

Apprehension of Kant's Transcendental Argument: An Analysis

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1. Introduction

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804AD), one of the most influential philosopher of modern time, was born in Königsberg (East Prussia). His philosophical work has exerted a major influences on virtually every area of the subject viz logic, metaphysics, mathematics, physical geography, anthropology, ethics, natural jurisprudence, natural theology to count some. Some of the nomenclature used by Kant in the making of his philosophy has been described in the introduction part briefly, which are as follows. Kant states that man has two universe- the being in himself, or the **noumenal** world, where freedom of will and consciousness exist; & the physical **phenomenal** world, the world of appearances. He further states that, we live for the most part in the phenomenal world and we get only glimpses of the noumenal world. This was counter to the views of many empiricists of the time. According to Kant, **a priori** statement is that which can be known through an understanding of how certain things work rather than by observation. However **a posteriori** statement is that which can be known by observation. The main controversy between Kant and Hume is between **a priori** and **a posteriori** statement respectively. Kant argued that philosophy was at its most interesting when dealing with **synthetic a priori** statements. In fact, philosophy must be **synthetic a priori**.¹ So, according to Kant, synthetic a priori truths are those essential truths that are necessary conditions for

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¹ IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON A143(eds. and tr. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (1998).

knowledge to be possible at all. The beauty of Kant's work can be cited in the introductory part of "Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics", in which Kant has opined universal character of metaphysics by stating that, if you think that metaphysics is worth studying, my aim is to convince you of the following: It is absolutely necessary that you stop your work for a while, regard anything that has been done as not having been done, and face up to the preliminary question of whether such a thing as metaphysics is even possible.² If it is a science, why can't it get universal and lasting approval, like other sciences? If it is not, what enables it to go on giving itself airs with its pretence of being a science, keeping men's minds in suspense with hopes that never die but are never fulfilled.

The aspect of Kant's philosophy which will be focusing on this paper is his doctrine of "transcendental idealism." The primary source of literature of our study is, "Critique of Pure Reason, eds. and tr. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant." The notation "A" and "B" of his work at the footnote, suggest respectively about the first and second edition of "Critique of Pure Reason." It should be noted that the three analytical part in the article viz. "primary schema", "secondary schema", and "synthetic schema" are the writer's perspective towards analyzing the Kant's work. It should also be noted that Kant is not a naive philosopher. He was highly influenced by many philosophers in the making of all his work and especially "Critique of Pure Reason." In which he was determined of critical analysis of the two realm of "idealism" prevailed during his time. First one being "rationalist" then existing form of idealism, where the spiritual or ideal realm prevails over other values- represented then by Leibniz; and then new emerging concept of idealism ie. "empiricism", where preference of sense perception is over the idealistic values- represented then by Hume. So, it should also be noted that this article is comparative rather narrative type of analysis.

2. Philosophers Influencing Kant's Perception:

Some of the prominent philosopher from whom Kant was influenced are presented here so that the reader might feel free understanding the concept.

2.1 Rene Descartes (1596-1650AD), French philosopher (and mathematician), presented two principle doctrines. The first was a

² IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS THAT WILL BE ABLE TO COME FORWARD AS SCIENCE. IN THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY AFTER 1781 at ix-xxiv(eds. Henry E. Allison and Peter Heath. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (2002).

comprehensive ***physico-mathematical reductionism***, according to which all observed phenomena were ultimately to be explained by reference to the interaction of particles describable solely in terms of size, shape and motion. The second was a conception of the mind as lying outside the purview of physics, a phenomenon ***sui generis*** whose nature could be grasped only from within, via introspective reflection.³ Although Descartes insisted on the importance of observation and experiment in deciding between rival hypothesis, he maintained that the fundamental axioms of the new science were to be uncovered simply by the innate powers of the human intellect.

2.2 John Locke (1632-1704AD), one of the most influential English philosopher, however was himself influenced by Descartes. For Locke, knowledge must be acquired. Our mental faculties (perception, reason, etc) are natural to us and may be said to be innate; however, it is only through the proper application of these faculties that we can acquire knowledge itself. Locke argues that all ideas are ultimately derived from experience; and experience is twofold: external experience ie 'sensation' and inner experience ie 'reflection'.⁴

2.3 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz(1646-1716AD), prominent German philosopher whose two pairs of concepts are significant. One is that of ***truths of reasons*** which are necessary, and ***truths of facts*** which are contingent. This distinction is associated with two principles: ***law of non-contradiction***, which applies to both kinds of truth and states that what involves a contradiction is false, and the ***principle of sufficient reason***, which applies to truths of fact and states that no fact can obtain and no proposition can be true unless there is a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise.⁵ Leibniz conceives of such reasons as explanatory factors, which are either efficient causes or final causes.

2.4 George Berkeley (1685-1753AD), an Irish philosopher, was concerned to refute materialism for a number of reasons, not because it provided a basis for unbelief, but regarded that something "exist" as a basic problem

³ DICTIONALRY OF PHILOSOPHY 150 (2nd ed., Penguin Publication) (2010).

⁴ JOHN LOCKE, THE WORK OF JOHN LOCKE: PHILOSOPHICAL WORK (Vol. I, London: lieovory G. Bolln, York Street, Covent Garden) (1854).

⁵ GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY 30(eds. And tr. by Roger Ariew & Daniel Garber, Hackett Publishing Co, Indianapolis & Cambridge) (1989).

of philosophy. According to Berkeley material things, such as chair or tree, to exist is to be perceived by our sense; and for non-material things, such as mind or spirit, to exist is perceived by either the senses, the feelings, imagination, or thought.

2.5 David Hume(1711-76AD), a Scottish philosopher (impressed by Isaac Newton's achievements in the physical sciences) presented the idea of placing all science and philosophy on a novel foundation: namely, an *empirical investigation* into *human nature*. Hume sought to introduce the same experimental method of reasoning into the study of human psychology, with the aim of discovering the "extent and force of human understanding".⁶ Against the philosophical rationalists, Hume argues that passion rather than reason governs human behaviour. He introduces the famous problem of induction, arguing that inductive reasoning and our beliefs regarding cause and effect cannot be justified by reason; instead, our faith in induction and causation is the result of mental habit and custom.

3. Understanding Transcendental Idealism: Kant's Primary Schema

This section of the article describes about Kant's basic premises in the making of "transcendental idealism." Without these three pair of premises, which writer has identified, viz "phenomena-noumena world", "analytic-synthetic judgments", and "a priori-a posteriori statement" it would be virtually impossible to understand Kant hypothesis. So, we can exemplify that these are the building block upon which Kant's entire philosophy rests.

3.1 On Phenomena and Noumena World: Representing Respectively 'Appearances' and 'Things in Themselves'

Kant opines that all that we perceive are nothing but representations or appearances. He calls this realm of perception, the realm of intuition, or sensibility. The objects of perception (or intuition, or sense) are called "phenomena." (These are similar to what Locke and Berkeley mean by "ideas") Like Berkeley, Kant says that phenomena are dependent on the mind. If we ceased to exist, the phenomena would also cease to exist. He writes, "They cannot exist in themselves, but only in us." In contrast to phenomena are the "noumena." These are the "things-in-themselves," or (elsewhere) the "transcendental objects." They are the

⁶ DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 10-13(2nd edition, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1978).

objects of the external world. So, they are not sensible things (i.e., they cannot be perceived). He writes, "We do not apprehend them in any fashion whatsoever." Of them, we know "nothing whatsoever." If we could know the noumena, we would know things "as they are"-whereas, to know the phenomena is merely to know things "as they appear." In Kant's view understanding can make only empirical use of all a priori principles, including of all its concepts, however it is not of the transcendental use. The transcendental use of a concept in any sort of principle consists in its being related to "things in general" and "things in themselves." The empirical-use is related merely to the "appearances" i.e. object of the possible experience. Sensibility and its field, namely that of appearances, are themselves limited by the understanding, in that they do not pertain to things in themselves, but only to the way in which (on account of our subjective constitution) things appears to us. So, Kant says that, with us understanding and sensibility can determine an object only in combination. If we separate them, then we have intuitions without concepts, or concepts without intuitions, but in either case representations that we cannot relate to any determinate object.⁷

3.2 On Analytic and Synthetic Judgments: 'Judgments of Clarification' and 'Judgment of Amplification'

A statement is **analytic** if the predicate of the subject is contained in the subject. Tautologies are analytic statements. For example, $2+2=4$; 'every bachelor is unmarried' is true since the predicate 'unmarried' is contained in the subject 'bachelor.' If a statement is not analytic, then the predicate of the statement says something new about the subject, thus we call such statements **synthetic**. For example, 'all bachelor are arrogant'. Here, the predicate 'arrogant' says something new about the subject 'bachelor.'

In Kant's word, in all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought (affirmative judgments), this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In first case I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic.⁸ He further explains stating that, analytic judgments (affirmative ones) are

⁷ KANT, *supra* note 1, at A258/ B314.

⁸ *Ibidem*, at A6/ B10.

thus those in which the connection of the predicate is thought through identity, but those in which this connection is thought without identity are to be called synthetic judgments. One could also call the former “judgments of clarification” and the latter “judgment of amplification”, since through the predicate the former do not add anything to the concept of the subject, but only break it up by means of analysis into its component concepts....while the latter, on the contrary, add to the concept of the subject a predicate that was not thought in it at all, and could not have been extracted from it through any analysis.⁹ Kant further adds, now from this it is clear: 1) that through analytic judgments our cognition is not amplified at all, but rather the concept, which I already have, is set out, and made intelligible to me; 2) that in synthetic judgments I have in addition to the concept of the subject something else on which the understanding depends in cognizing a predicate that does not lie in that concept as nevertheless belonging to it.¹⁰

3.3 On A Priori and A Posteriori Statement: Universal Cognition v Empirical Cognition

A statement is true *a priori* if its truth is determined before experience, or without reference to experience. A statement is true *a posteriori* if its truth follows after experience. That is, its truth can only be determined with reference to empirical evidence.

In Kant’s word, universal cognition (ie reason), which at the same time have the character of inner necessity, must be clear and certain for themselves, independently of experience; hence one calls them *a priori* cognitions: whereas that which is merely borrowed from experience is, as it is put, cognized only *a posteriori*, or empirically.¹¹ He further states that, for if one removes from our experiences everything that belongs to the senses, there still remain certain original concepts and the judgement generated from them, which must have arisen entirely *a priori*, independently of experience, because they make one able to say more about the objects that appear to the senses than mere experience would teach.¹² So, we can say that, *a priori* cognitions, however, those are called “pure” with which nothing empirical is intermixed. Thus, e.g., the proposition, “Every alteration has its cause” is *a priori* proposition,

⁹ *Ibid*, at A7/ B11.

¹⁰ *Id*, at A8/ B11.

¹¹ *Id*, at A2.

¹² *Id*, at A2.

only not pure, since alteration is a concept that can be drawn only from experience.¹³ Emphasizing the importance of reason (*a priori* statement) over experience (a posteriori statement) he asserts that, certain cognition even abandon the field of all possible experience through concepts to which no corresponding object at all can be given in experience. And precisely in these cognitions, which go beyond the world of the senses, where experience can give neither guidance nor correction, lie the investigations of our reason that we hold to be far more preeminent in their importance and sublime in their final aim than everything that the understanding can learn in the field of appearances.¹⁴ He further explains by taking mathematics as an example to explain the expanding nature of a priori cognition. In his word, mathematics gives us a splendid example of how far we can go with a priori cognition independently of experience.¹⁵ Hence, *a priori* cognitions are not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely independent of all experience.¹⁶

4. Understanding Transcendental Idealism: Kant's Secondary Schema

This section of the article describes about Kant's secondary premises in the making of "transcendental idealism." Although these premises are secondary however it enriches in the understanding of the subject matter. The premises are presented briefly in the paper.

4.1 On Space and Time: The Unsolved Mystic: Hypothesis claimed by Newton on space and time is that, space and time are the containers into which things and events may be inserted. Leibniz by the *relational theory* on space and time (opposed Newton), states that, without things there would be no space, and without events there would be no time. Hence, according to Leibniz space and time are not container (as stated by Newton) into which things and events may be inserted but which could have remained empty. So, Leibniz had the view that, without the things place in it, one point of space does not absolutely differ in any respect whatsoever from another point of space.¹⁷ Initially, Kant had the

¹³ *Id.*, at B3.

¹⁴ *Id.*, at A3/ B6-7.

¹⁵ *Id.*, at A4/ B8.

¹⁶ *Id.*, at B2.

¹⁷ G.W. LEIBNIZ, THE PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY KNOWN AS MONADOLGY, at 7(1714). Available at <https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/leibniz1714b.pdf> (Cited on: 23 June, 2019).

claim that, two distinct but absolutely identical portions of space were possible.¹⁸ However he rejected absolute space and absolute motion afterwards.¹⁹ Kant states that, space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences.... Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation.²⁰

He further states that, Space is a necessary representation, a priori, which is the ground of all outer intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, although one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.²¹ Kant adds to his understanding that, "Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relation of things in general, but a pure intuition.." lastly he mentions that, "Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude."²² About time, Kant states that, time is not a empirical concept that is somehow drawn an experience. For simultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception if the representation of time did not ground them a priori. Only under its presumption can one represent that several things exist at one and the same time (simultaneously) or in different times (successively).²³

He further adds that, Time is necessary representation that grounds all intuitions. In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from time. Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is all actuality of appearances possible. The latter could all disappear, but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be removed.²⁴ Kant further states that, this a priori necessity also grounds the possibility of apodictic principles of relations of time, or axioms of time in general. It has only

¹⁸ KANT, *supra* note 1, at A264/ B320.

¹⁹ IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL SCIENCE. Available at <https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1786.pdf> (Cited on: 23 June, 2019).

²⁰ KANT, *supra* note 2, at A23/ B38.

²¹ *Ibid*, at A24/ B39.

²² *Id*, at B 40.

²³ *Id*, at A30/ B46.

²⁴ *Id*, at A31/ B46.

one dimension: different times are not simultaneous, but successive. These principles could not be drawn from experience, for this would neither strict universality nor apodictic certainty.²⁵ He also mentions that, time is no discursive or, as one calls it, general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are only parts one and the same time. That representation, however, which can only be given through a single object, is an intuition.²⁶ Lastly, he states that, the infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible through limitations of a single time grounding it.²⁷

4.2 On Purity Of Cognition: No Experience or Sensation Accepted

Every cognition is called pure, however, that is not mixed with anything foreign to it. But a cognition is called absolutely pure, in particular, in which no experience or sensation at all is mixed in, and that is fully a priori.²⁸ Now reason is the faculty that provides the principles of cognition a priori.²⁹

Hence, pure reason is that provides the principles for cognizing something absolutely a priori. An organon of pure reason would be a sum total of those principles in accordance with which all pure a priori cognitions can be acquired and actually brought about. The exhaustive application of such an organon would create a system of pure reason.³⁰ He further states that, its utility would really be negative, serving not for the amplification but only for the purification of our reason, and keeping it free of errors.³¹

4.3 On Perception and Thought: Should not be Confused With Single Cognitive Faculty

Leibniz hypothesized perception and thought as a single cognitive faculty in the premises of the principle of non-discernible. For the response Kant stated that, by the theory of single cognitive faculty Leibniz (and Wolff) abolished the distinction between phenomena and noumena. Kant

²⁵ *Id.*, at A31/ B47.

²⁶ *Id.*, at A31-32/ B47.

²⁷ *Id.*, at A32/B48.

²⁸ *Id.*, at A11/ B24.

²⁹ *Id.*, at A11/ B24.

³⁰ *Id.*, at A11/ B25.

³¹ *Id.*, at A11/ B25.

states that, Leibniz treated the sense having only the unrighteous task of confusing and distorting the representation of reason.³²

4.4 On Leibniz's Principle of Contradiction: Negated by Kant

The central idea of the "principle of contradiction" of Leibniz is that, a proposition and its negation cannot both be true. Kant refutes this principle by insisting that, opposing forces, "hindering and counteracting processes" operates carelessly in the nature. The opposition of attractive and repulsive forces in physics produces the phenomena of matter, the opposition of good and evil principles in human soul produces morality etc.

4.5 On Principle of Non-discernibility: Appearances Should Not be Confused With Intelligibility

Leibniz hypothesized that, there are never two things in nature which are exactly alike and in which it is impossible to find a difference that is internal or founded on an intrinsic denomination.³³ Kant refutes this hypothesis by insisting that, to insists that any two objects presented to us in experience must be qualitatively different in some respect was, to take appearances for intelligibility.³⁴ ie. in the words of Kant, Leibniz took the appearance for things in themselves.

Thus for intelligibilia ie object of pure understanding Leibniz principle of non-discernible would not be contradictory, but however in the object of sensibility, and the understanding with regard to them is not of pure but of empirical use the principle will not be applicable. For this he explains the phenomena by insisting that, why are we not able to imagine two identical water droplets. Hence, Kant states that, we cannot have two concepts, concepts of two things, that are alike in all their specifications, but we certainly have two empirical objects that are exactly alike.

4.6 On Substance and Matter: No Specification Produced

According to Leibniz "substance" is the indestructible stuff of the universe having various figures and motions, and mostly by no means changes occurred through their contact, pressure, collision, entangling and so on. Matter(or monads) are qualitatively unique, indestructible and indivisible units that also perceived and strove.³⁵ Leibniz believed that the aggregates of monads as objects(substance).

³² Id, at B 332.

³³ LEIBNIZ, *supra* note 5, at 6.

³⁴ KANT, *supra* note 1, at A 264/ B320.

³⁵ Ibid.

Kant does not differentiate between substance and matter, however chooses the word “object” instead for the representation of the both. At some concepts Kant has the understanding with Leibniz and states that, the true nature of mind independent external reality cannot be described by reference to shape, contact or movement, which characterize only the objects presented to us.³⁶ Kant accused Leibniz of taking appearances for things in themselves.³⁷ Kant has attacked the idea by stating that, “things in themselves” that compose external reality are not perceived at all. They are not in causal contact with us, though they affect us in such a way that we experience a sensory world structured according to the categories of time, space, causality and objectionable. Hence, according to Kant, object cannot be “thing in itself” and states that, what we call object is an appearances. He explains as the rainbow is mere appearances relative to raindrops which, in a physical sense are things-in-themselves.³⁸ So, Kant notes an ambiguity in the notion of things outside us ie. object is outside us in space, but not independent.

4.7 On Interrelation between Soul and Body: Perception or Reality!

According to Leibniz, bodies are appearances in visual space founded upon spiritual substances lying underneath the spatio-temporal order.³⁹ According to Leibniz all happenings in the parts of the body are felt distinctly or indistinctly, the sensory organ collect the information of the external world and soul experience them. In other word, Leibniz believes that, human body is a substance and mind is a “dominant monad” which rules over or expresses more distinctly than the subordinate monad comprising the body. While stating this Leibniz in his mind must (surely) have some sort of influence of then anatomist, who believed that there was some faculty in human mind which is the site of interaction of soul and body. So, Leibniz did not believe in the separation of soul and body. Kant initially believed in Leibniz theory however he eventually decided that it was incoherent and came up with his idea in soul and body. For this he said that, because all our experience

³⁶ KANT, *supra* note 1, at A 265-6/ B 321-2.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, at A264/B330.

³⁸ *Id.*, at A45/ B63.

³⁹ G. W. LEIBNIZ, A NEW SYSTEM OF THE NATURE AND THE COMMUNICATION OF SUBSTANCES AND ALSO OF THE UNION THAT EXIST BETWEEN THE SOUL AND THE BODY (1695). Available at <https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/leibniz1695c.pdf> (accessed on: 23 June, 2019).

is experience of ourselves as living being, when soul and body are bound together, we cannot know what a separate soul would experience.

4.8 On Freedom and Agency: Representations Compelling Arguments for Every Event

Leibniz through his “Principle of Sufficient Reason” believed that every phenomenon could be explained or in other words, nothing takes place without a sufficient reason. Not only does everything have a sufficient reason, but all phenomena and events, including celestial motions, the formation of plants and animals, and the process of life are regulated by “Laws of Mechanics” as the movements of the hands are regulated in the watch.⁴⁰ However, he assumes that, God’s necessary existence is the only state of affairs that is caused and does not have a sufficient reason.

Kant, however, criticized the Leibniz principle of “spiritual mechanization” as merely “psychological.”⁴¹ For Kant, reason presents compelling arguments for the inevitable nature of every event. Reason also presents compelling arguments that the human will can influence the course of nature.⁴²

4.9 On Realm of Nature: Idea of Perfect Continuity- an Absurd

Leibniz, borrowing Cartesian claim, stated plants and animals are machine. And refined further (after the discovery of microscope) as infinitely complex machine, machine in their smallest parts into infinity.⁴³ Leibniz claimed universe to be a single mechanical system of deterministically interacting physical parts, designed and set by God.

There was another theory about the realm of nature propounded by Hume, who criticized the causal relations in nature. Hume supposedly stated that there is no foundation for the supposition that nature is sufficiently uniform in reasoning and understanding. He further insists that we are nonetheless always determined to proceed in accordance with this supposition. There is a natural basis or principle for all our

⁴⁰ LEIBNIZ, *supra* note 5, at 7.

⁴¹ IMMANUEL KANT, *CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON* (ed. and tr. Mary Gregor. In *Practical Philosophy*, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (1996).

⁴² KANT, *supra* note 2, at A 445/ B 473.

⁴³ LEIBNIZ, *supra* note 5, at 6.

arguments from experience, even if there is no ultimate foundation in reasoning.⁴⁴ Kant took the confused third path by refuting the rationalist claim that, the parts of a living creature are organized in infinitum.⁴⁵ In other words, Kant claims that the idea of perfect continuity is absurd however he allows the law of the ladder of continuity among creature has regulative importance in natural history.⁴⁶

4.10 On Realm of Grace: The Fallacious Hyper-Rationalism

According to Leibniz theocratic philosophy, God is a king and the world is his kingdom.⁴⁷ In other words, everything that happens exemplifies God's wisdom and justice.⁴⁸ In the existence of God Leibniz Postulated a hypothesis as, God's existence could be deduced from the maximal concept of God as sum of all perfections, only if it was first demonstrated that the God was a possible, not an impossible objects.⁴⁹ Kant criticized the existence of God that departed from the premise that the concept of God is non-contradictory as fallacious hyper-rationalism. Kant stated that, since the existence of God was unknowable, philosophical effort should be directed to the idea of God, especially the separate functions that the idea of God plays in regulating our moral conduct and the mode of address to the problem of form and function in the organic realm.⁵⁰

5. Understanding Transcendental Idealism: Synthetic Schema

In this section of the article, writer has tried to analyze some of the issue in the Kant's transcendental idealism. The prominent being that, if synthetic judgment is possible? And Kant's refutation of idealism.

5.1 An Analysis: If Synthetic a Priori Judgment Possible?

So far we have known that, ***all analytic statements are 'a priori'*** on the grounds that they are logical truths that are true regardless of our experience. They do not require empirical evidence to be proved. Also to our understanding is that, ***all 'a posteriori' statements are synthetic***, as they provide added information from experience, which was not there

⁴⁴ DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE section 5 (2nd edition, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1978).

⁴⁵ KANT, *supra* note 2, at A526/ B554.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, at A668/ B696.

⁴⁷ LEIBNIZ, *supra* note 5, at 6.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*.

⁴⁹ *Id*, at 4.

⁵⁰ KANT, *supra* note 2, at A 812/ B840.

prior to the experience. Which is to be explained as, if I observe a particular chair is red then this is synthetic as the predicate 'is red' is not in the notion of the subject 'chair' ie. we know "red chair" only after observation. The question remains, however, whether there are any ***synthetic statements that are 'a priori.'*** Kant argued that there are, and gives the "idea of causality" as an example of this.⁵¹ Kant opines that, mathematics gives us a splendid example of how far we can go with a priori cognition independently of experience.⁵² He further states that, synthetic a priori judgments are contained as principles in all theoretical sciences of reason.⁵³ He elaborates his idea by stating that, mathematical judgments are all synthetic, natural science (Physica) contains within itself synthetic a priori judgement as principles, and even in metaphysics synthetic a priori cognition are supposed to be contained.⁵⁴

This view can be introduced via an intuitive distinction between those parts of reality which exist independently of the mind, and those parts of reality which seem to owe their existence to their being involved in certain mental acts. Kant argued that philosophy was at its most interesting when dealing with synthetic a priori statements. In fact, philosophy must be synthetic a priori. This was counter to the views of many empiricists of the time. Hume denied that synthetic a priori statements were possible. However, Kant challenged this by arguing that ironically Hume's denial is itself synthetic a priori. Kant argued that the synthetic a priori was essential because it was a part of our cognitive equipment. Hence, "synthetic a priori" truths are those essential truths that are necessary conditions for knowledge to be possible at all.

5.2 An Analysis: Kant's Transcendental Idealism

Kant describes the term transcendental as, I call all knowledge transcendental if it is occupied, not with objects, but with the way that we can possibly know objects, even before we experience them.⁵⁵ It can be illustrated as - if our knowledge is unconditional, ie. lying outside the sensible world, and hence outside all possible experience, then the

⁵¹ *Ibid*, at A143.

⁵² *Id*, at A4/ B8.

⁵³ *Id*, at A10/ B14.

⁵⁴ *Id*, at A7/ B14-18.

⁵⁵ *Id*, at A12/ B26.

ideas becomes transcendental. The transcendental reason separate themselves entirely from empirical use of reason and make themselves into objects whose matter is not drawn from experience. So, the objective reality of transcendental reason rests not on the completion of the empirical series but on pure concepts a priori.

Kant differentiates the transcendental idealism from (traditional) idealism by stating that, as the senses.... never and in no single instance enable us to know things in themselves, but only their appearances, and as these are mere representations....all bodies, together with the space in which they are, must be held to be nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere else than merely in our thought. Now is this not manifest idealism?⁵⁶ Kant further states that, I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but with our a priori concepts of objects in general.⁵⁷ Kant states that, a system of such concepts would be called transcendental philosophy.⁵⁸ In his words, Transcendental philosophy is a philosophy of pure, merely speculative reason. For everything practical, insofar as it contains motives, is related to feelings, which belong among empirical sources of cognition.⁵⁹ Transcendental philosophy consists of **Doctrine of Elements** and **Doctrine of Method** of pure reason. The component of transcendental doctrine of elements consists of: Transcendental Aesthetic, Transcendental logic, Transcendental analytic, and Transcendental dialectic. The component of transcendental doctrine of method consists of: The discipline of pure reason, The canon of pure reason, The architecture of pure reason, and The history of pure reason.

Hence, (as discussed earlier) there are two stems of human cognition, which according to Kant arises from a common but to us unknown root, namely "sensibility" and "understanding", through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought.⁶⁰ Kant says, now if sensibility were to contain a priori representations, which constitute the conditions under which objects are given to us, it would belong to the transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of the senses will have to belong to the first

⁵⁶ KANT, *supra* note 2, at Ch13, Note II.

⁵⁷ KANT, *supra* note 1, at A11/ B25.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, at A11/ B25.

⁵⁹ *Id*, at A15/ B29.

⁶⁰ *Id*, at A15/ B29.

part of the science of elements, since the conditions under which alone the objects of human cognition are given precede those under which those objects are thought.⁶¹ Many of the Kant contemporaries interpret transcendental idealism as essentially a form of phenomenalism. Some think that this is not a metaphysical or ontological theory at all. George Berkeley denied the idea that the existence of matter can be seen as implying a phenomenalist theory.

5.3 An Analysis: Transcendental Realism v Empirical Idealism:

Transcendental realist believes that, space and things in it are entirely independent of us.⁶² Empirical knowledge aims to be knowledge of these 'things outside us': things in space, things in themselves, existing independently of us. However, empirical idealism states that, Perception does not establish the existence of things so understood, we have no knowledge of them, and since that is what knowledge aims at we have no knowledge. So, transcendental realism leads to empirical idealism.⁶³

5.4 An Analysis: Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism:

Transcendental Idealism states that, space and things in it are mere appearance.⁶⁴ We can have no knowledge of things in them, that is, things existing independently of us; rather we have knowledge only of appearances. However, empirical realism states the concept differently as, we do have knowledge of things outside us, though, that is things in space. Since space is ideal, things in space are not to be inferred on the basis of perception, but are rather immediately perceived. So, transcendental idealism leads to empirical realism.⁶⁵

5.5 An Analysis: Transcendental Idealism v Transcendental Realism:

According to Kant, transcendental realist (Leibniz and Locke) mistakenly considers space, time, and objects alike to be real in themselves, independent from human perception. So, according to Kant, they must consider appearances (ie the spatial-temporal objects) as imperfect shadow of transcendental reality.

5.6 An Analysis: Kant's Refutations of Idealism : Kant provides three 'Refutation of idealism', one in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, the other in the second edition and the one in the Prolegomena.

⁶¹ *Id.*, at A15-16/ B29-30.

⁶² *Id.* at A370

⁶³ *Id.* at A369

⁶⁴ *Id.* at A369

⁶⁵ *Id.* at A370

(i) First Edition Refutation of Idealism: Here he complains about idealists, who are here defined very loosely as those who deny or doubt the existence of external objects. They may be dogmatic like Berkeley or problematic like Descartes or Locke.⁶⁶ Skeptical idealism arises from the assumption in philosophers such as Descartes and Locke that we can only infer the existence of material things, as the likely causes of our perceptions.⁶⁷ If the existence of a thing can only be inferred as cause of perceptions, its existence is dubious. Outer appearances are such that they must be inferred as causes of given perceptions. Their existence is therefore dubious. Kant draws a distinction between empirical idealism and transcendental idealism,⁶⁸ according to which Kant states that, the traditional philosophical way of thinking (which he calls transcendental realism) ends up with empirical idealism. So, Locke and Descartes, starting out with the common sense assumption that material objects are independent of us, end up (according to Kant) being skeptical about them.

By contrast, Kant's own transcendental idealism, which denies that material objects are independent of us, ends up with empirical realism. Kant notes an ambiguity in the notion of things outside us i.e. independent of us, or in space⁶⁹. For Kant, matter is outside us in space, but not independent. It can be noticed how empirical realism is construed as dualism: mind and matter both exist.⁷⁰ But matter is not independent of mind.⁷¹ How does this work? Kant assumes here that that immediacy of perception is the key to knowledge. Now the question arises, does empirical dualism solve the problems of transcendental dualism?⁷² How can mind and matter interact? Kant here seems to suggest that matter is not an external cause, but a mere representation.

(ii) The Second Edition Refutation of Idealism⁷³: Consciousness of my own existence as temporal ('determined in time') proves the existence of permanent objects in space outside me. To have an empirical consciousness of my own existence in time, I must have

⁶⁶ KANT, *supra* note1, at A377.

⁶⁷ *Id.*, at A367.

⁶⁸ *Id.*, at A369.

⁶⁹ *Id.*, at A373.

⁷⁰ *Id.*, at A367, A 371.

⁷¹ *Id.*, at A385.

⁷² *Id.*, at A391.

⁷³ *Id.*, at B274-B279.

perceptions of a permanent- which is not the same as permanent perceptions.⁷⁴ Objective experience requires that we make distinctions within the objective world between the different time relations different things have (successive events, persisting things, whose parts co-exist); and between the objective and subjective time orders, the latter always successive, the former having all three time relations.

(iii) The ‘refutation of idealism’ that appears in the Prolegomena:

Idealism consists in the claim that there is none other than thinking beings; the other things which we believe we perceive in intuition are only representations in the thinking beings, to which in fact no object outside the latter corresponds.

6. Conclusion

Following conclusion can be synthesized from the above work. *Firstly*, Kant opines that all that we perceive are nothing but *representations or appearances*. He calls this realm of perception, the realm of intuition, or sensibility. The objects of perception (or intuition, or sense) are called “phenomena.” Kant says that phenomena are dependent on the mind. If we ceased to exist, the phenomena would also cease to exist. He states, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. In contrast to phenomena are the “noumena.” These are the *things-in-themselves*, or (elsewhere) the “transcendental objects.” They are the objects of the external world. So, they are not sensible things (i.e., they cannot be perceived). He states, we do not apprehend them in any fashion whatsoever. Of them, we know “nothing whatsoever.” If we could know the noumena, we would know things “as they are”-whereas, to know the phenomena is merely to know things “as they appear.” *Secondly*, a statement is *analytic* if the predicate of the subject is contained in the subject. Tautologies are analytic statements. If a statement is not analytic, then the predicate of the statement says something new about the subject, thus we call such statements *synthetic*. *Thirdly*, a statement is true *a priori* if its truth is determined before experience, or without reference to experience. A statement is true *a posteriori* if its truth follows after experience. That is, its truth can only be determined with reference to empirical evidence. Hume denied that synthetic a priori statements were possible. However, Kant challenged this by arguing that ironically Hume’s denial is itself synthetic a priori. Kant argued that the

⁷⁴ *Id.*, at B36.

synthetic a priori was essential because it was a part of our cognitive equipment.

Fourthly, Kant argues that space and time are merely formal features of how we perceive objects, not things in themselves that exist independently of us, or properties or relations among them⁷⁵. Object in space and time are said to be “appearances”⁷⁶, and he argues that we know nothing of substances about the things in themselves of which they are appearances. *Lastly*, Kant describes the term transcendental as, all knowledge is transcendental if it is occupied, not with objects, but with the way that we can possibly know objects, even before we experience them.⁷⁷ It can be illustrated as - if our knowledge is unconditional, ie. lying outside the sensible world, and hence outside all possible experience, then the ideas becomes transcendental.

Hence, it can be generalized as, transcendental idealism represents Kant's endeavor of synthesis between “rationalism” **then existing form of idealism, where the spiritual or ideal realm prevails over other values-represented then by Leibniz; and then new emerging concept of idealism ie. empiricism, where preference of sense perception is over the idealistic values- represented then by Hume.** In other word, Kant method is neither rationalist as Leibniz nor empiricist as Hume but the middle way between the two. And the preferred method to the philosophy, according to Kant, is by using *synthetic a priori* method in the hypothetical *noumena* world.

□□

⁷⁵ *Id.*, at A22, A33.

⁷⁶ *Id.*, at A37-8, A42.

⁷⁷ *Id.*, at A12/ B26.