoretical and conceptual review of the concept and research findings from the globes. In light of these author tries to envisage way forward to strengthen intergovernmental coordination to sustain new political change.

2. Concept of Coordination

Defining coordination is a complex task. Pressman & Wildavsky (1973) presented coordination as something often aspired to but rarely achieved. Furthermore, "coordination has been the subject of a good deal of study, there is still some confusion about its meaning, a great diversity of theory, and too little knowledge about its practice" (Alexander, 1993, p. 329). But, coordination as an important administrative phenomenon holds important roles and meaning for effective performance. Because scholar illustrates that coordination may well be the philosopher's stone of public administration (Seidman, 1970). It is central not only to the tasks of public administrators but also to the larger questions of the discipline (Morris *et al.*, 2007). From an analytical perspective it can be defined as

the purposeful alignment of tasks and efforts of units or actors in order to achieve a defined goal (Verhoest & Bouckært, 2005 in Lægried *et al.*, 2014). According to Hall *et al.* (1976) as cited in Bouckært *et al.*, 2010, p. 15) coordination can be defined as "the extent to which organizations attempt to ensure that their activities take into account those [activities] of other organizations." This definition focused on coherent deal towards the common goal between and among organizations. Comfort (2007) defines coordination as "aligning one's actions with those of other relevant actors and organizations to achieve a shared goal" (p. 194). Attempts to coordinate government policy-making and service delivery across organizational boundaries are not a new phenomenon; coordination is a traditional doctrine of public administration (Kavanagh & Richards, 2001; Ling, 2002; Hood, 2005 in Lægried *et al.*, 2014).

3 Approaches of Coordination

3.1 Classical Hierarchical Approach

Classical hierarchical view is built on the work of Gullick (1937) and Taylor (1911), along with Dahl (1947) and Simon (1947). Hierarchy is used to establish control, specify tasks, allocate responsibilities and reporting procedures, and presumably gain reliability and efficiency in work flow. This approach works reasonably well in routine circumstances when there is time to plan actions, train personnel, identify problems and correct mistakes (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006, p. 312). But the mega disaster situation is sudden and out of the scope of routine functions. Uncertainties and chaotic environments create tufts and difficulties to work in regular administrative path in such extreme events. "Under cumulative stress, hierarchical organizations tend to break down, and personnel are hindered by a lack of information, constraints on innovation and an inability to shift resources and action to meet new demands quickly" (Comfort, 1999). Effective coordination, from this perspective, is about dividing responsibilities within an organization and establishing clear links between functions. Or if we are speaking of interagency coordination, this view sees coordination as something occurring between units rather than between individual workers (Morris *et al.*, 2007).

Coordination in this model is an internal process, highly reliant on interdependence between actors (Cheng, 1983 cited in *ibid.*). The classical hierarchical model is strong in terms of accountability and role definition, and it excels at the performance of routine, repetitive tasks. On the other hand, such arrangements are highly inflexible, and adaptation and change are antithetical to these structures (Morris *et al.*, 2007). Moreover, under urgency and stressful situation highly inflexible hierarchical structure impede greatly in developing inter-organizational coordination (IOC). Because "more difficult is the task of integrating multiple agencies and jurisdictions into a smoothly functioning inter-organizational, inter-jurisdictional response system" (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006, p. 310). Most modern organizations, both in the public or commercial sectors, tend towards bureaucracy. Bureaucratic organization is at its best in areas where standardized functioning must be applied to familiar routine tasks. It is at its worst in unusual situations requiring initiatives (Granot, 1997, p. 307). Chisholm (1992) evokes some strength and weakness of hierarchy-based coordination, this approach to coordination functions well analytically so long as the organization or organizations involved are well integrated from top to bottom and they have a clear mandate about what to do. If organizations are structured more loosely or are involved in complex policy areas requiring multiple information exchanges and interactions with a number of different organizations the efficacy of hierarchy is reduced.

3.2 Network Approach

A second approach seeks to understand coordination as the interaction of interdependent actors outside traditional hierarchical structures (Agranoff 2006; Kettl 2003; O'Toole 1997; O'Toole & Meier 1999; Wise, 2006). Instead of being based on top-down authority and position, network coordination between organizations is based on a mutual need for sharing resources, authority, knowledge and technology, using negotiation and mutual adjustment instrument (Morris *et al.*, 2007, p. 95). In Mintzberg (1979), the term "mutual adjustment" is used as a loosely structured and informally arranged type of coordination for achieving a collective goal. Collective goal or shared goal appeared as pre-requisite feature for network coordination. According to O'Toole (1997) network-based approach places much less emphasis on formal, hierarchical, top-down authority mechanisms and instead recognizes that interdependence is not based simply on authority and position (as cited in Morris *et al.*, 2007, p. 94). Peter (1998) argues that the network perspective on co-ordination has the additional advantage of being more open to the role of non-governmental organizations than are more traditional conceptions of the actors.

In the public sector, network-based coordination is more common when there is a need for horizontal coordination among diverse organizations. It is less formal, less hierarchic, and more based on voluntarism, spontaneity, and solidarity. This form of coordination is frequently found when there are actors congregating in mutual dependence around specific issues (Mintzberg, 1979). The network model is a highly flexible and adaptable structure that can bring varying resources to bear on different problems as they arise, though, is also the network's most significant weakness: because its actions fall outside formal lines of authority, accountability is greatly reduced and diffused among multiple players (Morris *et al.*, 2007).

Setting up a network is useful for achieving coordination in cases where information is scanty. Also diverse, heterogeneous and complex environment therefore demands network-based coordination (Jamil, 2014, p. 5). Network based coordination denotes collaborative action and information sharing amongst mutually dependent organizations in order to achieve a common goal (Verhoest *et al.* 2010). Network approaches might be better suited to address the lack of authority common in many organizational settings; they also fall short when it comes to accountability and measuring of performances (Wise & Nadar, 2002).

Defining network is crucial task while describing its conceptual rationale in the field of intergovernmental relation due to its (un)commonality in use. Different scholars defined a term network differently according to their nature of research. O'Toole (1997 defined a term "network" as:

Networks are structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the other in some larger hierarchical arrangement. Networks exhibit some structural stability but extend beyond formal established linkages and policy legitimated ties. The notion of networks excludes more formal hierarchies and perfect markets, but includes a wide range of structures in between. The institutional glue congealing networked ties may include authority bonds, exchange relations and coalitions based on common interest, all within a single multiunit structure (p. 45).

Kapucu (2005) used the term network to describe multi-organizations relations as:

a network is a group of individuals or organizations who, on a voluntary basis, exchange information and undertake joint activities and who organize themselves in such a way that their individual autonomy remains intact (p. 35).

Network approach of intergovernmental relation Radin et al. quoted that

“(network) approach has developed around intergovernmental relations that emphasizes the importance of bargaining, negotiation, and networking as essential processes of decision making rather than traditional hierarchical command and control approaches or formal structures as venues for decision making. This approach flows from the overlapping authority model and highlights a movement away from a “sorting-out” of intergovernmental roles to an interdependent approach. It focuses on the development of interorganizational networks that include both governmental and nongovernmental actors and proceeds along a path that includes the acceptance of the independent and separate character of the various members, avoidance of superior-subordinate relationships, interfacing of political and career actors, inclusion of appropriate specialists when needed to focus on technical issues. and agreement to abide by tasks and goals (Agranoff; 1986).

This approach includes both the process and substantive nature of contemporary issues. It suggests that different processes must be used to reach decisions. But it also draws on the policy notion of issue networks. This concept, developed by Hugh Hecl, is viewed as a “web” of largely autonomous participants with variable degrees of mutual commitment or dependence on each other.

3.3 Contingency Approach

Both Classical and network model itself are not freed from their own strengths and weaknesses. When it comes to the complex task, neither model is entirely appropriate. The hierarchical approach suffers from the fact that managers in multi-organizational settings often lack authority over other organizations, making it also difficult to establish such clear top-down linkages. An additional problem is that the hierarchies can be too rigid and slow to adapt to the sudden changes and unanticipated problems (Wise, 2006, p. 311). On other hand, network approach falls short when it comes to accountability and measuring performance (Wise & Nader, 2002).

In regard of this, Kettl (2003) suggested next approach named as contingent coordination- "a hybrid approach to coordination in which separate and distinct actors at the different levels of government, each with its own formal hierarchical structure, work collaboratively when the situation demands cooperation." Hence in Contingency approach "coordination can take place in both traditional hierarchical and network-based approach" (Morris *et al.*, 2007: p. 96). Coordination is obtained both under hierarchical and network forms of authority, but Kettle (2003) suggests that "different actors, both within and outside of traditional hierarchical organizational structures, must collaborate with each other."

As a theoretical approach in coordination, Alexander (1995) elucidates contingency theory as "the single organizations' adaptation to its environment" (p. 10). In his work, to clarify his opinion, author cites Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) in this way "there is no one best organizational form or strategy, but that these are contingent on the situation in which the organization finds itself." Hence, contingency theory also suggests encompassing organizational adaptation as well for effective IOC. Basically, this applies to the voluntary adjustment of an organization to other organizations which make up its environment (Alexander, 1993).

Analyzing approaches of intergovernmental coordination and cooperation from IGR perspectives, scholars of federalism emphasized two conceptual approaches to their study of relationships between levels of government: the legal or structural approach and the study of fiscal relationships between jurisdictions. The legal or structural approach concentrated on the constitutional system of shared and separate powers defined by type of institution as well as level of government and the allocation of formal responsibilities and authorities within that system. The study of fiscal relationships focused on the allocation of taxing responsibilities and the patterns of transferring funds from one level of government to another.

Some scholar suggests different model of IGR. The inclusive authority model assumes that the national government plays the superior role and will control dealings with other levels of government. The coordinate authority model emphasizes the autonomy of States; local governments are viewed as total creatures of the state and the national government's dealings with the state assumes that both parties are separate and distinct. The overlapping authority model, by contrast, conveys several messages: many areas of policy require national, state, and local involvement; the areas of autonomy and discretion for any single jurisdiction are limited; and levels of governments require bargaining and negotiation to obtain adequate power and influence to carry out programs (Hanf, 1978; Agranoff, 1990 cited in Radin et al., 1998).

Hence, in literatures contrasting views or approaches or model appeared regarding IOC/IGR. Even though regarding effective intergovernmental relation all approaches of vertical and horizontal coordination described above are relevant according to the situational demand as well as functional relation between and among the government. Constitution of Nepal has given state power to the sub-federal governments and established the relationship between the federal levels as non-hierarchical. However, like in a hierarchical order, the federal government has powers to give necessary directions on national interest and on matters relating to coordination between the provinces, and it is the duty of the province to abide by such directions. In case of not following the direction, the federal government shall suspend or dissolve the provincial parliament and provincial government for a period of six months (Art. 232). Moreover, the federal government may directly, or through the provincial government, give necessary directives to the local governments. As per the Constitution, the local government must mandatorily follow the directives.

4. Determinants of Intergovernmental Relation/Coordination

Coordination as a phenomenon is not a new concept, have enriched with the emergence of various theoretical approaches or models or frameworks. Likewise, many seen or unseen factors that can plays critical role either to strengthen or weaken IOC/IGR. These factors in this paper are considered as determinants of effective IOC/IGR.

4.1 Resource Dependency

Resources whether they are monitorial or non-monitorial are inevitable for the operation of any types of organized units of government. New patterns were revealed in the development of interorganizational relationship overtime one is perceptions of dependence on others for resources spurs the development of interorganizational relations, Resource dependence is a powerful direct determinant of communications, resource transactions and consensus, and the another is the growth of interorganizational relationships is fostered by frequent communications to formalize the relationship among the parties involved.

4.2 Legal or Sstructural Coordination

In many cases, due to the worth of coordination for better yield of any tier of government some legal or mandatory forums are provisioned by specific laws as well. The Constitution of Nepal has provisioned the Inter-Provincial Council (Art. 234) chair by prime minister to settle political disputes raised between the federal and provincial governments and among provinces as well. Besides this, the Constitution also has the provision to form a constitutional bench in the Supreme Court (Art. 137) in the case of disputes over constitutional jurisdiction between the various spheres of government.

At province level, Section 105 of the local government operation Act 2017 provides a legal basis for coordination between province and local level government, a legal forum named as Province Coordination Council in every province under the coordination of the chief minister of the province. It comprises provincial ministers, chief secretaries, secretaries, heads and deputy heads of district coordination committees of the province, chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of rural municipalities, and mayors and deputy mayors of municipalities, with the secretary of the ministry responsible for local level acts as the member secretary of the council. The aim of these councils is to synergize the policies of provincial and local governments, create strategic cooperation on project management, utilization of concurrent jurisdiction, and coordinate the utilization and sharing of natural resources.

At district level, Article 220 of the Constitution provides for the formation in each district a District Coordination Committee (DCC) elected from among the chiefs and deputy chiefs of all the local governments within that district. The Article provides the DCC with the responsibility of coordinating between local levels in the district; regulating development work; and coordinating between offices of the federal and provincial governments in the district and the local level.

4.3 Communication

Form of communication may be formal or informal as per the means or situation but endure valuable space for betterment of effective IGR. Communication holds core value with coordination because some scholars (Malone & Crowston, 1994) define that coordination as the additional information processing performed when two or more connected actors pursue goals that a single actor pursuing the same goals would not perform (cited in Uddin & Hossain, 2011). Some scholars raised value and effectiveness of informal communication than that of formal for better collaboration. It is further clarified by Chisholm (1992) who raises some factors that make informal communication important than that of formal communication, they are: a) informal communication works more quickly than formal one; b) there are times when formal communication is blocked because of organizational politics; and c) even formal channels may not exist (p. 65-67). "Without information exchange, coordination between the leaders of the response organizations and their personnel, as well as among organizations and between jurisdictions, was delayed and disrupted" (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006, p. 320). Hence, formal and informal communication between and among government and their agencies play important role for wise and meaningful relationship between governments.

4.4 Trust

The notion of trust as a critical dimension of effective inter-governmental coordination is also well supported by the literatures (Gambetta, 1988; Gulati, 1995; Comfort *et al.*, 2003; Stephenson, 2005; Saab *et al.*, 2013). Trust is a psychological state comprising the intension to accept vulnerability

based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another (Rousseau *et al.*, 1998, p. 395). What determines trust between organizations for cooperation? "Trust encompasses not only the belief in the ability of a partner organization to accomplish a task but also the belief in the goodwill or positive intentions of this partner" (Mayer *et al.*, 1995; Serva, Fuller & Mayer, 2005 as cited in Vlaar *et al.*, 2007, p. 410). This emphasizes on belief on ability and goodwill or positive intentions of partner organization.

In trust literatures risk and interdependence are also regarded as necessary conditions for trust. "Risk creates an opportunity for trust, which leads to risk taking...the second necessary condition of trust is interdependence, where the interests of one party cannot be achieved without reliance upon other" (Rousseau *et al.*, 1998, p. 395). From the literatures, it is revealed that organization reputation also play vital role in trust building. Thus, "organizations with a good reputation are considered as trustworthy" (Palttala, 2012, p. 5). Stephenson & Schintzer (2006) also find that reputation...appears to play a significant role in individual willingness to trust others (p. 219). Past relations and working experience between government organizations also hold meaning in trustworthiness and effective IGR. Because, trust develops between partners over a period of time and is contingent upon the past experiences of the partner organizations (Gulati, 1995). Furthermore, professional or academic background may also account while talking about trust. This is because "Trust may be the result of shared values, a history of positive interaction, or common associations of kinship or professional or educational background" (Alexander, 1995, p. 17).

In culture of distrust, cooperation is seldom spontaneous and requires extensive legal apparatuses to control and sanction the implementation of formal contracts and public policies (Askvik & Jamil, 2013). In this juncture, Jamil posits that rules and procedures are replaced by trust and confidence in organizations with high level of trust (Jamil, 2007, p. 67). But, it cannot ignore necessity of certain legal instruments, despite in the situation of high level of trust as well. This is because "it seems that even for high-trusting relationships, it is necessary to spend some effort up-front to make sure that the responsibilities of each party are clearly spelled out" Dyer & Chu (2003, p. 64). It is true that high levels of formal coordination and control can be detrimental to interorganizational performance, because "they may entail cumbersome, overregulated, and impersonal processes that individuals are forced to adhere to" (Beck & Kieser, 2003, p. 794). It impedes flexibility "that is needed for coping with complex, ambiguous, and unstable task environment (Vlaar *et al.* (2007). Furthermore, distrust curtails effective IOC, because "distrust entails low degree of information exchange and limited opportunities for observing and learning from partners" (Maguire *et al.*, 2001 as cited in Vlaar *et al.*, 2007). Hence, "building of trust creates confidence and more confidence enhances the level of expectation toward each other which leads to effective coordination" (Kamrul, 2010, p. 30).

4.5 Power Distance

According to Hofstede *et al.* (2010) power distance is defined as "the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally" (p. 61). Power distance measures the extent to which relationships between superiors and subordinates are egalitarian or hierarchic (Jamil, 2002, p. 109). About PD, Hofstede argue that in an organization where there is large power distance, power is centralized as much as possible in a few hands: subordinates expect to be told what to do. Hence, power distance determine how power distributed among the members and less and less power distance enhance the more and more effectiveness in intergovernmental relation. Despite having clear functional lists of exclusive

and concurrent power for the spheres of government according to the constitution of Nepal, there might be more space for avoiding power distance for their effective execution. This is because more power distance between different level of governments weaken the decision making capacity of others.

4.6 Uncertainty Avoidance

According to Hofstede et al. (2010) it is defined as the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations (p.191). In short, it concerns to what extent members of a culture perceive threatened by unknown situation. For example, in bureaucratic culture where great uncertainty prevails then will tend to create formal rules and regulation to avoid uncertainty. Uncertainty avoidance is different from risk avoidance. "Rather than leading to reducing risk, uncertainty avoidance leads to a reduction of ambiguity. Uncertainty-avoiding cultures shun ambiguous situation. People in such cultures look for structure in their organizations, institutions, and relationships that makes events clearly interpretable and predictable" (*ibid.*, p.197-198). Authors further differentiate weak and strong uncertainty avoidance at work and organization as:

Table 1: Key differences between weak and strong uncertainty avoidance in work and organization

Weak Uncertainty Avoidance	Strong Uncertainty Avoidance
There should be no more rules than strictly necessary.	There is an emotional need for rules, even if they will not work.
Tolerance for ambiguity and chaos.	Need for precision and formalization.
Belief in generalists and common sense.	Belief in experts and technical solution.
Top managers are concerned with strategy.	Top managers are concerned with daily operation.
Focus on decision process.	Focus on decision content.
Better at invention, worse at implementation.	Worse at invention, worse at implementation.

Adopted from Hofstede et al. (2010, p. 217) with slight modification.

Hence, in strong uncertainty cultures are more likely to create and maintain rules than in weak uncertainty cultures, and people in the strong uncertainty culture will tend to avoid situations that may not be easy to tackle. So, state of organization culture of uncertainty avoidance perceived by different government also determine the level of effectiveness between government relation and collaboration.

5. Conclusion

Relation between different level of government cannot assessed based on legal provisioning, structural and institutional set up only. It is broadly depends upon the level of coordination, collaboration and cooperation as well. Besides these, organizational culture like power distance and uncertainty avoidance, level of trust, resource dependency, means and frequency of formal and

informal communication and many more also exhibit critical role for effective intergovernmental relation. Interestingly most of the political and bureaucratic leaders of the different level of governments evoke the importance of intergovernmental coordination for effective IGR but exceptionally very few are committed to internalize this truth for collaboration. In our context effectiveness of intergovernmental council is still not realized as per the spirit of our constitution as well as our context deemed to mature the execution of baby federalism. Overlapping of plan and projects, weak coordination, lack of effective and timely dispute settlement are some counter products of ineffective intergovernmental relation. Various study evident that mixed or combined approach (both hierarchical and network approach of coordination as per the context or situation demand) of coordination will be the fruitful to establish good intergovernmental relation to achieve the common goal of federalism i.e. prosperous nation. Determinants or driving forces of coordination, collaboration and cooperation whether they are formal or informal, seen or unseen, hierarchical or non-hierarchical must indulge in our intergovernmental relation process regardless of political, economic and social biases.

References

- (1993). Interorganizational coordination: Theory and practice. *Journal of Planning Literature*, 7(4), 328-343.
- (2002). Administrative culture in Bangladesh: Tension between tradition and modernity. *International Review of Sociology*, 12(1), 93-125.
- Alexander, E. R. (2014). *How organizations act together: Interorganizational coordination in theory and practice* (Revised edition). Routledge Taylors & Francis Group.
- Askvik, S. & Jamil, I. (2013). The institutional trust paradox in Bangladesh. *Public Organization Review*, 13, 459-476.
- Beck, N. & Kieser, A. (2003). The complexity of rule systems, experience, and organizational learning. *Organization Studies*, 24, 793-814.
- Bouckaert, G., Peters, B. G. & Verhoest, K. (2010). *The coordination of public sector organizations: Shifting patterns of public management*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chisholm, D. (1992). *Coordination without hierarchy: Informal structures in multiorganizational systems*. University of California Press.
- Comfort, L. K. & Kapucu, N. (2006). Inter-organizational coordination in extreme events: The world trade centre attacks, September 11, 2001. *Nat Hazards*, 39, 309-327.
- Comfort, L. K. (1999). *Shared risk: Complex system in seismic response*. Pergamon Press.
- Comfort, L.K. (2007). Crisis management in hindsight: Cognition, communication, coordination, and control. *Public Administration Review. Special issue, Hurricane Katrina*, 188-196.

- Dyer, J. & Chu, W. (2003). The role of trustworthiness in reducing transaction costs and improving performance: Empirical evidence from the United States, Japan, and Korea. *Organization Science*, 14, 57-68.
- Granot, H. (1997). Emergency interorganizational relationships. *Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal*, 6,(5), 305-310.
- Gulati, R. (1995). Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38, 85-112.
- Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J. & Minkov, M. (2010). *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival* (3rd ed.). McGraw Hill.
- Jamil, I. (2014). Inter-organizational coordination in urban governance in Bangladesh: A tale of two cities. *South Asian Journal of Policy and Governance*, 34(1), 1-22.
- Kamrul Ahsan, A. H. M. (2010). *Problems of coordination in local administration in Bangladesh*. M. Phil. Thesis. University of Bergen.
- Kapucu, N. (2005). Interorganizational coordination in dynamic context: Networks in emergency response management. *Connections*, 26, 33-48.
- Kettl, D. (2003). Contingent coordination: Practical and theoretical puzzles for homeland security. *American Review of Public Administration*, 33,(3), 253-277.
- Lægried, P., Liiv, T. R., Rykkja, L. H. & Sarapuu, K. (2014). Introduction: Emerging coordination practices in European public management. In Lægried, P., Sarapuu, K., Rykkja, L. H. & Liiv, T. R. (Eds.). *Organizing for coordination in the public sector*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Local Government Operation act (2017)* . Law Books Management Board (2017) .
- Mintzberg, H. (1979). *The structuring of organizations: A synthesis of the research*. Prentice Hall.
- Morris, J. C., Morris, E. D. & Jones, D. M. (2007). Reaching for the philosopher's stone: Contingent coordination and military's response to hurrican katrina. *Public Admnistration Review, Special issue*, 94-106.
- O'Toole, L. J. (1997). Treating networks seriously: Practical and research based agendas in public administration. *Public Administration Review*, 57, 45-52.
- Peters, B. G. (1998). Managing horizontal government: The politics of co-ordination. *Public Administration Review*, 76, 295-311.
- Pressman, J. L. & Wildavsky (1973). *Implementation*. University of California Press.
- Radin, B. A., Agranoff, R., Bowman, A. O., Buntz, C. G., Ott, J. S., Romzek, B. S., & Wilson, R. H. (1996). Intergovernmental Relationships: Tensions and the Search for Solutions. In *New Governance for Rural America: Creating Intergovernmental Partnerships* (pp. 12–50). University Press of Kansas. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2mgg2t6.7>

- Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S. & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. *The Academy of Management Review*, 23(3), 393-404.
- Schnabel, J. & Hegel, Y. (2021). Explaining intergovernmental coordination during the covid-19 pandemic: Responses in Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland. *The Journal of Federalism*, 51(4), 537-569.
- Stephenson, M. & Schnitzer, M. (2006). Interorganizational trust, boundary spanning, and humanitarian relief coordination. *Nonprofit Management & Leadership*, 17(2), 211-233.
- The Constitution of Nepal*. (2015). Law Books Management Board (2015).
- Uddin, S. & Hossain, L. (2011). Disaster coordination preparedness of soft-target organizations. *Disaster*, 35(3), 623-638.
- Verhoest, K., Roness, P., Verschuere, B., Rubecksen, K., & MacCarthaigh, M. (2010). *Autonomy and control of state agencies: Comparing state and agencies*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vlaar, P. W. L., Van den Bosch, F. A. J. & Volberda, H. W. (2007). On the evolution of trust, distrust, and formal coordination and control in interorganizational relationships. *Groups & Organization Management*, 32(4), 407-429.
- Wise, C. R. & Nadar, R. (2002). Organizing the federal system for homeland security: problems, issues, and dilemmas. *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 62, Special issue, 44-57.
- Wise, C. R. (2006). Organizing homeland security after Katrina: Is adaptive management what's missing? *Public Administration Review*, 66(3), 302-318.