



China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

Sharmila Bagale, M.Phil.

Public Administration Campus, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal

Article History: Submitted 28 June 2024; Reviewed 29 July 2024; Revised 31 July 2024

Corresponding Author: Sharmila Bagale; Email: sarmilakbagale@gmail.com

Article DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3126/mg.v7i1.70034>

Copyright Information: Copyright 2024 © The author/s of each article. However, the publisher may reuse the published articles with prior permission of the authors. This journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License.

Abstract

This article seeks to examine China's Third World Strategy from Mao-Deng-Xi's political eras. The societal tensions emerged in China after 1949, which have arisen as a consequence of its rapid economic expansion in the twenty first century. While China continues to ascend and demonstrate a high potential for further progress, signs of a slowdown in its once-robust economic growth raise concerns about potential implications for social stability in specific regions. China's unparalleled economic presence and influence have been evident in its engagements across Africa, Asia, South Asia, and Latin America. This expansive involvement in the developing world has been a consistent component of Beijing's foreign policy since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Notably, China's foreign policy, particularly post-1990, has remained actively engaged in South Asian regions, shaping a new reality with profound geopolitical implications. For this, it uses qualitative research method to inspect into the political and strategic transformations in regional governance triggered by the resurgence of the third world in Chinese foreign policy. The full extent of the impact of these developments on the world's geopolitical landscape remains uncertain, making it a compelling area of exploration. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China's new strategy for new third world strategy emerged to support the third world countries, and it is an aspiration to be a global power.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, geopolitics, global governance, soft power, twenty-first-century

Introduction

China's land boundaries encompass with fourteen countries Afghanistan,

Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, North Korea, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

Tajikistan, Mongolia, and Russia. China's boundaries have seen many changes over the ages, telling a complicated story as they have evolved historically. Before nineteenth century, the Chinese believed that they ruled over everything under heaven, with the emperor having special rank as the Son of Heaven, including all of humanity. Yunling (2022) China focuses its cordial relations with neighboring countries prioritizing on good neighborliness and amity, good partners and harmoniousness surrounding to improve friendly and beneficial relationship with them. This relation has connection with traditional Chinese ideology and culture, reframed in new global milieu of development in contemporary world. Lowell Dittmer (2010, p. 2) states "China has always been particularly concerned with cultivating and preserving good relations with these borderlands...". For this, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has maintained a longstanding and active involvement with South Asian countries, initially as an ally of India within the nonaligned bloc, which marked an essential moment in the development of a unique 'Third World identity'.

China's Third World policy, originally developed by Mao Zedong, dates back to the early years of the PRC and aimed to unite the Third World against the superpowers of the United States (US) and the Soviet Union in order to organize and mobilize the Third World strategy to form a new international order (Yu, 1977). His rule influenced China's foreign policy as Third World Strategy in order to be safe from big power and develop economic "inward-looking" approach (Alves, 2018, p. 74). The "five principles of peaceful coexistence"—mutual respect for territorial integrity

and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality, and mutual benefit—were established as the foundation of China's Third World policy. In the early years, India led China in terms of developmental indicators, together, they shaped the global and regional framework of peaceful nonalignment and laid the groundwork for the noninterventionist foreign policy. This strain embodied in the *panchsheel* (Five Principles) of Peaceful Coexistence. Yu (1977) further views that China's development and support is for sensible move for both China and the developing world to fight after the crisis of development in capitalist economies.

Mao's strategic leadership focuses on China's internal development and connecting with neighboring countries. China needed a calm international environment when it entered the new age of reform and opening at the end of 1978. Chas W. Freeman (2020) states that China's Third World Strategy i.e. grand strategy is rooted in the nation's past and its historical evolution. [It] traces the various historical and cultural sources of China's contemporary approach to the world" (p. 37). Xi Jinping a new course of strategy emphasizing neighbors and developing countries. These three leaders prioritized friendship in different context for diplomatic initiatives. Balancing China's regional and global ascension and harmony with developing countries always residues constant with changing theme. It has been slightly shifted from previous strategy after 2010 AD. The economic position of China is in new point and it wants to play new role in global order. The important question is why China was in favor of adopting new third world strategy in order to improve

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

economic inward-looking approach and exercise power in the twenty first century.

Literature Review

Mao Zedong formulated the concept of the Third World in 1946, envisioning an “intermediate zone” of nations between two superpowers. He foresaw revolutionary forces in Africa, Latin America, and Asia challenging hegemony, colonialism, and imperialism. The CCP's international assistance to developing nations began post-1955 Bandung Conference and extends to the present, reflecting China's evolving foreign policy from Mao to the Belt and Road Initiative, integrating trade, investment, aid, and technical support. China's foreign policy underwent structural changes from prosperous nation diplomacy to strong nation diplomacy as its economic power grew post-1978 reform and opening up. President Xi's era marks a notable shift towards assertive diplomacy. In the 1990s, China's perspective on multilateralism transformed from viewing it as a tool of Western restriction to an opportunity for its goals, global reputation, and engagement with non-traditional areas. Sandra Gillepie (2004) states that the first world comprises the US, the Soviet Union, the second world refers to Canada, Japan, and the countries of Global North. The third world countries include China, India, countries of Africa, Latin America and remaining Asian countries.

Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham (1998) point out that the three world theory is a Maoist clarification and geopolitical understanding, and the third world comprises economically poor countries including the one hundred and twenty countries of

Non-Aligned Movement. In 1974 Mao's Three Worlds Theory classified the world into three blocks, responding to Soviet revisionism. The Third World, comprising developing nations from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, aligned with China's principles of peaceful coexistence and opposition to hegemony. China's foreign policy, influenced by Mao's philosophy, positioned itself as a leader against superpowers and an advocate for global political and economic reforms. Artyom Lukin (2022) agrees with the ideas of Sandra Gillepie (2004). China's foreign policy significantly changed with the pursuit of peace and prosperity, reflecting a more upbeat view of world events. Victor Carneiro Corrêa Vieira (2019) states that Mao Zedong's Third World theory suggests an intermediate zone between superpowers, and Asia of defeating imperialism, colonialism, and hegemony. China was one of the founding and permanent members of the United Nations (UN) as it has relations with the victorious allies of the World War II. The Republic of China (ROC) was the part of UN in 1945, after the Chinese revolution succeeded in 1949, the ROC government left China ruled in island of Taiwan. The policy shift involved taking an independent stance on foreign policy, and it reaffirmed China's core foreign policy tenets of peaceful coexistence. After the PRC was established, the Premier wrote a letter to the UN assembly to legitimize the government of PRC. Evan Luard (1971) states that the UN assembly denied to fulfill the request of PRC as the Soviet Union raise the issue of China's participation in UN assembly.

After the Sino-Soviet rivalry and Vietnam War Richard Nixon, US President, entered negotiation with PRC in 1971.

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

Francis P. Sempa (2022) states that Nixon anticipated the strategic change in global politics which would continue into the new century and beyond. The Final Clauses of Material Treaties (2003) incorporates that the General Assembly of UN would recognize government of PRC as the legitimate representative of UN and the Secretary General of the UN would not accept Taiwan (resolution 2758 –XXVI of the General Assembly of 25 October 1971). China supported for the UN Charter and its processes, alignment with the demands of the nonaligned community for a New International Economic Order, and China's membership in organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In line with this, the idea Deng Xiaoping (1987) justifies the essence of revival of China's third world strategy at present:

Its vote belongs firmly to the Third World, to the underdeveloped countries. We have said more than once that China belongs to the Third World. It will still belong to the Third World even in the future, after it is developed. China will never become a superpower. (p. 83)

The idea of China's new strategy developed the country as a new and trading nation in the regional and global politics. Deng set Chinese policy and emphasized on economic development and modernization on the following strategy (Chas W. Freeman, 2020).

- establish and sustain a peaceful environment on China's borders and in the approaches to them,
- avoid forming alliances making enemies, or taking sides in other countries' quarrels,

- keep a low political and military profile,
- cultivate friendship and trade with all nations regardless of their ideology, and
- minimize friction with other countries by reacting to perceived slights and insults with restraint.

Christopher Hughes (2005) outlines that "gradual acceptance of a multilateral approach towards Southeast Asia" and Roland C. Keith (2005) remarks "a more vigorous approach to multilateralism at both the international and regional level." Chinese diplomatic engrossment in South Asia always centers with India and Pakistan, as these two countries are the biggest two countries in the South Asian subcontinent. These two countries share over 4,500 kilometers of border with China and are contiguous, nuclear-armed adversaries (85). Hence, this article answers why China's foreign policy especially after 1990 focuses in South Asia to revive the third world strategy.

In South Asia Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are receptive nation-state to Chinese belt and road initiative support for infrastructure projects. Nepal is preferring new model to finance for its own development needs. Nepal borders with the Tibet Autonomous Region and the government of Nepal has tied to open new link ways to link China and establish relation through bonds of trade, culture, and family for centuries. Deep Pal (2021) perceives that when the Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Nepal in 2019 -a mutual legal aid treaty, agreements on border management, and even an extradition treaty were discussed in order to strengthen the diplomatic

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

relation between China and Nepal.

Research Methods

The geopolitical circumstance of South Asia, East Asia and entire global issue is changed after 1991. With the collapse of Soviet Union, the US exercise its super power for two decades. After 2010, China has been a powerful country in economic and technological aspects. This paper uses published literature in order to analyze evidences, and in this qualitative paper the procedure of developing the ideas will be studied (Frey, 2018).

It is exploratory paper and it applies a descriptive–interpretative–qualitative approach to investigate the present context China's Third World Strategy and concept of it in response of Mao, Deng and Xi Jinping. It analyzes how Mao's concept of Third World Strategy is in gradual change after China's economic development initiated after 1980 and 2010. It examines how qualitative research is significant to diplomacy and political development. It argues the rigorous tendency for understanding new ideas changing context (Arceneaux & Bier, 2022). For this, it deals with the ideas of assuming concept, and new concept for making to comprehensive understanding of new Third World Strategy of China.

Findings and Discussion

In 1949, China concluded its revolutionary phase, characterized by its stance against superpowers, pursuit of Third World nations, avoidance of international organizations, and an inward-focused economy shaping its foreign policy. Mao's political revolution, subsequently continued by Deng Xiaoping with economic reversals for modernization, set the stage for

a dynamic shift. Mao's Three World Theory was different from the concept of third world countries. Deng redefined on this concept and explained that three worlds were mutually inconsistent, and China as a socialist country belonged to the third world. His concept of third world is similar to Non-Aligned countries (Lukin, 2022).

Post-1980, China embarked on economic revolutionary policies, impacting both domestic and global arenas, repairing ties with superpowers, and actively engaging with international financial institutions. The concept of foreign relation gives priority to accountability of the powerful state is the major aspect of international relation. In the same aspect, Watson (1997) focuses on "responsibility implies accountability for one's actions, for their consequences" (p. 95). The period from 1949 to 1978 saw passive diplomacy, and transitioning to a period of adjustment and moderation from 1979 to 1989 reformulated new economic policy. Beyond 1990, China experienced active changes, marked by political and economic growth. Chen Song (2023) emphasizes the global recognition of 'Chinese modernization,' dispelling misconceptions of westernization and outlining five key characteristics: independence, prioritizing people, peaceful development, openness, and inclusiveness, all aligned with President Xi Jinping's diplomatic moves under the Belt and Road Initiative. Lukin (2022) concludes that as the global economic power of the 1970s is totally changed. The US as the first superpower is still in existence and the collapse of the Soviet Union is gradually replaced by Russia. The second and third tier of countries remain more or less unchanged even after the 1970s. The second world

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

still comprises the economically rich capitalist - US-leaning - countries, the US-led countries, such as European Union, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, etc., and the third world countries represent developing and underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Paul Kennedy (1989) views economic condition of developing countries has impacted the world trade and changed the status of economic reform of world order. Radulescu, Mirela and Voica (2014) agree with the emerging countries like China, India, Russia, and Brazil have integrated into the global market. The reorganization of global economy as BRICS economy is a threat to the global power.

As the world's most populous developing nation, China bears a primary domestic responsibility: to drive the nation's progress for the well-being of its 1.4 billion citizens. Hedley Bull (2002) states that the enhancement of the welfare of the Chinese populace is not solely an internal duty of the Chinese state; it also holds significant global implications. With one-fifth of the world's population residing in China, the rapid improvement of the well-being of its people and the reduction of poverty within its borders constitute China's pivotal contributions to global development and poverty alleviation objectives. This commitment not only uplifts millions from impoverished conditions but also plays a crucial role in mitigating the potential repercussions of mass emigration, which could lead to instability -a perilous side effect of a potential economic downturn in China. Deng Xiaoping's reform policy of China initially conceptualized China's international responsibility along this sense. The early 1990s brought a pivotal change in Chinese foreign policy,

responding to both local and global circumstances, including diplomatic isolation after Tiananmen in 1989 and the Soviet Union's fall. Despite its own poverty, China actively assisted other developing nations, employing aid strategically to enhance its global standing. Xi Jinping's leadership since 2012 has brought economic reforms, opening up to the world, and addressing domestic issues.

In response to advancements and alterations, China navigated the challenges of the contemporary age, with possibilities and difficulties. The Sino-US relationship significantly influences China's surrounding environment, and neighboring nations hedge their bets amid China's ascent. China's "omnidirectional diplomacy" in the post-Cold War world aimed to readjust international relations, counter sanctions, and promote effective equality among nations. Alden and Alves detail China's diplomatic offensive, emphasizing goodwill missions, normalization of relations, and integration with Third World countries. The shift toward a socialist market economy in 1992, aiming for WTO membership in 1995, demonstrated the alignment of foreign policy with domestic economic goals. When Hu Jintao stepped down from his roles as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012 and as state president in March 2013, China's global standing underwent a significant transformation during his ten-year leadership. Notably, China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 marked the beginning of a period of remarkable growth that surpassed expectations both domestically and internationally. The 'China dream' has since become a foundational element

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

of Chinese diplomacy, emerging as the prevailing theme in both domestic and international arenas under the Xi Jinping administration. Xi Jinping has given priority to the 'one belt, one road' initiative, considering it his primary innovation in foreign affairs. This initiative has evolved into China's distinctive long-term foreign policy strategy. As Kerr (2015, p. 2) put it:

The notion of the China Dream is a clever negotiation between collective identity and individual aspirations. It is rather like a large body of water—the dream reveals the Chinese people as having a collective will and identity shaped by a difficult history but at the same time if individuals and communities look closely into the dream they should be able to see their own reflection in it.

On a certain level, these works introduced the notion of a China 'dream' as something commonplace, not exclusive to China, as other nations also possess their own variations of 'dreams.' Nevertheless, the concept of 'dream' assumed a somewhat nebulous quality, encompassing a fusion of national traditions, experiences, economic and societal organizational models, developmental paths, and foreign policy strategies. The identity of the dreamers was not always explicitly articulated, although it generally implied the participation of societal elites. In various instances, these illustrations embodied nationalist values, each envisioning heightened prosperity and global influence for their respective countries or entities. Moreover, the acknowledgment of unique non-European 'dreams' was at times linked to the necessity of safeguarding and promoting a diversity

of distinct 'civilizations'-a response to the thesis of Huntington (1996) is on the clash of civilizations. Liu Dexi (2014, p. 136) denies the ideas of Huntington and makes it clear as:

China wishes to share its development experience and foreign philosophies with all countries, realizing the China dream and recalling the fine civilizations of other countries in the world; helping Japanese civilization, Indian civilization, Islamic civilization, Western civilization, Eastern Orthodox civilization, Latin American civilization, African civilization and all other civilizations to rejuvenate or retain their splendour, while at the same time studying the valuable parts of them.

This diplomatic push coincided with economic reforms, easing political unease in the West. Despite initial concerns about industrialization decline in other countries, China's growth became intertwined with globalization, fostering economic ties and benefiting international businesses. A need for institutionalizing and decentralizing decision-making processes further influenced China's foreign policy direction. In essence, the evolution of China's foreign policy reflects a dynamic journey marked by economic reforms, diplomatic strategies, and adjustments to global realities, ultimately positioning China as a key player on the world stage.

China's engagement with multilateral organizations expanded, including participation in UN peacekeeping missions and agreements on weapons control and non-proliferation. As China shifted from victimization to a rising great power mindset, it joined the UN

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

in 1971, regained sovereignty over Macao and Hong Kong, and hosted the 2008 Olympics, boosting national pride and contributing to a rising power foreign policy. While China increased participation in multilateral organizations, its adherence to dominant international standards remained limited. Values governing China's interactions with developing nations, such as respect for state sovereignty and informal consensus-building, shaped its approach. Despite increasing multilateral engagement, bilateral contacts continued to be China's preferred diplomatic strategy.

China's strategy in the 1960s supported the rural areas of the world against cities, halted during the Cultural Revolution, and resumed in the late 1960s. Reconciliation with the US in the early 1970s and readmission to the international community allowed China to play an active role globally. However, modernization and economic reforms took precedence until the late 1990s, delaying China's active engagement with the Third World. In 1981, China implemented an independent policy, distancing itself from Mao's revolutionary strategy while affirming Maoist achievements. China sought stronger ties with the developed world for modernization, with concerns about isolation in 1996 leading to renewed focus on the Third World. Trips by Jiang Zemin and Li Peng in 1996-97 paved the way for the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000.

Under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, China continued its commitment to the Third World, intensifying diplomatic missions and expanding commerce with Latin America and Africa. Xi's leadership saw

Africa's involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative and increased financial support. Economic pragmatism and global integration shifted China's foreign policy toward peaceful coexistence and collaboration. As China's desire for ties with the Third World in the 21st century appears driven by domestic factors, including economic diversification and resource acquisition, the focus on the U.S. as the main driving force diminishes. This geopolitical shift presents strategic choices for Nepal, emphasizing the complex relationships and goals among China, India, and the United States in the region.

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was a sole concept of Xi Jinping developed in 2013. Its key aspiration is to become a global power, rooted in the historic Silk Road, and now China is shifting from low diplomatic strategy to frontline strategy which focuses on the network of trade, communication, and cultural exchange routes. Hong Yu (2024) states that the Global China image appears under the BRI. "The Initiative has been opened up to all countries which are interested, and there has subsequently been a gradual shift away from the ancient Chinese Silk Road narrative based on the historical and cultural significance" (p. 2). It is a new policy introduced by Xi Jinping, and it is a political shift from the policies of Mao and Deng in order to be a global power.

China's Third World policy, originated with Mao Zedong in the early phase, has evolved over time. It has marked by distinct phases shaped by internal leadership and global dynamics. Initially this policy of Mao came to existence to unite the Third World against

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

superpowers and establish a new world order. The strategy of China focused on five principles of peaceful coexistence of the United Nations. Despite consistent inclusion in Chinese foreign policy since 1949, the Third World strategy underwent shifts, influenced by geopolitical changes and China's aspiration to lead the periphery. In the period from 1953 to 1985, China began to provide foreign aid outside OPEC, and reinforced its role as a leader among developing nations.

Mao's emphasis on strengthening bonds with Asia, Africa, and Latin America was echoed by Zhou Enlai. He emphasized to support for independence, state sovereignty, natural resource protection, and economic advancement. The strategy found its early roots in the 1950s, gained momentum with China's participation in the Bandung summit in 1955. Chinese tensions with the Soviet Union further solidified China's Third World Policy, and the Vietnam War brought China and US close which was China's approach to gain a global dimension. Deng's policy even in his time had followed the paths of Mao as (Freeman, 2020) had pointed out keep a low political and military profile, and minimize friction with other countries.

The geopolitical advantage of aligning with developing nations, constituting a significant voting bloc in the United Nations, underscored China's soft power. The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2023 reaffirmed the commitment to third-world politics. It set guiding principles for diplomatic strategies of China in changing context. Against this backdrop, Nepal navigates its relationships with China, India, and a resurgent interest from the United States. The U.S.'s

involvement, particularly through initiatives like the Millennium Challenge Corporation, offers an alternative perspective in the region. China's head-of-state diplomacy, evident in events like the China-Central Asia Summit and the Belt and Road Forum, showcases its foreign policy approach. The power of China's Third World policy, conceived in the 1950s, reframes its adaptability to changing global dynamics. Soft power, derived from China's economic cooperation and trade, positions it as a development agent and peaceful force in the eyes of many developing nations. As China's principles align with global ambitions, the contrast with U.S. foreign policy enhances China's appeal. While perceptions vary across regions, Southeast Asia exhibits skepticism due to economic rivalries and historical factors. However, the increasing trade between China and ASEAN nations, coupled with multilateral agreements, signals growing engagement.

The idea of soft power, as defined by its Joseph Nye, appears when "a country ... obtain[s] the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—want to follow it" (p. 5). It rests on the capacity of forming the preferences of others. It is distinct from influence, perceived through hard power, and goes beyond persuasion or moving others by argument. It is about the ability to attract through common values and, by persuading others. It involves the "attractiveness of one's culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices" (Nye, p. 7). The three sources of perceiving soft power include the culture for attracting others, coherent political values, and

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

foreign policy to legitimize the moral authority. Although interesting, it is beyond the scope of this article to assess the strength of Chinese culture, political values, and foreign policy as sources of soft power.

Africa serves as a showcase for China's peaceful development, shifting from political and military support in the 1970s to focused cooperation initiatives and economic engagement post-2000. Latin America, historically indifferent to China, has witnessed a surge in interest driven by geopolitical considerations, abundant natural resources, and potential strategic alliances. China's unwavering support for third-world causes remains a cornerstone of its soft power. Despite potential challenges and competition, China's consistent commitment to developing nations strengthens its reliability and trustworthiness in foreign policy. Xue (2023) observes that Xi's political doctrine has sparked a lively debate among China observers, leading to a wealth of literature dedicated to interpreting China's foreign policy. Some of this literature views China's behavior as reminiscent of the revisionist policies adopted by other ascending powers throughout history.

More focused analyses delve into how domestic politics shape China's foreign policy. While acknowledging the value of materialist and rationalist explanations, this article engages in the discourse by highlighting the significance of psycho-cultural elements in shaping China's foreign policy. Based on the premise that ego utility fosters increased confidence, this article seeks to demonstrate that China's foreign policy is rooted in a yearning for recognition deeply embedded in Chinese culture. In

managing China's foreign relations, the Xi administration has more challenges than in previous eras. Though Xi Jinping came to power with promising change, he is more likely that he will be the leader who halts China's advancement. China's foreign sphere of influence has not always increased as a result of the Xi administration's robust foreign policy positions and actions. The new administration's aspirational foreign policy objectives have had the opposite effect, especially with some of its Western, and he has given more priority in the bordering countries. Thus, the Xi administration has contributed to the concerns of other countries over China's rise.

Conclusion and Implications

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Beijing has consistently incorporated the Third World Strategy into its foreign policy framework as part of a broader initiative to counter the hegemony of superpowers and promote an alternative economic system. The inception of the Third World strategy was traced back to Mao Zedong's vision in 1946. The Communist Party of China (CCP) extended its international assistance efforts following the 1955 Bandung Conference, and this approach evolved into the Belt and Road Initiative -an updated vision introduced by President Xi Jinping. This initiative represents a novel model of cooperation, integrating elements of trade, investment, aid, and technical support. As China entered the twenty-first century with robust economic expansion, the strategic significance of its engagement with the Third World became even more pronounced. This strategic direction is

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

influenced by both international political considerations and domestic economic imperatives. China's growing influence over the Third World in the twenty-first century, manifested through increased economic ties and enhanced soft power, possesses the potential to reshape the existing international order and its normative foundations.

China's approaches to economic engagement diverge significantly from the neo-liberal paradigm, suggesting a unique appeal to regions embracing the Chinese cooperation model. The impact of China's expanding soft power on emerging nations could be profound, particularly as the influence of the United

States diminishes in these regions. China's growing sway over developing nations, constituting a majority in multilateral organizations, might enable it to gradually reshape international norms and regulations from within. This transformative process could ultimately lead to a more Sino-centric global order. Nepal as a neighboring country of China, Nepal can be a neighboring, regional and global part of BRI. Again, balancing with India, China and global power the US is crucial. The gradual shift of China from the economic position of 1950 has been changed rapidly, and Nepal must maintain positive relation with China and India.

References

Alden, Chris and Alves, Ana Cristina. (2008). "History and Identity in the Construction of China's Africa Policy", in: *Review of African Political Economy*, vol 35, no. 115, pp. 43-58.

Alves, Ana Cristina. (2018). "The Resurgence of China's Third World Policy in the Twenty First Century", *Antologia Sobre Ásia Contemporânea: Perspetivas de Investigação no Instituto do Oriente*, pp. 73-84.

Anere, J. M. (2022). A New Era of Chinese Foreign Policy, *Diplo*, <https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/a-new-era-of-chinese-foreign-policy/>.

Aoyama, Rumi. (2012). Structural Changes in Chinese Foreign Policy: From Prosperous Nation Diplomacy" to "Strong Nation Diplomacy, *Japan Review*, vol.4 no.2, pp. 1-12.

Arceneaux, Philip & Bier, Lindsey, M. (2022). "Cultural Considerations and Rigorous Qualitative Methods in Public

Diplomacy Research" *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, vol. 18, no. 4, DOI: 10.1057/s41254-021-00232-4

Bull, Hedley. (2002). *The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics*. Columbia University Press.

Chi, Zhang. (2013). *Historical Changes in Relations Between China and Neighboring Countries (1949-2012)*, Institute for Security and Development, Sweden.

Deng Xiaoping. (1987). *Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

Dittmer, Lowell. (2010). "China and the Developing World", *China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 502-505.

Evans, Graham & Newnham, Jeffrey (1998). *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*. Penguin Books.

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

- Freeman, Chas W. (2020). "China's National Experiences and the Evolution of PRC Grand Strategy," in David Shambaugh (ed.), *China and the World*. Oxford University Press, pp. 37-60.
- Frey, B. B. (2018). *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Educational Research, Measurement, and Evaluation*, SAGE Publications, Doi: 10.4135/9781506326139.
- Gillepie, Sandra. (2004). "Diplomacy on South-South Dimension", in Slavik Hannah (Ed.) *Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy*. Diplo Foundation.
- Goldstein, Avery. (2001). "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice", *The China Quarterly*, No. 168.
- Gupta, Rishi. (2023). *Nepal's Geopolitical Crossroads: Balancing China, India, and the United States*, *Asia Society Policy Institute*.
- Hsiung, James C. (1995). "China's Omnidirectional Diplomacy: Realignment to Cope with Monopolar U.S. Power", *Asian Survey*, vol. 35, no 6, pp. 573-586
- Hughes, Chris. (2006). *Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era*, London: Routledge.
- Hughes, Christopher R. (2005). "Nationalism and Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: Implications for Southeast Asia", *Pacific Review*, vol. 18, no. 1. pp. 119-135.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster Publication.
- Hutchison, A. (1976). *China's African Revolution*. Westview Press.
- Keith, Roland C. (2005). *China as a Rising World Power and its Response to Globalization*. Routledge
- Kerr, David. (2015). 'China's many Dreams', in David Kerr, ed., *Comparative Perspectives on China's Search for National Rejuvenation*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Li, Anshan. (2007). *China and Africa: Policy and Challenges*. *China Security*, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 69-93.
- Liu Dexi. (2014). "The New Contribution for Human Society of Realizing the China Dream", in *Decoding the New Concept of Chinese Diplomacy*. Beijing: Wuzhou Chuanbo.
- Luard, Evan. (1971). "China and the United Nations". *International Affairs*. 47 (4): pp. 2910.2307/2625680. ISSN 0020-5850. JSTOR 2625680.
- Lukin, Artyom. (2022). From Three Worlds to Four: Mao's Revised Theory of an Emerging Global Order, *Think China*, <https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/state-our-world-three-worlds-four-maos-revised-theory-emerging-global-order>
- Manning, Robert. (1986). "The Third World Looks at China", in: Lilian Harris & Robert L. Worden, (Ed.s). *China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger*, London & Sidney: Croom Helm Limited.
- Medeiros, Evan S. and Fravel, M. Taylor (2003). "China's New Diplomacy", in: *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 6, pp. 22-35.
- Mitchell, Derek J. (2018). *Expanding the Strategic Periphery: A History of China's Interaction with the Developing World.* In Joshua Eisenman and Eric

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

- Heginbotham (eds), *China Steps Out: Beijing's Major Power Engagement with the Developing World*. Routledge, pp. 23-46.
- Nye, Joseph. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, NY: Public Affairs.
- Qingmin, Zhang (2021). China's Multilateral Diplomacy, *Pagina*, pp. 1-10. Pal, Deep (2012). China's Influence in South Asia Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Radulescu, Irina Gabriela & et al. (2014). "BRICS Countries Challenge to the World Economy New Trends", *Procedia Economics and Finance*, 8, pp. 605-613. DOI:[10.1016/S2212-5671\(14\)00135-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00135-X)
- Saez, Lawrence and Crystal Chang. (2010). China and South Asia: Strategic Implications and Economic Imperatives, *China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Sempa, Francis P. (2022). "Nixon and China: 50 Years Later." *Diplomat*. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/nixon-and-china-50-years-later/>
- Smith, Sarah-Ann. (1986). China's Third World Policy as a Counterpoint to the First and Second Worlds", in: Lilian C. Harris & Robert L. Worden (Ed.s). *China and the ThirdWorld: Champion or Challenger*, London & Sidney: Croom Helm Limited.
- Song, Chen. (2023). New Journey of China's Diplomacy, *The Kathmandu Post*, <https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2023/03/16/the-new-journey-of-china-s-diplomacy>.
- Takahara, A. (2013). *The Rise of China and Its Neighborhood Diplomacy: Implications for Japanese Foreign Policy*. University of Tokyo.
- United Nations. (2003). *Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties Handbook*, United Nations Publications.
- Van Ness, Peter. (1998). "China and the Third World: Patterns of Engagement and Indifference", in: Samuel S. Kim (Ed.), *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policyfaces the New Millenium*, Boulder-Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press.
- Vieira, Victor Carneiro Corrêa. (2019). From Third World Theory to Belt and Road Initiative: International Aid as a Chinese Foreign Policy Tool, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 529-551.
- Wang, Hongying. (2003). "Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization", in: *Asian Survey*, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 475-491.
- Watson, Adam. (1997). *The Limits of Independence: Relations between States in the Modern World*. London & NY: Routledge.
- Xue, Ye. (2023). China as a Great Power: Reconsidering Face Culture in Chinese Foreign Policy. vol. 78, no. 4, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231213601>
- Yahuda, Michael. (1999). China's Foreign Relations: The Long March, Future Uncertain", *The China Quarterly*, no. 159, pp. 650-659.
- Yu, George T. (1977). China and the Third World. *Asian Survey*, vol. 17, no 11, pp. 1036-1048.
- Yu, Hong. (2024). *Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative*,

China's Evolving New Third World Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

Springer Publication.

Yunling, Zhang. (2022). China's Relations with Neighboring States and Regions: A Comprehensive Perspective, *Dangdai shijie (Contemporary World)*, (4):10-14.

Zhang, Baijia. (2004). "Chinese Domestic and Foreign Policies in the 1990s" in: Ezra S. Vogelet al (eds), *The*

age of Uncertainty: The U.S.-Japan-China Triangle, from Tiananmen (1989) to 9/11 (2001), Harvard University Asia Centre, Cambridge & Massachusetts.

Zhou, Enlai. (1975). Documents of the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. At <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/zhou-enlai/1975/01/13.htm>.