

**Nepali Communist and Their Internalized Cultural Values**Kanshi Prasad Adhikari<sup>1</sup><sup>1</sup>APhD Scholar, Central Department of Anthropology, Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur, Nepal<sup>1</sup>Corresponding Author: [kpadhikari@tufohss.edu.np](mailto:kpadhikari@tufohss.edu.np)

Article History: Received: Nov. 14, 2022

Revised: Jan. 8, 2023

Received: Jan 11, 2023

**Abstract**

The communist political leadership in Nepal is the subject of this article, which focuses on their ideology and practices. Despite the fact that they identify as communists and support ideal political systems that feature equality, freedom, citizenry, the rule of the working class, and universal human rights, their internalized cultural values are centered on the hegemonic domination of one cultural group, gender, kinship, religion, area, and also serve the interests of power and wealth. The main features of communist political leadership are factionalism, opportunism, anarchy, individualism, petty bourgeoisie egoism, ultra leftism, double roles like right and leftist, reactionary and revisionist, as well as double roles like right and left. They declared themselves to be radical anarchist individualists who supported the monarchy in addition to adhering to Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist ideologies. The paper's foundation for this is scientific work in the areas of anthropology, sociology, political science, history, and other subjects by authors from Nepal and abroad. This study's major objective is to close the gap between communist leadership theory and practice in Nepal. Which of their internalized traditional cultural ideas have an impact on their leadership responsibilities? In order to analyze social scientists who are based on the communist leadership of Nepal and other nations, the paper uses empirical research with a primary focus on the study.

*Keywords:* Culture, Communist, ideology, factionalism, Maoist, hegemony

**Introduction**

The study examines the variations in the political leadership's ideology and practices that are seen among Communists. Due to their affinity for particular feudal cultural values based on hegemonic dominance by one dominating caste group, gender, kinship, religion, regional, bargaining with money, reciprocity of encouraging each other's, and working for their benefit, the communist leadership's philosophy and techniques appear to be feudal. They debate ideas and political systems including citizenship, equality, freedom, the rule of the working class, and fundamental human rights in their philosophy. Every individual accepts a set of standards and values that have been created by others through the process of socialization, which involves assimilating the values and conventions of a certain culture. Here, something—a concept, a thought, or a deed—moves from outside the mind or personality to an area within it that I've termed the feudal values region. This makes me ponder the communist political elite's cultural attitudes. Do they support their ideology or do they act in accordance with their internalized value systems? In preparation for my intended research effort, I have reviewed some pertinent scholarly literature, including books, journal articles, unpublished dissertations, and local news websites. I have done this to present a historical overview of the communist political leadership of Nepal and some other communist movements, as well as their nature, culture, and practices.

In a different approach, this review study is positioned in a revolutionary environment for radical social change and anti-state belief systems as people sever ties with previous social networks and forge new ones. Many anthropologists have investigated political violence and revolutions from an anthropological point of view. To do this, Sara Shneiderman concentrates on the expansion of the Maoist Movement and the rise of political consciousness in Thagmi village (Shneiderman, 2010). Shah and Ramirez (2004) examine the Maoist conflict's geopolitical dynamics (Shah & Ramirez, 2004). The major topics of Anne de Sale's essays on studying in the Rukum district include organizing village life and the movement's early stages (de Sales, 2003). The insurrection in a community in the Kaski district is then further described by Judith Pettigrew in detail (Pettigrew, 2003). In writings by Dipak Thapa and Kiyoko Ogura, the history of Maoist development in the village of Jelbang in Rolpa, experiences with excessive violence, and having a higher fatality rate in Jelbang are further investigated (Thapa, ed. 2003 & Ogura, 2007b). Pettigrew and Schneiderman assert that Maoism established a distinct national identity in a rural area that was disconnected from the nation's development discourse (Pettigrew & Shneiderman, 2004). Additionally, Marie Lecomte's book *Tilouine* focuses on the Maoist operations during the Red Terror era as well as the Maoist insurgency at a later date (Tilouine, 2004). In addition to discussing the communist revolution and its insurgency, several other academics conduct research on the Maoist uprising, including its discourse, development, and conclusion. Many other anthropologists, including Lewis Taylor and Orin Starn, who focused on the Maoist revolution in Peru (Starn 1999; Taylor 2006), Norma Krigner and David Lan, who studied the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, and Ricardo Falla, who studied the Palestinian liberation struggle, have studied the communist revolution and its political movement in their own contexts (Bianco 2001; Hinton 1996). All of these anthropologists have written about the revolution's impact and reality. They also depict the revolution as a profound shift that severed ties to previous support networks in order to forge new ones (1996, Hinton).

### **Objective of the Study**

To examine how Nepal's mainstream communist political leadership operates and to evaluate its philosophy and tactics

### **Methodology**

Academic journals, books, articles, news websites, PhD theses that have not yet been published, as well as historical and archival sources, all served as secondary sources for this study. The empirical examination of writings in the anthropology, history, sociology, and political science departments. The empirical analysis of the literature is based on the social, cultural, and political backdrop of the communist political leadership. For facts and information, reputable authorities in anthropology, sociology, political science, history, and political activism are consulted. In their books and papers, the scholars used both qualitative and quantitative approaches. In addition to collecting secondary materials from the scholarly literature, including books, articles, news portals, historical, and archive sources, numerous researchers used ethnographic data collection techniques to gather their primary sources. Exploratory and descriptive research approaches are useful in gathering a range of leadership perspectives and world views in order to understand people's internalized cultural values and political leadership practices.

During my assessment of the academic literature, I paid particular attention to anthropological writing about communist political leadership and its activism. The majority of the researchers are from outside of Nepal and come from various academic fields. An ethnographic writing is connected to their full research project. Judith Pettigrew (2004), Marie Lecomte-Tilouine (2004), Anne de Sale (2003), Saubhagya Shah and Philippe Ramirez (2004), Kiyoko Ogura (2007b), Pettigrew (2004), and Sara Shneiderman (2010) discuss the Maoist revolution in Nepal for this. The communist revolution and its political movement were studied by numerous anthropologists in their particular contexts, as was done above.

### **Review of Literature**

People around the world are divided by political views, religion, caste, and other things. In other words, the globe currently has two distinct political philosophies. The left promotes social equality and egalitarianism in contrast to the right, which favors free enterprise, private property rights, and frequently defends socially accepted values. One of the most widely accepted political spectrums is the left-right one, with right-wing politics being considered as the opposite of left-wing ones (McClosky; Chong, 1985).

Elites are a result of institutionalized leadership in modern society, when authority has been institutionalized. In essence, two different elite groups: 1. People who are involved in politics or who make choices are considered political elites. 2. Elites in government, academia, and religion (Mills, 1956). The economic elite now have an excessive amount of power at the top of the social structure, according to Hunter, who shares Burnham's view (Hunter, 1953). The leadership of the party should serve as a living embodiment of its principles, objectives, and policies. Leadership is crucial for the party and for society as a whole. It serves as the primary conduit between the party and the rest of society. Class, reputation, and party, however, have historically been the origins of leadership power. Physical, social, political, economic, and other forms of power that establish hierarchies in society can all be viewed as forms of power in this context. I have concentrated more on communist leadership, including its theory, practices, nature, and culture in Nepal, by outlining the characteristics of leadership.

Feudal lords are based on how something is produced. Katz uses Marx's concept of "capitalist representation" to explain how he thinks feudal class relations were abolished and how a capitalist class with private ownership of the means of production and a working class with only labor as property were created (Katz, 1993). This is described by Emile Durkheim using the idea of social facts. Social institutions like faiths, morals, and cultural norms are examples of "social facts" since they put the interests of the individual ahead of the needs of maintaining social control and order. His major claim is that, if human behavior were to originate from within, biology or psychology would be sufficient to analyze it (Durkheim, 1986). The communist political leadership's social structure hasn't changed throughout time; instead of doing so, they've promoted their traditional ideals, which are different from Marxist theory. The most they could do was to compare Nepalese society to that of the then-Chinese country, which they described as semi-feudal and semi-colonial.

The Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Nepal was the Naxalite gang, which started in a small area of Jhapa in the eastern Terai in 1971, then grew to 8 districts east of Kathmandu in 1975, and then continued to grow to 35 districts until it changed its name to the ML in 1978. Out

of a total of 75 districts in the country, there were 14 zones and 56 districts in the latter days of the Panchayat government. The communist party, however, saw numerous splits later on as a result of the leadership's personal ambitions. The rightist movement is corrupted by intra-party ideological conflict because of its impact on global society. For instance, Charu Majumdar's political attitude was part of the split communist movement in Nepal that emerged during the Jhapa struggle and was influenced by the global and Indian communist movements.

In line with its political platform of populist multiparty democracy, the communist party CPN (UML) had an ideology that was adjusted in favor of liberal democratic values. The CPN-UML identifies as "representing the proletariat and working class" and declares that its main goal is "to defeat bureaucratic capitalism, imperialism, and comprador feudalism." The party's governing principle is its adherence to Marxism and Leninism. Businessmen who support nationalism, middle-class people, intellectuals, etc. are among its allies (CPN (UML) Central Committee, 1991). The Pushpa Lal faction favored obtaining Naulo Janabad as soon as possible in the 1970s rather than considering a peasant armed revolution. An extreme Maoist named ML promoted proletarianization and disapproved of bourgeois schooling. Instead of growing its structure and influence across the nation, the party focused on securing its position in particular areas. It was also quite rigorous about the four requirements for unification with other communists. They included having entire trust in Maoism, adhering fervently to the Naxalite principle of "annihilating class enemies," comprehending the need for an armed revolt, and choosing to fight for forcibly capturing local lands (Rawal, 1988).

The armed struggle was started in Jhapa to implement Charu Majumdar's political theory as a revolutionary idea in Nepalese politics. The crucial question in the conflict was whether or not an armed conflict was necessary, but other leaders favored it. They started an armed movement as a result, adhering to Charu's political viewpoint. Similar to how the CPN (Maoist) adopted both the Russian tactic of armed rebellion and the Chinese strategy of a protracted people's war (entry from villages to towns and cities) (Sharma, 2003), the parliament parties believe in a capitalist version of multiparty democracy and monarchy (Upreti, 2006), and the palace appears intent to establish the monarchy's domination. Ideological conflict between the fighters is being caused by these three beliefs, which seem to contradict with one another (Upreti, 2006).

The afro-mentioned researchers have studied about communist leadership from different perspectives, but they have left untouched the issue of internalizing cultural values of communist leadership of Nepal. To fulfill the research gap, this research work was conducted.

### **Political Leadership of the Communist Party after the 1950s**

The key characteristics of the communist political leadership after Nepal's democratic revolution in the 1950s were factionalism, opportunism, anarchy, individualism, petty bourgeoisie egoism, ultra leftism, double duty as rightist and leftist, reactionary and revisionist. They also adhered to Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist ideologies despite portraying themselves as extreme anarchists who defend the monarchy in their daily lives. By dismantling the prevailing "feudal" order, they have pushed for social reform ever since the communist party was created. As part of their dedication to a combative war against the feudal and capitalist systems, they have entrusted China to acquire for training (Rawal, 2007, p. 42).

By adopting the NDR program and electing Man Mohan Adhikari as GS, the Communist Party's first congress, which met in secret in 1954, repudiated the Delhi settlement as well as

American and British "imperialism." The communist party had to recognize constitutional monarchy in order to withdraw its ban at the time.

At the second congress, they upheld their political stance by rejecting the constitutional assembly and fairyland democracy (1957). Keshar Jung Rayamajhi states explicitly in support of the palace that communism would be absurd and that in democracies; the leadership is split between "revisionist" and "revolutionary" factions. Since then, this conflict has been caused by leaders' aspirations, hunger for power, and desire for higher positions (The CPN, Barga Shangharsha, 1978). In another, Rayamajhi and Bishnu Bahadur Manandhar were at odds; Rayamajhi was a "Pro-Russian communist" who was charged with supporting Panchayat and playing silly games. Rayamajhi charged Bishnu Bahadur Manandhar with being a CIA spy and deserting the party (1981, New Weekly).

Pushpa Lal supported the king's constitution at the third congress in April 1962, claiming it was totally democratic (Nepal Press Digit, 1959), but Tulsi Lal charged Pushpa Lal with violating the conditions of the agreement and party discipline by endorsing anarchy (Tulsi Lal Amatya, Nepal Communist Andolanma Dekhparaka Matvavedharu, CPN: n. d., p. 25). Tulsi Lal is to blame for the groupism that grew within the party, the contempt for democratic centralism, and the humiliation that led to the party's adoption of a "revisionist" agenda (Pushpa Lal, Chhanieka Rachanaharu, p. 32-58). In a distinct case, Keshar Jung Rayamajhi (Pro-Russian blocs/Soviet support movement) organized the Third Central Conference in 1966. Pushpa Lal created the Central Organizing Committee in 1967, and the Third National Conference was held in 1968. The leadership of NDR Pushpa Lal opposed Gurkha recruitment, Indian monopoly capitalism, and Anglo-US imperialism (K. C., 2000, p. 22). He received harsh criticism for taking a "extreme communist" position akin to Ranadiwe of India.

In the Fourth Congress, which officially split apart in 1992–1993, Nirmal Lama headed the minority while Mohan Baidhya and Bhakta Bahadur Shrestha headed the majority. While the majority was known as the Fourth Congress, the minority ran in the general Rastriya Panchayat election. The CPN (M) Party has existed since the 7th congress of the ML, which took held in 1980. The ML is accused of leading with a dual role—rightist opportunism (Rato Tarbar, 1977) and leftist—and of having fundamentally abandoned the ideas of Marxism and Leninism by presenting extraneous components in the name of principle.

Vaidya's viewpoint was opposed by Bhandari Madan, who labeled the multiparty system as "Imperialist" and said that its tactics covertly supported "Panchayat nationalists." Vaidya, however, disagreed with Bhandari and argued that the UML did not fight against India's hegemonic economic embargo on Nepal. C. P. Mainali of ML claimed that an economic blockade was wrongly enforced and that the Panchayat system and Indian hegemony must be actively challenged. J. N. Khanal outlined the failures of the Mainali plan once more. He claimed that the economic blockade on India received less attention at the summit than the anti-Panchayat campaign. The Panchayat system of administration was seen as the principal enemy of the communist movement in Nepal.

Assert that the UML will change society by peacefully forming a government. When compared to the revolutionary effort, it is a sharp contrast. It has therefore already sunk to the level of the capitalist and revolutionary party (Shrestha, B. S. 1995). Similarly, Nanda Kumar Pasain's Samyabadi Party does not accept CPN (UML) as a Communist party (MA-LE-MA). It was "bourgeoisie reformist" and "capitalist." The CPN (UML) is not a radical communist party;

it was simply a communist party in name. Young revolutionaries fed up with the party's old guard and motivated by the Naxalite movement in East Bengal, India, and China's "Cultural Revolution" (Karki and Seddon, 2003, p. 11), launched their movement.

The CPN (Masal) 5th Congress, which took place in Ayodhya, India, in November 1984, Mohan Baidhya was selected as the GS. Ideological and organizational internal problems were not resolved. After 1986, the CPN (Masal) split into the CPN and the CPN (Masal). By placing several people in custody, the authorities had put an end to it. In his attempt to "cover up" the party's role, GS Mohan Baidhya was unsuccessful. In 1987, Prachanda visited Bihar, India, to attend the Maoist Communist Center to learn about guerrilla warfare (MCC). Retired NA and Indian Gorkha army leaders gave the instruction. As a result, Mohan Baidhya decided to appoint Prachanda as the party's general secretary in 1988. In Siranchwok, a rural region of the Gorkha province, Prachanda oversaw the education of 13 core Mashal members in the foundations of guerrilla warfare in 1988. In 1988, when it was debatable whether to call Mao's philosophy "Maoism" or just "Mao thinking," the CPN (Mashal) adopted the name "Maoism." The RIM and SP of Peru, two international radical communist organizations that provided not only inspiration but also knowledge on doctrine and military strategies for extremely violent conflict, were tied to the Maoists (Adhikari, 2014, p. 7). Contrary to what is commonly believed, the monarchy was what initially started the Maoist movement, which may have had a core concept.

The CPN (M) emphasized the "agrarian revolution" based on rural areas from the declaration of the people's war at the 6th congress held in November 1991 to the CC meeting held in July 1966. Furthermore, critics of the CPN (UML) have called the party's leaders "extreme terrorists" and that the CPN (M) is "extremist in political nature and terrorist in operations" (Central Committee, CPN (UML), 1998, pp. 34–35). The democratic revolution's ideological and political targets were monarchy, expansionist and imperialist nations like India, America, and Britain, as well as feudalism, comprador capitalism, bureaucratic capitalism, and imperialism or monarchy (CPN (UC), 1992, p. 9). One of the CPN (UC-Masal) factions reportedly denounced the CPN (M) for its "ultra-left deviation" and "opportunism, anarchist individualism, and petty bourgeoisie egoism" on page 57 of the organization's 2002 publication. The party regarded the struggle of the people as nothing more than a "alternative" because everything—aside from state power—is an illusion (Basant, 2013, p. 330).

In light of this, the communist party is merely a Social Democratic Party from an intellectual and theoretical position, although possessing a communist flag and banner as part of its general historical background. They call one other out for being a Gaddar, an anarchist CIA agent, a reactionary revisionist, a petty bourgeois, a rightist, and other things. This interpretation holds that political parties' philosophies and methods are increasingly diverse. They subscribe to one political theory yet put another one into practice when it comes to policy. The political leaders of the Communist Party in Nepal are all egotistical and driven by self-interest. Everything, with the exception of governmental authority, is an illusion.

Due to the complete inefficiency of the politicians and the divide and obscurity brought on by individual and political ideology, Nepal does not have a better political system. Politicians are dishonest and dysfunctional; newbies won't appreciate outstanding work or welcome constructive criticism, and they'll encourage finger-pointing (Mahat, 2017).

The communist movement in Nepal was a result of the international communist movement's lack of a clear plan for the Nepali revolution due to the conflict between the working

class and the peasants, according to historian and expert Prof. Dr. Surendra K. C. Despite the fact that one leadership group called for strengthening the parliamentary system, another wrote to the King to try to keep the political balance between the bourgeoisie and the working class. Even if one leadership group favored strengthening the parliamentary system, another wrote to the King to try to keep the political balance between the bourgeoisie and the feudal powers (K. C., 1995). In his priceless work, Anirudhra Gupta goes into great detail about the party politics, political orientation, structure, and manner of the communist party. The author also briefly discussed the communist party of Nepal in this context, which was established by a number of young people from Nepal with help from the communist party of India (Gupta, 1964). Discussions on the Communist Party as a result, K. C. and Gupta, were a result of an international movement supported by the Indian Communist Party.

Lok Raj Baral asserts that the Nepali government was built against its will in his article "Nepal: Problems of Government" from 1993. Conflict, along with ideological uncertainty and ineptitude, is the main challenge the communist party and the state must overcome (Baral, 1993). One of the party's leading figures, D. P. Adhikari, talks about the history of the communist party, their socialist movement, and the interparty ideological conflict (Adhikari, 1964).

Several times, the autocratic regime of Nepal was the target of the Communist movement. Nepalese view capitalism, the formation of a people's republic, a lovely bourgeois monarchy, corruption, and feudalism as myths because of the inherent disparities between communist and capitalist teachings and practices. Ideology failed for Nepalese communists, but their internalized traditional value system succeeded. They incite one another, acting in contravention to their ideas. They merely perform government duties.

In another, Nepali politician and activist Bhim Rawal claims that the Maoist insurgency was political violent property devastation, human and material hunting, disruption of social order, and state structure, and that they plagiarized the Indian idea of secularism and federalism (Rawal, 2020). The basic and indirect causes of the Maoist insurgency are also covered by Simkhada and Oliva (Simkhada and Oliva, 2006). In a similar vein, Pathak's book "Politics of People's War and Human Rights in Nepal" looked at the philosophical and intellectual foundations of the Maoist insurgency and human rights while discussing the connection between these topics (Pathak, 2005). Similar to this, Patel contends in "The Making of Cash Maoism in Nepal" that the CPN (Maoists) did not adhere to the long-term guerrilla warfare principles. In a similar vein, Patel contends in "The Making of Cash Maoism in Nepal" that the CPN (Maoists) did not adhere to the principles of protracted guerrilla warfare from the start. At that point, the 40th demand, which dealt with nationality, popular democracy, and means of subsistence, remained unfulfilled. They merely utilized the successful accomplishment of the socialist enterprise as a stepping stone to enter bourgeois parliamentary democracy. There, it adopted a political philosophy that placed a premium on quick victory, turning it into "cash Maoism" (Patel, 2019).

Above all, a review of the literature reveals that the communist party of Nepal was a product of international movements and organizations that attacked state institutions and social order by looking for individuals and property. They lack a clear objective, which hinders them from overcoming the gaps in kinship, family, and caste. They also divided people into groups based on their political ideas. Nepal now exists in a semi-feudal authoritarian state with social, cultural, and political hypocrisy as a result of the communist party's policies.

## Conclusion

In the case of Nepal, the communist leadership looks to be corrupt, opportunistic, anarchist, reactionary, revisionist, petty bourgeois, and ultra-leftist. The main problems with communism also include ideological ambiguity, inefficiency, and intra-party conflict. Since the first Congress, they haven't worked for the People's Republic and have only ever been concerned with individuality. Posing as a CIA agent, anarchist, or right-wing opportunist while supporting Panchayat. They are never regarded as leftists or patriots, but rather as opportunists who just intend to gain by robbing, killing, and destroying property. By doing this, they have prevented both the present and future creation of the proletariat's dictatorship. These are the main objections advanced by Nepal's communist political elite opposing the creation of a People's Republic. The People's Republic of Nepal is the subject of rumors. Similar to Nepal, the communist leadership of today failed because to internal issues. The core tenet of Nepal's communist political leadership is the stark difference between their goals and actions. They don't appear to be democratic or communist; rather, they seem to be feudalist since they oppose the fundamental ideas of Marxism and support their own deeply ingrained traditional cultural norms. These are the primary stances that communists in Nepal take. . This research is unique for future study in another way because, according to many academics and scholars, I have not addressed the issues of ideology and practices of mainstream communist political leadership and its cultural viewpoint, particularly in the situations of the CPN (UML) and CPN (Maoist) or modern Maoist movements.

## References

- Adhikari, A. (2014). *The Bullet and The Ballot Box: The Story of Nepal's Maoist Revolution*. New Delhi: Aleph Book Company.
- Adhikari, D. P. (1964). *Nepal Communist Party Bhitrako Saidhantik Matvet K Ho?* Banaras.
- Amatya, T. L. (N. D). *Nepal Communist Andolanma Dekhparaka Matavedharu*, CPN, P. 25
- Baral, L. R. (1993). *Nepal: Problems of Government: Governing South Asia*. Centre for Policy Research. Delhi: Konark Publishers, c1993 xiii, p. 241. ISBN: 8122003044
- Basant, T. B. (ed. 2013). *Nepali Communist Aandolan Ra Janakrantika Dastabejharu*. Part-1, Kathmandu. Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Magrant Rajya Sammelan Ayojak Samiti.
- Bianco, L. (2001). *Peasants without the party: grass-roots movements in twentieth century China*. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.
- Burnham, J. (1943). *The Machiavellians Defenders of Freedom*. Putnam & Co, London.
- Central Committee, CPN (UML). ( 1991). *Communist Party of Nepal: Political Declaration*, Approved by the meeting of National Council on January 1991. Kathmandu: *Central Committee*, CPN (UML).
- Central Committee, CPN (UML). (1998). *Political Report Passed by the Sixth National Congress of Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) on January 25-31, 1998*. Kathmandu: Central Committee, Communist Party of Nepal (UML). Kathmandu: *Central Committee*, CPN (UML).
- CPN (Mashal). (1979). Year. 7, No. 1 The Official Organ CPN 4<sup>th</sup> Congress. (The CPN, P.11
- CPN. (1978). *Barga Shanghrsha (Class Struggle)*. CPN, Issue No .6, Jestha 2035.
- De Sales, A. (2003). *The Kham Magar country: Between Ethnic Claims and Maoism*. Translated by D. Gellner. New Delhi: Social Science Press.



- Durkheim, E. (1986). *An Introduction to Four Major Works*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. Pp. 60-81.
- Falla, R. (1994). *Massacres in the Jungle: Ixcán, Guatemala*. Boulder: Westview Press
- Gupta, A. (1964). *Politics in Nepal: A Study of Post Rana Political Development and Party Politics*. Bombay: Allied Publications Pvt. Ltd.
- Hinton, W. (1966). *Fanshen: A documentary of revolution in a Chinese Village*. New York: *Monthly Review: an Independent Socialist Magazine*.
- Hunter, F. (1953). *Community power structure: A study of decision makers*. University of North Carolina Press.
- K. C., S. (1995). *Nepal Ma Samyabadi Aandolanko Ithash* (History of Communist Movement of Nepal) (2006-2019). PhD Unpublished Thesis. Tribhuvan University: Kathmandu.
- K. C., S. (2000). *Aithasik Dastabeja Sangraha* (Collection of Historical Document). Kathmandu: Pairavi Prakashan.
- Karki, A. and Seddon. (2003). *The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspectives*. Delhi: Adroit Publishers.
- Katz, C. J. (1993). Karl Marx on the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism. *Kluwer Academic Publishers*. Printed in the Netherlands, 22, 363-389. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00993533>
- Lan, D. (1985). *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and spirit mediums in Zimbabwe*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lecomte-Tilouine, M. (2004). Regicide and Maoist Revolutionary Warfare in Nepal: Modern Incarnations of a Warrior King. *Anthropology Today* 20(1): 13–20. (Trans: David Gellner).
- Levi, W. (1956). Politics in Nepal. *Far Eastern Survey*, 25 (3), 39-46. DOI: 10.2307/3023744
- Mahat, J. J. (2017). Good Political Culture. *The Kathmandu Post*.
- McClosky, H. & D. Chong (1985). Similarities and Differences between Left-Wing and Right-Wing Radicals. *British Journal of Political Science*. 15 (3): 329-363. doi:10.1017/S0007123400004221. ISSN 1469-2112
- Mills, C. W. (1956). *The Power Elite*. Galaxy Book, GB-20. ISBN: 13:978-0195133547
- Muni, S.D. 2003. Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The Challenge and Response. Delhi: *Rupa & Co. in association with Observer Research Foundation*. 134 pp., price: IRs 195.
- Ogura, K. (2007b). Maoists, People, and the as Seen from Rolpa and Rukum, in H. Ishii, D. Gellner, and K. Nawa (eds). *Politica Social Transformations in North India and Nepal*, (Social Dynamics in Northern South Asia, Vol. 2) [Japanese Studies on South Asia]. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Patel, P. (2019). *The Making of 'Cash Maoism' in Nepal: A Thabangi Perspective*. Adarsh Books, New Delhi. ISBN-10:81-8363-142-8
- Pathak, B. (2005). *Politics of People's War and Human Rights in Nepal*. Kathmandu: BIMIPA Publication.
- Pettigrew, J. (2003). *Guns, Kinship and fear: Maoists among the Tamu-mai (Gurungs)*. In Resistance and the state: Nepalese experiences, ed. D. Gellner, 305–325. Delhi: Social Science Press.
- Pettigrew, J., & S. Shneiderman. (2004). Women and the Maobaadi: Ideology and agency in Nepal's Maoist movement. *Himal SouthAsia*, 2004. 17 (1): 19–29.
- Ramirez, P. (2004). *Maoism in Nepal: Towards a Comparative Perspective*. In M. Hutt (1998), Himalayan 'People's War': Nepal's Maoist Rebellion (pp. 192-224).C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.

- Rawal, B. (1988). *Nepal Ma Samyabadi Andolan: Udbhab, Vikash Ra Bartaman Avastha* (Communist Movement in Nepal: Origin, Evolution and Recent Development), Kathmandu: Samana Pradashan, pp. 89.
- Rawal, B. (2007). The Communist Movement in Nepal: Origin and Development. Kathmandu: *Achham-Kathmandu Contect Forum, Communist Party of UML*
- Shah, S. (2004). *A Himalayan Red Hurring? Maoistt Revolution in the Shadow of Lagacy Raj*. In M. Hutt (1998), Himalayan 'People's War': Nepal's Maoist Rebellion (pp. 192-224).C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
- Sharma, P. R. (1989). *Nepali Culture and Society: Reflection on Some Historical Currents*. Kamal P. Malla, ed., Nepal: perspectives on Continuity and Change, Kathmandu: CNAS/TU, pp.139-68.
- Shneiderman, S. (2010). *Creating "Civilised" communists: A quarter century of politicization in rural Nepal*. In Varieties of Activist Experience: Civil Society in South Asia, ed. Gellner D. London: Sage Publications, forthcoming.
- Shrestha, K. D. (1995). *Bahundaliya Janabad, Kranti Birodhi Sar Tatwo* (Multiparty Democracy, Specific Element of Anti-Revolution). Kathmandu: Krishna Prakashan , pp. 9-10.
- Shrestha, P. L. (1996). Nepal Communist Andolanko Samkshipta Ithas. Kathmandu: *Pushpa Lal Memorial Foundation*, p. 106.
- Shrestha, S. R. (1995). Comrade Pushpa Lalka Shamihanama (One the Memory of Comrade Pushpa Lal). Comrade Pushpa Lal: Memorial Collection, Kathmandu: *Pushpa Lal Memorial Foundation*, p. 109.
- Simkhada, S. R & F. Oliva (2006). *The Maoist Insurgency In Nepal: A Monograph Causes, Impact and Avenues Of Resolution*. Iuhei, Ch-Geneva.
- Starn, O. (1999). *Nightwatch: Politics and protest in the Andes*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Taylor, L. (2006). *Shining path: Guerrilla war in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980-1997*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Thapa D. & B. Sijapati (2003). *Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996-2003*. The Prince house, Kathmandu.
- Tse-Tung, M. (1967). *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung*. Foreign Languages Press., pp. 54-335.
- Upreti, B. R. (2006). *Armed Conflict & Peace Process in Nepal*. Adroit Publisher New Delhi.