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Abstract

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Intergovernmental Interaction in Federal Nepal and Challenges in the Transitional Period

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Federalism is a power-sharing political system, which designates power through various layers of government. Powers are delegated and decentralized by the constitution over the different layers of government. In federalism, intergovernmental or inter-province relations are very crucial for better delivery of the federal system. The provinces in Nepal are at loggerheads and as they are facing internal conflicts, and the inter-governmental relations are not so smooth. The provinces are attempting to make their internal cooperation better but this is not achieved due to political transition. Given this complex context, poor intergovernmental relations and conflicts between the three layers of government in Nepal have become one of the key challenges for the successful implementation of federalism. Limited knowledge, short experience with federalism and lack of legal and policy issues have created these gaps. The contexts have further jeopardized inter-governmental relations. Weak intergovernmental relations in federalism would ultimately pose a challenge to federalism and result in political instability in Nepal.

FEDERALISM AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL relations are inseparable entities of the federal system. The essential viewpoint of federalism is the division of state power and authority between the different levels of government (federal, provincial, and local). Within the government framework system, the framework of administration, the political, administrative, economic, judicial, and other functional responsibilities of the country are separated among different levels of government. The premise of federalism is the diversity of units within a federation. Federalism can be characterized as a mode of political organization that joins together partitioned legislative issues inside an overarching political framework by disseminating control among common and constitutional governments. By requiring the fundamental approaches through a preparation of transaction that includes all the approaches concerned, the

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federal system empowers all to share within the general system's decision-making and execution. Federalism implies national unification through the functioning of sub-national frameworks. In a broader sense, federalism is more than a course of action of governmental structures; it may be a mode of the political movement that requires the expansion of certain sets of agreeable connections through a political framework.

Fundamentally the constitutional provision of the states in a federal system is decided by four elements: the arrangements within the federal system and state constitutions that either constrain or ensure the powers of the states vis-a-vis the federal government; the arrangements within the government structure that donates the states a part within the composition of the national government; the consequent translations of both sets of the arrangement by the courts; and the unwritten protected conventions that have advanced casually. For the advancement of a federal system, intergovernmental relation (IGR) is an integral part that determines the success or better delivery of federalism.

The origin of IGR can be followed from the late 1930s in the United States. The concept of IGR became globally acknowledged in the 1950s with the formation of the United States lasting body known as the Advisory Commission on Internal Governmental Relations in 1959 and the advancement of the Canadian experience of cooperative federalism. The concept of IGR primarily focuses on the interactions among different levels and types of governments because coordination between different levels is a must.

As such, this organizational prerequisite of the constitution of the states sets forward the behavioral designs in IGR. If the constitutional position is not well ensured but the federal government is bowed upon side-tracking the constitutional provisions genuine breaks start to affect IGR. This also happens when the federal government is indifferent to rising powers or is prejudiced on the treatment of the states or when the federal design is inadequate. The foundation of agreeable federalism lies not only within the organization's establishments of the arrangement but within the behavioral forms of both the center and the states. Like other federal nations, the state power in Nepal is divided into diverse circles of government; namely federal, provincial, and local government levels. As the state's power is delegated among the three levels of government, there is a requirement for IGR between these circles of government on the execution of useful obligations. IGR is defined as formal and informal mechanisms to ensure coordination and cooperation between different levels of governments in decentralized and federal political systems. According to Opeskin (1998), the term "intergovernmental relations" is commonly used to refer to relations between central, regional, and local governments that facilitate the attainment of common goals through cooperation.

For Van der Waldt and Du Toit (1997), intergovernmental relations refer to the mutual relations and interactions between government institutions at horizontal and vertical levels. This is in line with Thornhill's (2002) definition that 'an intergovernmental relation is all the actions and transactions of politicians and officials amongst the national and sub-national units of government and organs of the state' (p.127). As state control is separated between the degrees of government, there is a necessity for closer ties between these circles of government. A positive note of Nepal's federalism is that the basic standard of IGR is clarified within the real structure. Regarding the theoretical definition of IGR, Poirier and Saunders (2015) argue that it is integral to every federal system, regardless of differences in history, geography, constitutional framework, legal culture, distribution of competencies or resources, and federal design.

In line with Poirier's and Saunders' articulation, Watts (2003) composes different perspectives and significance of IGR. There are vertical relations between governments of diverse orders

in federal-provincial relations, provincial-local relations and federal-local relations. Progressively such vertical connections inside alliances may moreover include supra-federation organizations.

Methodology

This paper has intended to answer the status of intergovernmental relations in Nepal after the formation of the provincial government. The study has explored the evolution of horizontal and vertical relations among the provincial governments. This paper has also examined the challenges and practices of intergovernmental relations in major federal democratic states including Nepal.

Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies have been employed to prepare this paper. Primary data were collected through interviews with the 18 provincial assembly members and 28 government officials. Likewise, four Chairpersons, eight Vice-Chairpersons, 19 Ward Chairpersons and 22 Ward Members of different local levels have been interviewed as the key informants for this study as the primary source of information during September and October of 2022. Similarly an intensive desk review concerning national and international literature on this issue has also been carried out. Also to find out the IGR in a federal setup, the study of practices in major federal countries has been duly taken into account for the documentation of this study.

Literature Review

Intergovernmental relations, varies from country to country, and of major countries are discussed below.

The Canadian Intergovernmental Practices

Canada has got a governmental system that can be classified as a decentralized federal parliamentary democracy. According to Wheare (1967), the Canadian Constitution appears to be quasi-federal. The government comprises the central government and 10 provinces, and two northern territories with the majority of the population living in Ontario and Quebec. The Canadian legislature consists of two houses, which are, the House of Commons -- the lower legislative chamber -- and the Senate. The Prime Minister of Canada is the leader who together with various ministers forms the executive arm of the government. The Prime Minister is additionally capable of selecting a cabinet.

Herperger (1991) notes that Canada is perhaps the most innovative nation because its federation represents the first attempt to combine federalism with a system of responsible parliamentary government. He goes on to highlight a few of the areas in which Canada can be credited as the trailblazer, such as: The constitution that relegates the legislative powers (federal, provincial and concurrent). The common residual power is relegated to the federal government instead of the provinces. The conveyance of powers is extraordinarily checked by the consideration of a few federal governments' one-sided powers, which can overrule provincial powers. Examples are the powers of reservation and disallowance and revelatory control most of which have not been utilized within the past few decades (Herperger, 1991). The final drift highlighted by Herperger was embraced by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) in Sections 100 and 138 even though nonexclusively, the rule of subsidiary applies, which infers that choices be taken at the least level conceivable. These sections center on the political supremacy of the higher sphere of government over the lower sphere. This implies that the higher sphere of government makes arrangement and the lower sphere executes such arrangements.

The multi-cultural nature of Canadian society may have contributed to the adjustment of

the federalist fashion of government as "federalism makes the required for competition and they require for its control through compromise" (Hague & Harrop, 2001). The need for a coordinated society has been the key driver, which has driven quickened improvement within the space of intergovernmental relations. This kind of agreeable government stresses interdependency. There are times when agreeable federalism needs to come to terms with the competition between different partners. Gagnon (1994), contends that for a long time Canadians have applied some measure of political asymmetry but have been hesitant to move past the protected asymmetry. Given the constitutional order to advance participation, compelling administration requires solid IGR components which can enable the state and the central government to work together to create approaches that all can concur with. In Canada, this can be known as executive federalism (Hague & Harrop, 2001).

South Africa Intergovernmental Practices

Modern IGR in South Africa does concern itself with measurements of vertical and even connections with a few degrees of disparity. In line with this, Kahn et al. (2011) demonstrate that the national sphere has more control than the lower spheres. However, Malan (2014) declares that the standard of cooperative government recognizes the interdependency of the spheres in South Africa. According to the creator, this institutional course of action centers on association and the related values of participation, coordination, and struggle evasion. The nature of the South African IGR is characterized by constitutionality and the three tiers of government. The structure is the incomparable law of the nation and it builds up South Africa as a unitary state (Watts, 2001; Siddle et al., 2012; Van der Waldt, 2007). Certain schools of thought argue that South Africa features a cross-breed framework of unitary and government highlights. The reality is that South Africa has delineated boundaries and capacities of the sub-national spheres as in government frameworks (Kahn et al., 2011; Van der Waldt, 2007; Haysom, 2001), but is additionally a unitary state with a constitutional democracy (Reddy & Govender, 2013).

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Section 40) diagrams the structure of government into three distinctive, forbid, and interrelated bodies. Within the national government, legislative authority is vested within the National Assembly (Parliament which incorporates the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces) which might be considered "the primary legislative body in South Africa (Kuye et al., 2002) and executive authority within the Cabinet (Botes et al., 1996).

At the provincial government, a total of nine provincial governments are made, with the legislative specialist vested within the provincial legislatures. The authority of the provincial legislature is as it was pertinent within the particular domain of each territory (Botes et al., 1996). The local government is made up of municipalities that are closest to communities. Venter (1998) portrays each sphere of government in South Africa as independent but interlocked with the other sphere and must work in harmony with them within the conveyance of open administrations. Each reinforcing intergovernmental relations made for strides benefit conveyance in South Africa. Issues for the thought sphere are particular from the others and even though they are interdependent and interrelated; each has relative independence to perform its capacities and work out its powers. This infers a few levels of equality between and among the sphere, as they are breaking even concerning their significance in benefit conveyance.

The USA Federal System

The American Constitution has multi-layered legislative provisions; it recognizes the requirement for an arrangement of governments more specifically in contact with the individu-

als and more definitely adjusted to their needs. Only a limited number of functions, such as the management of currency, raising an army, diplomatic and foreign policy, and waging war were reserved for the Federal Government (Glick, 1989). The Federal Government is additionally able to direct inter-state commerce through this device. Outside the framework, the states are free to govern their communities. They consequently have some authority over the form of local government within their territories, as well as elements of civil and criminal law, policing, public works, education, and planning (Chandler, 1993).

Ferguson and McHenry (1971) state that local government is not enshrined in the Federal Constitution. The exclusion is clarified by the desire that their foundation and control were a state duty. Lawfully, local governments are seen as arms or offices of the states. Rassel (1995) argues connections between state and local governments are characterized by the constitutions and laws. The Federal Constitution is silent on the issues of local government. According to Ranney (1992) and Wright (1995), the provisions of the written Constitution of the United States and their associated customs and usages add up to a constitutional system that has three distinctive features, namely, federalism, separation of powers, i.e., the constitutional division of government power among separate legislative, executive and judicial branches, and judicial review.

Institutions such as the Presidency play a major part in the victory, or indeed the possibility of 'big government'. The fundamental components are fiscal policy, including control of expenditure, taxation, and the use of those to accomplish social ends the closely related function of economic planning, coordination of agencies personnel policies liaison with the legislature and the public, administrative organization investigations of the sphere of advisable government operations as well as both long and short-range planning (Griffith 1983). Chandler (1993) writes that the Federal Government has an impact on local policymaking through grant aid programs. Walker (1991) states that

In 1980 President Reagan managed to reduce the federal government's intergovernmental role, to devolve various federally-aided programs to state and local governments, reduce the heavy reliance on the traditional federal-state partnership with a scrapping of the multiple federal sub-national governmental relationships and, in general, reduce governmental activism at all the levels of government, state and local as well as federal. (p.301)

Regarding intergovernmental relations, Chandler (1993) sets that limitations on local government came not from the Federal Government but from the states. Lawfully, local governments are made utilizing the constitution of the state or particular or common state enactment. However, the states have ended up a vital source of local subsidizing by giving an expansive cluster of categorical gifts, which in turn, disintegrates the capacity of local specialists to raise their funds.

The Australian Intergovernmental Practices

Australia is made up of six previous colonies which came together to make the quasi-sovereign Commonwealth of Australia. The main reason behind this was that Australia, at that time, existed as a geographical space and not fundamentally as a nation that tenants had estimations joined to Federalism, in this case, what Joske (1971) mulled over, that federalism comes about when independent political communities come together and settle to create a common government. They accomplished this by coming together but without wanting a total union, subsequently protecting a few degrees of independence.

The Australian Constitution came into presence in 1901. Just like the American Constitution, the Constitution of Australia permits the dissemination of powers among the organs of

government. Nevertheless, Joske (1971), comments that the contrast between the Australian and American frameworks lie within the acknowledgment of the sovereignty and indivisibility of the Crown all through Australia and the framework of capable government beneath which the priests of the Crown are straightforwardly mindful of the parliament recognizing that these were determined from the British standards of government.

There are similarities between the Australian and Canadian government systems as argued by Herperger (1991) when he contends that Australia is additionally administered by a parliamentary framework but its system is interesting in the sense that it has given for the appointment of administrative specialist from the states to the federal government.

Australian states can raise their income locally, even though they have ended up so much subordinate to the center, especially on monetary assets, a circumstance which has made the central government indeed more effective. Hague and Harrop (2001) note that almost 60 percent of the state's income comes from the federal government. Whereas the issues of financial revenue sharing show remain complicated and tricky. Other challenges still complicate the relationship between the federal government and the states. For example, a few have contended that in Australia, the choices of the High Court have favored the center to the point where a few respect federalism as having been maintained more by political convention than by the constitution (Hague & Harrop, 2001).

The Australian Constitution may have clauses that endeavor to advance correspondence revered in it but Mullins and Saunders (1994), contend that the Australian Constitution has been criticized for not articulating what can be the expected goals of the people joining together to form a new nation, this could be substantiated by the truth that this structure does not have an introduction. These scenarios are in contrast to the South African model of IGR, where we have a preface within the constitution's various places stipulating legislation on how the national government ought to relate to the provincial and local government as well as money-related asset allocation and raising income within the soul of independent and interrelated participation.

Indian Intergovernmental Practices

Intergovernmental relations in India have been a colossal issue of "executive federalism" rather than "legislative federalism" which, through Rajya Sabha, never got off the ground. The components of intergovernmental relations cannot be a matter of neglect as it was formal constitutional provision in any nation. The relations of such greatness and possibilities are not amiable to envisioning and directing through an inflexible legalistic process. The state governments of India have shown diverse approaches at distinctive focuses in time to Article 263 of the constitution giving for the foundation of an Inter-State Council (ISC) in case it shows up to the President that such a body would encourage open interface as well as advance concordant intergovernmental relations. India commenced a handle of drawing up a Constitution when the nation accomplished independence from the British in 1947 and the method was completed in 1950 (Maheshwari, 2003). The drafting committee of the constitution guaranteed members that India may be a federal state because it fulfills the necessities of a federal system. For case, the constitution segments the legislative and executive authority between the middle and the units (Chauhan, 2010). India had to consider these issues of colonial fracture to reach the choice to guarantee solidarity, multi-level administration, and arrangement of seven union domains. The Indian government is made up of 28 states and seven union regions (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004). Although the Indian structure is the oldest, its IGR framework is successful and advancing like that of South Africa. India sanctioned the 73rd and the 74th Correction Acts in 1992 and implemented them in 1993.

Agreeing with Chauhan (2010), these revisions have given statutory acknowledgment to a three-tier framework of administration: Centre (Union government), state level (State Government) and local level (local government). The corrections were concerned with raising the status of the chosen bodies and setting up-area arranging committees (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004).

Radin (2007) states institution instruments as counting formal parts and connections, designs of authority, and leadership. In this way, institutions help with affirming a frame of government, IGR framework, and cooperative government that a nation seems to have received. To find a setting of IGR inside the system of the government of India, a mimicked structure of government is worth a brief examination. The beginning of a sense of political integration and regulatory unification was received amid the British colonial run the show since 1835, which finished within the appropriation of a Westminster-type government with the run the show of law. In this way, parliamentary popular government and the authoritative frameworks are British bequest (Maheshwari, 2003). Not at all like in South Africa where the express ‘spheres of government’ is utilized (Require et al., 2001), in India ‘tiers’ of government are utilized to allude to levels (Buddy, 2003; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004).

Results and Discussion

In course of the implementation of federalism and intergovernmental relations, Nepal has witnessed some new and genuine issues since Nepal is in the initial phase of the implementation of federalism. In this regard, some scholars argue that this phase of intergovernmental relations is not harmonious. Unclear policies, some politicians’ reluctance to federalism and poor delivery of the provincial governments are blamed for poor IGR in Nepal even after seven years of the implementation of federalism.

Table 1

Phases of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR)

S.N.	Phase description	Main problems	Participants’ perceptions	IGR mechanism	Federalism metaphor	Period
1.	Conflict with demand	Defining powers of provinces.	-Dilemma -Doubt -Centralist	Legislative Rules and regulations. Verdicts of the courts.	Centralist Federal	February 2018 to 2021
2.	Cooperation and concentrated	Instability of political regime of provinces	Regime based politics of provinces	Federations, province and local level Act 2021	The existence of provinces is in crisis	After the reshuffle of government. (2021 January onwards)
3	Political transition	Lack of provincial horizontal relations	Provinces have no common agenda	Power of Schedule 6 of the Constitution	Conflict with the federal government	After taking the vote of confidence from the Chief Ministers

Source: Intergovernmental Relations: An Analytical Overview By DEIL S. WRIGHT

Conflict with demand phase. Federalism is a conflicting political system between national

and sub-national governments. While the constitutional powers and rights are ambiguous, such conflicts seem on the surface. Intergovernmental relations are never constant which depends on the political scenario, upsizing and downsizing of the seats of the provincial assembly and federal parliament. The whole centre-state relationship should be reviewed in light of the changing times and circumstances (Roy, 1978).

This is the first phase after the promulgation of the constitution in Nepal. In this phase, there is a single constitution to implement federalism in Nepal; hence the people have cast their doubts on federalism. Most of the people who opposed the idea of federalism argue that it is not in the interest of national integrity and sovereignty. In Nepal, only a fringe party Rastriya Jan-amorcha Nepal has opposed the idea of federalism. Also, a section of people assume that federalism is not our home-grown agenda and argued that it was imposed by external forces. Similarly, provinces recently set up institutions in federal Nepal and were/are not able to deliver effectively. Provinces claimed their demand in a wider range as guaranteed by the Constitution but the federal laws were not passed. While the seven provinces' Chief Ministers raised their voices, slowly federal laws were passed. The preliminary laws were concentrated on the operation of federalism and fiscal management. Provinces always demand powers from the federal government but the federal government did not want to lose its power. In this context, conflicts have surfaced time and again.

When the Chief Ministers of all seven provinces held a meeting in Pokhara in 2018, they set a common agenda for making their respective provinces prosperous. However, the federal government was not happy with the Chief Ministers' Pokhara Meeting. The Chief Ministers had the plan to submit the resolution of the Pokhara Meeting at the inter-state council meeting. But, the chairperson of the inter-state council (Prime Minister) postponed the meeting, which created some sort of gaps between the Chief Ministers with the Prime Minister in this regard. The major decisions of the Pokhara Meeting were concentrated on the transfer of physical infrastructure to the provincial governments, the demand and management of administrative staff, to expand of the power of the chief attorney of the province, the acquisition of land by the province, and other policy-related disputes.

Similarly, the meeting of chief attorneys, internal affairs and law ministers of all seven provinces was a milestone to consolidate their powers and rights. Both the meetings passed a resolution, which was submitted to the federal agencies, as a move to pile pressure on them to fulfill their demands. This phase was a conflicting phase between the federal and provincial governments. Such a type of conflict was sometimes latent or sometimes manifested. Madesh Province was a major stakeholder to raise reservations towards the federal government on issues and agendas of the budget allocation process, Federal Forest Act and Community Forest, National Forest of the Province, Province Police Administration and Peace and Security, and Province Public Service Commission.

In this phase, provincial governments were at the initial phase of their formation with a popular mandate from the people. The members of the province assembly had ambitions to carry out new functions. They had the desire to break the centralist metaphor through federalism and inter-governmental relationships. They even raised unrealistic slogans to the voters but it was unlikely to get fulfilled. In this phase provincial governments were facing structure adjustment problems, a lack of efficient human resource and inadequate laws to regulate the provincial governments. The traditional mindset of bureaucrats and technocrats was another setback for provincial governments.

The Chief Minister of Gandaki Province argues that in this phase basically, they were unable to empower the governing capacity our self. The first phase of our tenure passed with

confusion and conflict (ekantipur.com/news/2021). There were no laws enacted, no resources in place, and a lack of physical infrastructure and sufficient personnel (onlinekhabar.com, 2021). The notion of an "administrative unit" regarding the province was a centralist metaphor for the ruling political party.

Cooperation and concentrated phase. Nepal's federalism is a cooperative federalism, not a competitive one. This was the second phase of the IGR in Nepal and it could take some more for taking a firm shape. Provinces were commencing their internal cooperation and were concentrated on their development and service delivery system. Internally, provinces were also planning to implement their decisions of the Pokhara Meeting. Provincial governments were engaged with the federal government in terms of their provincial development and were conducting horizontal relations by linking some mega-projects including projects related to irrigation and hydropower. For instance, Gandaki Province and Lumbini Province were in a great deal for developing Kaligandaki Diversion Irrigation Project. When the federal government established a Project Office of Kaligandaki Diversion Irrigation Project in Rupandehi on June 27, 2021, the disputes again came to the fore. In this project, Gandaki Province strongly objected to the federal government's move and asked to immediately postpone the diversion of the river. However, there was no reaction from other provincial governments. Similarly, Gandaki Province was coordinating with the federal government for revenue sharing of the Annapurna Conversation Area Project. Thus, the provinces were coordinating and concentrating on their provincial development with the federal government. Similarly, Province No. 1 is coordinating with the federal government for its nomenclature. Although the right to declare the name of the province rests upon the respective provincial assembly as per the constitution, Province No. 1 is indeed waiting for the federal government's cooperation in naming the province. At the same time, Gandaki Province has launched three meetings regarding the coordination.

Table 2

Meetings of Province Coordination Council

Meeting date	Attendance	Invited members	Total attendees
28 May, 2018	209	43	252
27-28 November, 2018	209	205	414
21 October, 2018	208	19	226

Source: Office of the Chief Minister of Gandaki Province, 2019

These three meetings became a departure point regarding to IGR. The first meeting pointed out to making a strategic partnership between the provinces and local levels on the consumption and utilization of natural resources. Both governments agreed to consult each other while making the laws regarding the concurrent powers of both governments. Gandaki Province was joining hands with the local governments to promote intergovernmental relations. But, the other provinces don't have any such decision for such exercises. However, these three meetings could not decide on horizontal relations. After the third meeting on 18 October, 2021, no other meetings were convened nor were any decisions taken to coordinate vertical and horizontal relations.

In this phase, the Federal, Province and Local Level (Coordination and Interrelation) Act 2020 was induced by the federal government. This Intergovernmental Cooperation Act was a milestone for the federal and local governments because it provisioned some basic guidelines for intergovernmental relations. On the other hand, provinces are unstable due to the fluid political scenario in the federal government. The shadow of the federal government is a factor to coor-

dinate and cooperate with the provincial governments. As a result, provincial governments and cabinet portfolios were reshuffled in the respective provinces.

Political transition phase. Nepal has entered into the stage of a political transition phase while the federal parliament was dissolved in 2021 January. The repercussion of the federal parliament dissolution was visible in the provinces too. Provincial governments respectively started to vote for no confidence to the sitting chief ministers of the provincial governments. The provincial governments then faced political transition with the tussle for power. Out of seven provincial governments, five governments and their Chief Ministers were changed. This table shows changes in the political context after the third and a half year of the tenure of the province (Office of the Chief Minister of Gandaki Province, 2019).

Table 3

Formation and Reshuffle of the Province Ministries

Provinces	Took office	Resign/Reshuffle	Obtained vote	Composition of Government
Sudurpaschim	16 February, 2018	8 June, 2021 received vote of confidence	30 votes out of 52	The coalition led by Trilochan Bhatta
Karnali	16 February, 2018	16 April, 2021 won vote of confidence	22, out of 37 votes	The coalition led by Mahendra Bahadur Shahi
Lumbini	31 March, 2018	2 May, 2021 Resigned and reappointed	Reappointment as the leader of the largest party	The coalition government led by Shankar Pokhrel
Gandaki	16 February 2018	Unable to get a confidence vote	Got just 27 votes out of 60 votes	The coalition government led by Krishna Chandra Nepali Pokhrel
Madesh	14 February, 2018	Reshuffle on June 6, 2021		The coalition government led by JSP leader Lalbabu Raut
Bagmati Province	12 February, 2018	Reshuffled		The majority government led by Dormani Poudel
Province 1	14 February, 2018	Reshuffled		The majority Government led by Sherdhan Rai

Source: Office of the Chief Minister of Gandaki Province, 2019

As the provincial governments had to witness the political transition, the repercussion of federal politics came into existence in Gandaki Province and the Chief Minister of Gandaki Province lost his majority vote. This was the result of political rifts within the ruling party in the federal parliament after Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli dissolved the federal parliament. The Sudurpaschim, Karnali and Lumbini provinces also underwent the transitional phase of provincial politics.

During the transitional political phase, provinces can't deliver good policy as the needs of provinces. Managing these policy challenges demands coordination between actors and institutional forums at international, national, and sub-national levels, generating complex, multilevel governance challenges (Bernstein & Ashore, 2012; Oberthür & Gehring, 2006). For such transnational actors, the ability to exert influence at national and sub-national levels can crucially underpin their capacity to drive meaningful change on the ground (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012; Young, 2006). Theoretically identify and empirically document recurrent causal mechanisms of influence through which legitimating strategies influence the policy processes and outcomes targeted by transnational actors (Checkel, 2006).

Bureaucracy is a machine to implement government plans and policies, but the officials are not in favor of federalism because they think that their power and rights are being curtailed by this system. They have a major concern over resources and power.

Conclusion

Federalism is also characterized as a conflicting political system between the federal and provincial governments. Nepal's intergovernmental relation is facing the same issues as the constitutional powers and rights are ambiguous. Intergovernmental relations depend upon constitutional provisions and other federal laws. They have to truly apply the constitutional provisions in this regard. Similarly, provincial governments have to approach each other. Formal relations among the governments also deepen their internal relations. On the other hand, informal relations among the governments help develop government relations in the federal context. To sustain federalism in Nepal, intra-party and interparty cooperation is a must but that is not taken into account by the major political parties, which has marred the effective implementation of federalism and deepening intergovernmental relations. Also the crucial factor is the gap remaining among the political parties to grasp the essence of cooperative federalism. Similarly, Nepal's cooperative federalism failed to take a solid form since it did a very little in finalizing the federalized administrative setup, empowering all tiers of governments and fair resource allocation. With the change in mindset, and constitutional and financial mechanisms in place, the intergovernmental relations will also change with the change in the context in Nepal. Provincial governments are not institutionalized in Nepal but we have no other alternative. These governments have to exercise enough for their resilience.

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