

Decline of German Historicism: Friedrich Meinecke's theory of Historical Value

Yi Zhang

Researcher

Hunan International Economics University

scholarzhangyi@163.com

DOI: 10.3126/hj.v16i1.76374

Abstract

German Historism, a prominent historical school that flourished in Germany from the late 19th to the early 20th century, exerted considerable influence within the Western historical community. Despite its prominence, the reasons for the decline of this once-thriving school remain largely unexplained. Although there is an abundance of research on Friedrich Meinecke, the last leading figure of the German Historians, these studies have not effectively connected his historical ideas to the broader context of the school's decline. This oversight has led to a disconnection between the historical thought of the past and the historical currents of their times, imposing significant limitations on the research. This article, therefore, delves into the heart of Meinecke's historical value theory. It aims to conduct a qualitative analysis of the factors contributing to the decline of German Historism. This is achieved by examining the intertextual connections between Meinecke's work and the broader historiographical landscape, employing a range of historical theoretical tools, including the Philosophy of History, Comparative Historical Analysis, and Conceptual History.

Keywords: demise reasons, friedrich Meinecke, German Historicism, historical value theory, history of western historiography.

This article employs the historical perspectives of Friedrich Meinecke to dissect the factors contributing to the decline of German Historism. A prominent school of historiography from the late 19th to the early 20th century in Germany, German Historism profoundly impacted the Western historical community of that era. Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954), its preeminent figure, was celebrated for his scholarly work on German intellectual and cultural history, particularly on the interplay between power and morality. The origins of German Historism can be traced back to the embryonic "world historical" approach of George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1793-1831), who sought to uncover the laws of rational historical progression. Building upon Hegel's legacy, subsequent German historians further developed this approach, culminating in the formation of German Historism as a distinct historiographical school. Johann Gustav Droysen, a Prussian historian, significantly advanced the school's influence with the publication of his *Historik* in 1857 and 1882,

establishing German Historism as a widely recognized thought system within the Western historical community. The 1874 publication of Friedrich Nietzsche's *Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben* offered a critical perspective on German Historism, even equating it with the very essence of "history," thereby underscoring its extensive sway at the time. The decline of German Historism is often pinpointed to the publication of Ernst Troeltsch's *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* in 1922. By the 1930s, the school had effectively reached its conclusion. (Barracough, 1987). Despite the historical significance of this transition, the current historical community has yet to provide a comprehensive explanation for the demise of the once-thriving German Historism. This absence of clarity impedes a thorough understanding of the overarching development trends within the multifaceted and intricate history of the 20th century.

Unraveling the decline of German Historism hinges on an in-depth examination of the intellectual currents among historians during the period of its decline, particularly the presence of theoretical inconsistencies or inherent weaknesses - a shift from analyzing micro phenomena to dissecting macro historical trends. This article aims to render such a discussion both coherent and viable by integrating a suite of historical theoretical tools. It specifically draws upon the Philosophy of History, Comparative Historical Analysis, and Conceptual History, employing a range of perspectives, theories, and methodologies from scholars such as George G. Iggers, James Westfall Thompson, and Gianna Pomata, among others. These tools will be leveraged to re-evaluate Meinecke's oeuvre and associated scholarly work, as well as the texts and research related to the German Historians. Building upon this reassessment, the article will undertake a qualitative analysis to formulate a comprehensive explanation for the demise of German Historism. This approach seeks to bridge the gap between micro-level theoretical critiques and the broader macro-historical narrative, thereby enhancing our understanding of the school's historical trajectory and its eventual decline.

Rendering through Theories & Methodological Tools

In this article, the researchers have employed qualitative analysis techniques. Furthermore, the study incorporates a set of theoretical tools, which forms the substance of this particular section. These tools are integral to the analytical framework, ensuring a rigorous and nuanced exploration of the subject matter.

The historical philosophy underpinning this study is delineated as the domain concerned with the nature and genesis of historical knowledge. On one hand, history is portrayed as a body of knowledge constructed by historians, imbued with a philosophy that, for the people of its time, represented the essence of modernity (He, 1998; Troeltsch, 1922). Within this framework, the inquiry into the demise of German Historism fundamentally addresses the challenges and cessation in the production of historical knowledge that the school encountered. From James Westfall Thompson's (2017) perspective, the creation of historical knowledge is fundamentally a synthesis of rigorous scholarship with audacious interpretation. Given that historians within German Historism consistently upheld a high standard of knowledge, the crux of the issue lies in the realm of "bold interpretation."

Another significant dimension of this study is the application of comparative historical analysis, which concentrates on scrutinizing historical trends in both synchronic and diachronic contexts. Synchronically, German Historism encountered challenges from burgeoning historiographical movements, such as the Robinson-Colombia School led by James Harvey Robinson and the Annales School represented by Marc Bloch. Concurrently, there was a resurgence of "German idealism" within the humanities and social sciences in Germany, a movement that has been linked to Meinecke and his late phase of German Historism (Liebeschütz, 1957). Thus, the emergence of these new historical schools and the impact of the "German idealism" revival movement merit close examination. Diachronically, from the 18th century to the early 20th century, the mainstream of German historical thought evolved from Johann Gottfried Herder's cosmopolitan cultural nationalism to a nationalism more oriented towards power (Iggers, 2014). The entire trajectory of German Historism, from its inception, development, to its eventual decline, is encapsulated within this timeframe and its overarching trend. A comparative analysis of the phenomena and causal threads across its developmental stages may reveal the underlying reasons for its demise. Additionally, an influential event in Western historiography was Reinhold Niebuhr's assertion that history should be recognized as an independent science, signifying a shift in the discipline from exemplar history to speculative history (Gooch, 2017; Po percentta & Siraisi, 2005). It is pertinent to inquire whether Meinecke and German Historism conformed to this trend or had already embraced it. If the latter is true, it suggests that this trend may not be implicated in the decline of German Historism.

Additionally, this study employs conceptual history as a methodological framework. According to Kurt Riezler (1924), the core of history is a progression of evolving concepts and the interests they represent. From this vantage point, the essence of German Historism was fundamentally a construct of the ideological amalgamation between German nationalism and the authoritarian politics of its era. The crux of this intellectual orientation was the inherent necessity for open contention and the quest for legitimacy among nations and social classes (Berlin, 2000). A quintessential instance of this is Johann Gottfried Herder's state organic theory, which emerged during the Sturm und Drang period. Moreover, German historicism is not merely an artifact of rationalizing this ideology - it is, in essence, a romanticized embellishment. After all, "the natural law of the Enlightenment era transitioned towards historicism," (Meinecke, 1957a) implying an emphasis on the concept of rationality and the critical discourse it engendered. Consequently, this study should concentrate on discerning any shifts in the conceptual landscape and their interests that may have precipitated the obsolescence of the historical knowledge germane to German Historism. The investigation will explore whether such conceptual evolutions have rendered the traditional narratives and methodologies of German Historism obsolete or irrelevant in the evolving intellectual climate.

Traditional German Historicism and Meinecke's Historical Value Theory

In the annals of German historical thought, German historicism stands as a counterpoint to scientism, which champions "instrumental rationality." For the historians of German

historicism, "history" constitutes the bedrock of all humanistic inquiry (Chen, 1994). This conception of history underpins the epistemology of German historicism, advocating that true comprehension of the verities and meanings engendered by historical events is attainable only through history itself, encapsulated in the assertion that "humans do not have... nature, but history" (Gasset, 1943). This epistemological stance informs the German historicist view of history as an amalgamation of philosophical concepts and historical exemplars, thereby crafting a system of historical narration. Specifically, it involves the application of diverse post-Cartesian perspectives on life and epistemology within Western philosophy to the realm of historical study (Beard & Vagts, 1937). This approach also signifies the establishment of a compositional principle within the historical framework that differentiates between subject and object, with a focus on the subject as the central element.

Friedrich Meinecke posited that the seemingly divergent propositions by Leopold von Ranke, "what does man mean to history," and Jacob Christopher Burckhardt, "what does history mean to man," are in fact complementary and demand synthesis. The crux of this integration lies in forging a new and more profound trajectory in the most elemental and spiritual nexus between power and culture, life and history. The synthesis of these two perspectives yields the theory of historical values, a concept that encapsulates the essence of their combined insights (Kohn, 1954). This theoretical construct underscores the intricate interplay between human agency and historical significance, offering a nuanced understanding of the role of history in shaping and reflecting human experience and societal evolution.

Meinecke's theory of historical value asserts that historical value emerges from the praxis of effective historical inquiry, which possesses a surety more instinctive than that derived from logical abstraction. As such, the concept of historical value is expansive, extending to encompass an individual's political ideals and other aspirations, as well as the significant expressions of each autonomous spirit. Meinecke's (1928) rationale for this definition is rooted in the necessity to consider historical continuity within a novel and profound direction, one that constructs the most fundamental and spiritual ties between power and culture, life and history. His theory underscores that historical continuity naturally engenders individual uniqueness, contingent upon the differentiation of space and time, and is inherently subject to the sway of value judgments (Hey percentnn, 1919). These judgments necessitate the employment of "impression" as an intermediary criterion for apprehending the spirit veiled within history. Consequently, Meinecke established the premise that the value inherent in impressions is accorded precedence, recognized as a unique and irreplaceable embodiment of spiritual existence (Meinecke, 1928). This approach underscores the subjective yet profound role of individual perception in the interpretation and valuation of historical phenomena.

The cornerstone of historical value theory is rooted in a cultural-historical outlook. Influenced by the resurgence of German idealism, Meinecke posited that culture is inherently spontaneous, evolving from "spiritual-moral values." He critiqued Oswald Spengler's "civilization morphology," arguing that it was deficient in some form of

"spiritual-moral ideal." According to Meinecke (1928), culture emerges when an individual harness all their internal faculties to engage with nature. This force encompasses not only intellectual thought but also behavior that holds value in a more profound sense. Meinecke further elaborated that "the value of an era does not reside in what it produces, but in its own essence, in its true self" (Ranke, 2024), suggesting that every historical object possesses value-related attributes. This perspective underscores the intrinsic value of each epoch, not merely as a consequence of its tangible outputs but as an expression of its inherent, authentic nature (Meinecke, 1928). This viewpoint challenges a purely materialistic understanding of culture and history, advocating for a more holistic appreciation that acknowledges the spiritual and moral dimensions of human endeavor.

Under the influence of the German government's emphasis on historical reference, Meinecke refined his theory of historical values. He proposed a dichotomy of value: cultural values generated by the human soul and those unique to historical phenomena, shaped by the variability and interdependence of historiographical methods. This distinction implies that the evaluation of great cultural achievements and spiritual elements cannot be based solely on the magnitude of their causal impact. In Meinecke's (1928) perspective, cultural values arise when unique spiritual forces intersect with mechanical and biological causal sequences. He asserts that the comprehension of value hinges on the causal origins of history, categorized into three types of causality: mechanical, biological, and spiritual moral. These distinct forms of causality contribute to the unique complexity inherent in historical narratives. Concurrently, Meinecke delineates history into causal and super causal realms, with the super causal possessing life value. He critiques the common definition of historical concepts that focus solely on causality, arguing that this approach leads to a lack of internal harmony and a surrender to pure causal determinism. He posits that the essence of history transcends causality, encompassing value as well. The exploration of causality is, for Meinecke, a means to an end - the full restoration of spiritual value. The primacy of value preoccupies its own existence, enriching life and lending allure to causality. This perspective can be interpreted as Meinecke's historical rebuttal to positivism and objectivism concerning historical values, advocating for a more nuanced understanding that acknowledges the interplay between causality and value in the construction of historical knowledge and interpretation. (Meinecke, 1928)

In Meinecke's conception, the historical individual is constituted by phenomena that exhibit a positive, virtuous, and truthful trajectory, thereby imbuing them with significance and value for us. The more these trends embody the self-affirmation and survival of human structure and are elevated, the more potent and precious they become. For Meinecke, this represents "having faith and sustenance in history" (Iggers, 2014), and his theory of historical values serves as the ultimate testament to this belief. Meinecke's historical perspective, shaped by the philosophy of the mind, has been infused with spirituality and morality. In his historiographical approach, the history of ideas and the history of spirit, traditionally considered part of the historical record, have been elevated to the status of historical components with distinctive significance. This underscores Meinecke's belief in

the importance of intellectual and spiritual dimensions in the understanding and interpretation of history, reflecting a profound commitment to the exploration of human experience in its moral and spiritual aspects.

Meinecke's theory of historical values diverges from prior iterations of German historicism, particularly in its treatment of individuality. According to Meinecke, the portrayal of individuals is not merely a facet of historical scholarship but a vital component, integral to the methodology that seeks to apprehend the value and significance of history. This approach leverages the inherent malleability of individuals as a means to discern the collective spirit (Buck, 1999; Meinecke, 2009; Meinecke, 1957b; Zhang & Zhang, 2003). In contrast, earlier German historicism had placed a premium on an excessively abstract notion, incorporating a metaphysical dimension into its historical discourse (Meinecke, 2009; Scheler, 1999). Consequently, it fell short in fully elucidating the nexus between historical concepts and their value relationships. At its core, this approach was limited to extracting consciousness products that had been preserved and altered throughout history, thereby failing to capture the dynamic interplay of individual and collective historical forces.

The Defects of German Historicism and Meinecke's Solution

The preceding section established a foundational understanding by detailing German historicism and Meinecke's theory of historical values, underscoring the pivotal divergences in Meinecke's approach from that of his predecessors. With this groundwork laid, the subsequent section examines the manner in which Meinecke's theory of historical values confronts and seeks to resolve some of the intrinsic challenges that were characteristic of the early German Historicism tradition.

Speculative German historicism was inevitably ensnared by the allure of pure ideas, leading to an extreme of abstraction in its evolution. A quintessential instance of this tendency is the shift within German historicism away from the concept of natural rights, which fostered a sense of history and consequently inclined towards relativism. The peril of this relativism was its emphasis on the primacy of individuality and the nation-state's role in history, culminating in an almost obsessive veneration of their historical narrative. Meinecke (2008) regarded this as an unintended outcome of traditional German historicism's endeavor to forge an "active mirror" that would mediate the relationship between subject and object. Heinrich John Rickert (1986), from his vantage point on the interplay between historical concepts and values, noted that the efficacy of historical influence alone could never suffice as a benchmark for assessing the essence of history. This stance represents an attempt to reconcile the subject-object dichotomy through negation. Meinecke (1957c) introduced a moral realism standpoint: mature historicism necessitates a concordance of three elements-organic dynamics, individualized thinking, and moral judgment. This synthesis restructured the interpretive framework of historicism, circumventing the issue of excessive abstraction. Drawing on the Enlightenment's cyclical theory of history, Meinecke perceived history as a cyclical process that fosters both the universalization and specialization of individual personalities. History is articulated through

an indissoluble amalgamation of judgment, individuality, and universality. Moreover, Meinecke posited that history is an intrinsic and transcendent reality, which in turn shapes one's philosophical stance on history. For him, the philosophy of history represents the most definitive and transcendent historical perspective (Croce, 2005). From this vantage point, the constructs of nation and state are not artifacts of historical consciousness but are instead organisms defined by a liberal universalism. In this context, individual freedom and morality are integrated with public needs and values (Berlin, 2019). Meinecke viewed the state as originating from social collective phenomena, an objectively given potential. Thus, the state itself is capable of reaching a developmental stage characterized by unity, harmony, or a favorable equilibrium. At this stage, the rational concept of the state mitigates the tension between the individual and the state, redefining the role and mission of individuals within national movements-the state is not an end in itself but a medium through which historical values are realized. In this conclusion, the sanctity traditionally ascribed to the nation and the state is effectively dissolved.

Meinecke's historical philosophy, characterized by its advocacy for intuitive knowledge and imbued with a neoplatonic, devout, and mystical tint in its theory of historical values, effectively bridges the chasm of traditional relativism. This philosophical stance counters the historical veneration and grand narrative that often accompany relativistic perspectives, thereby mitigating their potential excesses and offering a more balanced and nuanced approach to the study of history.

Criticism: The Issue with Meinecke's Theory of Historical Value

In the preceding section, Meinecke's theory of historical values was shown to address a range of critical issues inherent in German historicism, particularly the problem of relativism and its associated ramifications. It is important to recognize, however, that Meinecke's theoretical contributions, while offering a corrective to these issues, did not entirely detach from the foundational constructs of German historicism. Consequently, his theory retained certain limitations and imperfections.

- i) German historicism places a strong emphasis on the ongoing evolution of historical knowledge, yet this understanding is often couched in mystical terms. As previously highlighted, Meinecke held the view that historical knowledge possesses a deterministic and transcendent quality. In his works, he (Meinecke, 1928; 1957d) asserts that "the historical world often mysteriously and openly creates new spiritual entities," suggesting that even the interconnections between historical phenomena are subject to divine will. This perspective is undeniably imbued with mysticism. For instance, in discussing the nature of historical knowledge, Meinecke (1928) posits that "the individual can't speak," implying a limitation on individual agency in the face of broader historical forces.
- ii) Meinecke's theory of historical values posits history as an intuitive discipline, asserting that "history grows from the true historicity" (Berlin, 2019). However, his conception intertwines the spiritual conditions of the individual with the

fabric of history itself, effectively merging the subject and object within the realm of historical cognition. This conflation presents a fundamental contradiction at the heart of Meinecke's endeavor to construct a historical system reminiscent of Montesquieu's approach. It results in a challenge to differentiate between the regularities and the concrete particularities within the philosophical understanding of history, thereby complicating the clarity and coherence of his theoretical framework.

- iii) Meinecke's pronounced focus on morality within the context of historical value risks devolving into moral centrism. From this vantage point, the lessons drawn from history are stripped of their political and moral dimensions, distilled into purely rational insights (Grafton, 2012). Driven by a profound reverence for life, Meinecke contemplates the interplay between the principle of power and moral ideals, advocating for an ethical standard of absolute goodness—a naive idealism that overlooks the complexities of historical explanation within an epistemological framework. Epistemological considerations of history entail the embodiment of universal objective truths within the specific contexts of time and space, and the manner in which history is constructed within such conceptual movements (Croce, 1913; Iggers, 2007). In other words, history, when viewed through an epistemological lens, is grounded in empirical judgments rather than on ideals. Any idealized "historical judgment" falls short in accounting for the diverse phenomena of the era (Beard & Vagts, 1937).
- iv) Meinecke's theory of historical values subtly embeds his political views. Although his "Voltairean historical philosophical combativeness" (Meinecke, 1936) is presented as a rational stance, it conceals ideological contradictions. Nietzsche noted that historicism, as emphasized by Meinecke after his disillusionment with Germany's political developments in the 1930s, is far from being a politically neutral cultural phenomenon. It is inherently interwoven with political concepts from the outset (Iggers, 2014). Meinecke (1936) views the state with a deep respect, advocating for a sense of national rationale. Thus, in his perspective, the actions of the state, even when they assume a heroic dimension, are perceived as being guided by pure intent. This viewpoint aligns with what Marvin Harris referred to as historical particularism, which may implicitly endorse a form of state supremacy (e.g. Prussian supremacy). In "Die Idee der Staatsrason," Meinecke develops a theological construct that incorporates bureaucratic elements, influenced by the submissive aspect of secular piety in Protestantism. He promotes a perspective that highlights the distinctiveness of German characteristics and development, suggesting that the degree of oppression influences the richness of individual imagination, leading to an uncritical acceptance of the prevailing order and its progression (Reed, 1996). Consequently, Meinecke defends state actions in history without reservation, which not only conflicts with his identity as a "nationalist liberal intellectual influenced by Max Weber and Friedrich Naumann" (Pois, 1972), but also

- contradicts his advocacy of historical teleology, which posits that "history is the liberation of individuals from objective strength" (Meinecke, 1936).
- v) Meinecke's theory of historical values serves as a rebuttal to Oswald Arnold Gottfried Spengler's cultural pessimism while also drawing inspiration from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's Friedrichism. In Meinecke's approach to historical compilation, there is a pronounced emphasis on recreating a more authentic vision of the past within its objective context, and he holds a belief that the trajectory of historical development is a progression towards a realm of freedom. He indeed transcended Hegel's concerns regarding "rational trickery," yet concurrently neglected the "disgrace" that Edmund Burke alluded to. Concretely, Meinecke's theory, while seemingly advocating a worldview of social progress, ultimately reverts to the formulation of grand narratives.
 - vi) Meinecke's philosophy of history accentuates the primal and canonical forms of human existence as a fundamental medium for historical analysis. However, this approach can engender internal conflicts due to the intrinsic properties of ideological concepts. Meinecke indeed harnessed and amalgamated the emotive upheaval of anti-traditionalism within historical discourse, innovatively incorporating empathy into the methodologies of historical research. This act of intellectual borrowing and the subsequent awakening it sparked can be characterized as a counter-revolutionary revolution, imbued with a pronounced eclecticism.

The aforementioned limitations and deficiencies render Meinecke's Theory of Historical Value unsuccessful in its attempt to salvage Traditional German History.

Conclusion

In this article, several conclusions have been reached:

- i) German historicism encountered a theoretical cul-de-sac, and although Meinecke mounted a stalwart defense of its principles, his endeavors ultimately proved to be of limited efficacy.
- ii) While Meinecke's theory of historical values tackled pivotal concerns within German historicism, notably relativism and its attendant repercussions, it did not achieve a complete departure from the foundational tenets of German historicism. Consequently, it retained inherent limitations and imperfections, leading to the failure of its endeavor.

The conclusions presented thus far indicate that German Historism had reached a theoretical impasse. As Lu (2011) has observed, Meinecke valiantly endeavored to defend the tenets of historicism, yet his efforts were somewhat ineffectual. The theoretical framework he introduced, the theory of historical values, was not without its own shortcomings and proved incapable of fully and effectively resolving the school's theoretical dilemmas, ultimately being unable to avert its progression towards the culmination of its historical trajectory. Subsequently, the emergence of "Historische Sozialwissenschaft," exemplified by the Bielefeld school, marked a paradigm shift that supplanted German

historicism, establishing itself as the predominant approach within the German historical community. This new direction in historical studies introduced novel methodologies and perspectives, signaling a departure from the traditional historicist narrative and ushering in a new era of historiographical thought.

References

- Barracough, G. (1987). *Dangdai shixue de zhuyao qushi* (Y. Yang, Trans.). Shanghai yiwu chubanshe.
- Beard, C.A. and Vagts, A. (1937). Currents of thought in Historiography. *The American Historical Review*. 42(3). 460-483. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1838848>
- Berlin, I. (2019). *Guannian de liliang* (Z.X. Hu and Z.L. Wei, Trans.). Yilin chubanshe.
- (2000). *The Power of Ideas*. Chatto&Windus.
- Buck, T.M. (1999). Zu Rankes Diktum von 1824: Eine vornehmlich textkritische Studie. *Historisches Jahrbuch*. 119. 159-185.
- Chen, Q.Y. (1994). Lishi yu wenhua, sixiang yu zhexue: renwenxue lilun fansi. *Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiu tongxun*. 4(3). 7-33.
- Croce, B. (1913). *Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic* (D. Ainslie, Trans.). percentmillan&Co.
- (2005). *Lishixue de lilun he lishi* (S.G. Tian, Trans.). Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe.
- Gasset, J.O.Y. (1943). *Geschichte als System*. De Gruyter.
- Gooch, G.P. (2017). *Shijiushiji lishixue yu lishixuejia (shang)*. Shangwu yinshuguan.
- Grafton, A. (2012). *What was History: The Art of History in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge University Press.
- He, Z.W. (1998). *Hezhaowu xueshu wenhua suibi*. Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe.
- Hey percentnn, E. (1919). Below, V. Die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung von den Befreiungskriegen bis zu unsern Tagen. *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung*. 38(1). 437-440.
- Iggers, G.G. (2007). *Geschichtswissenschaft im 20 Jahrhundert*. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- (2014). *Deguo de lishiguan* (G. Peng and H. Gu, Trans.) Yilin chubanshe.
- Kohn, H. (1954). *German History: Some New German Views* (H.H. Rowen, Trans.). Beacon Press.
- Liebeschütz, H. (1957). Friedrich Meinecke and The Revival of German Idealism. *German Life and Letters*. 10(4). 285-288. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0483.1957.tb01171.x>
- percent, N. (2020). Meinike de sixiangshi guannian yanjiu. *Beifang luncong*. 47(3). 109-117.
- Meinecke, F. (1928). Kausalität und Wert in der Geschichte. *Historische Zeitschrift*. 137(1). 1-27.
- (1936). Die Entstehung des Historismus. In: *Meinecke Werke ZweiBande*. R.Oldenbourg.
- (1957a). Aphorismen: Allgemeines. In *Meinecke Werke IV*. K.F.Koehler Verlag.
- (1957b). Persönlichkeit und Gechichtliche Welt. In *Meinecke Werke IV*. K.F.Koehler Verlag.
- (1957c). Aphorismen: Möser, Herder, Goethe. In *Meinecke Werke IV*. K.F.Koehler Verlag.
- (1957d). Deutung eines Rankeswotes. In *Meinecke Werke IV*. K.F.Koehler Verlag.

- (2008). *percentjiyaweilizhuyi* (Y.H. Shi, Trans.). Shangwu yinshuguan.
- (2009). *Lishizhuyi de xingqi* (Y.H. Lu, Trans.). Yilin chubanshe.
- Pois, A.R. (1972). *Friedrich Meinecke and German Politics in the Twentieth Century*. University of California Press.
- Po percentta, G. and Siraisi, N.G. (2005). *Historia: Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe*. MIT Press. <https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/3521.001.0001>
- Ranke, L. -Von. (2024). *Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte*. Projekt Gutenberg. Retrieved from <https://www.projekt-gutenberg.org/ranke/epochen/epochen.html>
- Reed, T.J. (1996). *Thopercents percentnn: The Uses of Tradition*. Oxford University Press.
- Rickert, H.J. (1986). *Wenhuakexue he ziranhexue* (J. L. Tu, Trans.). Shangwu yinshuguan.
- Riezler, K. (1924). *Idee und Interesse in der politischen Geschichte*. Die Dioskuren.
- Scheler, M. (1999). *Shele xuanji* (W.D. Cao, Trans.). Sanlian shudian.
- Thompson, J.W. (2017). *Lishi zhuzuo shi (xia): Shiba ji shijiu shiji*, Fence 3 (B.Y. Sun and D.F. Xie, Trans.). Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe.
- Troeltsch, E. (1922). *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*. Beim verlag.
- Zhang, G.Z. and Zhang, G.Y. (2003). *Shixue: wenhua zhongde wenhua*. Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe.