

Attack on Kangara Fort and its Impact on Nepal's Victory Campaign

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Abstract

Nepal's political history reflects a long journey from fragmentation to unification. Though unified in ancient times, the medieval era saw the rise of multiple states: the Malla kingdom in the Kathmandu Valley, the Doya kingdom in the Terai, and the Khasa kingdom in the west. Over time, Nepal divided into nearly fifty-two small states. The unification began under King Prithvi Narayan Shah of Gorkha and was carried forward by his successors, including King Pratap Singh Shah, Queen Rajendra Laxmi, Prince Bahadur Shah, and Prime Minister Bhimsen Thapa. Their combined efforts consolidated Nepal into a single nation. Expansion continued as the Nepali Army advanced westward, conquering Kumaon, Garhwal, and other territories up to the Sutlej River. The research employs qualitative historical methodology using descriptive and Analytical approaches drawing from mainly secondary sources. The main achievement of this article lies in clarifying the perception of the attack on Kangara fort and its impact on Nepal's victory campaign.

Keywords: Amarsingh, attack, expansion, fort, Kangara

Introduction

The war of Kangara holds great importance in the history of Nepal's unification. First, it was the only occasion when Nepal fought continuously with a single state for four years, both the first and the last such instance. Second, Nepal suffered heavy losses of lives and resources in this war, yet gained no tangible achievement. In this context, it is natural to ask why Nepal remained entangled in the war with Kangara for so long. One explanation is that Nepal's

confidence had grown so much from its successful campaigns that the army even dreamed of extending the frontier up to Kashmir (Regmi Research Series, p.154).

However, this claim does not appear entirely true. In reality, Nepal's campaigns across the Mahakali River were more defensive than offensive. The main objective of the Nepali Army seemed to be protecting the territories it had already won rather than conquering new ones. Yet, to safeguard those territories, it was necessary to subdue nearby smaller states.

During Bahadur Shah's time, the conquest of Garhwal was essential to secure Nepal's rule in Kumaon. Likewise, to maintain dominance in both regions, it was necessary to subdue states like Sirmour, Hindur, and Kahloor, which frequently created disturbances. By the end of 1861 B.S., after bringing twelve and then eighteen petty principalities along with some powerful states under its control, the Nepali Army perhaps had little desire to advance further. However, King Sansar Chand of Kangara, across the Sutlej River, was inciting smaller states against Nepal in an effort to drive it out of the region. Nepali commanders, especially Amar Singh Thapa, were aware of this (Joshi, 2063 B.S.). In such circumstances, the Nepali Army's primary objective became preventing Kangara's interference in the territories Nepal had already conquered.

Moreover, many small states across the Sutlej were still under Kangara's influence. These states secretly supported Amar Singh Thapa against King Sansar Chand, which further boosted the morale of Nepali commanders. Even so, had Kangara refrained from interfering in Nepal's territories west of the Sutlej, the Nepali Army would not have crossed the river to wage war. A vivid example of this is the peace treaty signed between Amar Singh Thapa and Sansar Chand in the month of Marga, 1862 B.S. The treaty recognized the Sutlej River as the boundary: the Nepali Army would not cross beyond it, and Kangara's forces would not cross this side (Joshi, 2063 B.S.). Had Sansar Chand honored this agreement, the history of Nepal's unification might have taken a different course. But since the Kangara king violated the treaty almost immediately, Amar Singh Thapa was compelled to attack Kangara in the month of Poush, 1862 B.S.

In various books written in the context of Nepal's unification and military campaigns, references can be found regarding the attack carried out by the Nepali Army on Kangra Fort. However, those published materials do not provide a detailed description of the attack on Kangra Fort by the Nepali Army. Likewise, they also do not analyze the impact that the failure of the

Nepali Army in that attack had on Nepal's overall victory campaign. In this context, the questions raised by this article are as follows.

(a) What was the Battle of Kangra?

(b) What was the impact of the Battle of Kangra in the unification of Nepal?

Objective

The objectives of this article are as follows:

(a) To give detail information about the Battle of Kangra.

(b) To analyze the impact of the Battle of Kangra in the unification of Nepal.

Method and Methodology

This article has been prepared using both descriptive and analytical methods. Accordingly, events are sequentially mentioned, followed by an analysis of their outcomes. A large number of published secondary sources like books, articles and document etc. have been used in the preparation of this article. The main achievement of this article lies in clarifying the Attack on Kangara Fort and its impact on Nepal's victory campaign. When using reference materials, if the date is given in Bikram Sambat (B.S.), it should be understood as a Nepali date and if the date is not written in Bikram Sambat, it should be taken as an English (Gregorian) date.

Finding and Discussion

The Nepalese army attack on Kangra Fort in 1809 was part of the Nepal-Sikh War, where army under Amar Singh Thapa besieged the fort but were ultimately defeated by Maharaja Ranjit Singh's Sikh army, marking a decisive halt to Nepal's westward expansion.

Preparation for the Kangara Campaign

Even after Nepal's frontier had reached the Sutlej River, the ambition of the Nepali Army to expand further did not rest. They began planning to conquer the Kangara state and its fort, located beyond the Sutlej (Bhandari, 2027 BS.). Had this fort been captured, it would have been easier for Nepal to subdue the smaller, disorganized Indian states in the west and advance toward Punjab and Kashmir. However, King Sansar Chand of Kangara was a powerful ruler, and the Kangara Fort itself was strong, making it impossible to seize as easily as imagined (Sharma,

2033 B.S.). With this in mind, Nepal's commander-in-chief, Badakaji Amar Singh Thapa, initially made a treaty with Sansar Chand. In that treaty, the Sutlej River was established as the boundary between Nepal and Kangara (Gyawali, 2000 BS.).

Although Amar Singh had signed a treaty with Sansar Chand, he soon found a suitable opportunity to launch an attack on Kangara. This happened because Sansar Chand was expanding his territory by attacking neighboring states (Pant, 2024 BS., p.154). In the process, he conquered states such as Chamba, Sukhet, and Mandi, and inflicted oppression upon them. He also encroached upon parts of the Kahloor (Bilaspur) state. As a result, King Mahan Chand of Kahloor, along with other small rulers, sought Amar Singh's assistance against Sansar Chand. At the same time, several states promised Amar Singh military and financial support if he crossed the Sutlej to conquer Kangara. These allied rulers included: Guler (Bhup Singh), Jaswan (Umed Singh), Datarpur (Govind Chand), Siba (Govind Singh), Chamba (Jit Singh), Sukhet (Bikram Singh), Kulu (Bikram Singh), Narpur (Bir Singh), Bisauli (Mahendra Singh), Katlehar (name of ruler unknown), Kahloor (Mahan Chand) (Gyawali, 2000 BS.).

Amar Singh had been waiting for such favorable situation. Since the neighboring rulers were angered by Sansar Chand, he found himself isolated despite his power. These circumstances encouraged Amar Singh to prepare for an attack on Kangara. Before advancing, however, he strengthened the defenses of the territories already conquered. To protect Kumaon, he stationed 1,200 troops under the command of his son Ranajor Singh Thapa and Birbhadra Kunwar. To defend Garhwal, he deployed 3,000 troops under Chandabir Kunwar and Surbir Khatri (Bista, 2020 BS.). This cautious step before going to war demonstrated Amar Singh's great foresight.

Crossing the Sutlej and the Battle of Mahalmori (1805-1806)

In December 1805, the Nepali Army crossed the Sutlej River (Sharma, et al., 2049 BS.). As promised earlier, once the Nepali forces crossed the river and entered Kangara territory, the allied rulers immediately arrived with their troops. On that occasion, Amar Singh made a solemn pledge with those rulers: he would claim authority over the Kangara Fort, the allied rulers would maintain friendly relations with the Nepali court, and in return, the Nepali court would allow them to govern their states independently without annexing their territories (Dabral 'Charana', 2030 B.S.). Meanwhile, Sansar Chand had organized his army at a place called Mahalmori on the banks of the Sutlej to confront the Nepali forces. Thus, in 1806, a fierce battle took place

between the Nepali Army and Kangara's forces at Mahalmori. In this battle, Nepal suffered relatively fewer losses, while Kangara's army lost about 500 men (Vaidya & Mishra, 2054 BS.). Sansar Chand was defeated and fled. The Nepali Army then advanced to Nadaun, where King Ishwari Sen of Bhandi had been imprisoned by Sansar Chand for twelve years. Amar Singh freed him from captivity and signed a treaty. According to the treaty Ishwari Sen accepted Nepal's suzerainty and promised not to obstruct the conquest of Kangara, while Amar Singh granted him the right to rule independently. Amar Singh also restored the state of Katlehar to its former ruler, which Sansar Chand had previously seized (Gyawali, 2000 BS.). In fact, Amar Singh adopted a strategy of showing generosity toward the rulers oppressed by Sansar Chand, thereby securing their support for Nepal's campaign to conquer Kangara.

After being defeated in the battle of Mahalmori, Sansar Chand fled to Tira Sujanpur, where he prepared to confront the Nepali Army. In response, Bhakti Thapa advanced with a small contingent of troops toward Tira. Since Sansar Chand had taken refuge inside the fort of Tira, Bhakti Thapa surrounded it from all sides. Realizing that the fort could not be defended, Sansar Chand escaped and hid inside the Kangara Fort (Sharma et al., 2049 BS.).

Attack on Kangara Fort

The Kangara Fort was a grand and impregnable fortress built atop a high hill. It was considered one of the most secure forts in the region. With excellent water facilities, it could accommodate four to five thousand soldiers inside (Sharma et al., BS. 2049). The outer walls were constructed of stone, with openings at various points. Sansar Chand had further strengthened and fortified it (Gyawali, 2000 BS.). Conquering such a renowned fort was a major challenge for the Nepali Army, requiring extensive preparation. To support Amar Singh, Bhimsen Thapa sent additional troops under the command of his brother, Kaji Nayan Singh Thapa.

Since Sansar Chand had taken refuge inside the fort, attacking it became necessary. The Nepali Army first brought the surrounding territories under its control. In this process, they also captured the famous pilgrimage site of Jwalamukhi. At the same time, rulers of Chamba, Narpur, Bisauli, Guler (Haripur), Jaswan, Datarpur, and Siba met Amar Singh and accepted Nepal's suzerainty (Gyawali, 2000 BS.). Amar Singh then advanced his forces and encircled the fort from all sides. While the Nepali Army was laying siege to Kangara Fort, Ram Sharan Singh, the

king of Hindur, attacked them from the rear. However, the Nepali forces defeated him, bringing Hindur under Nepal's control as well.

While Amar Singh was besieging the Kangara Fort, Kaji Nayan Singh Thapa arrived with additional troops. Seeing that the Nepali Army had already subdued surrounding states, was becoming increasingly aggressive, and had received reinforcements, Sansar Chand's soldiers gradually began to flee. The atmosphere at that time is vividly described in *Ranabahadur Chandrika*:

Chaos erupted everywhere. Even the foreigners were terrified. Rumors spread that the army of King Girvan Yuddha Vikram Shah was advancing, led by the great commander Amar Singh Thapa, whose victory banner flies wherever he sets foot. The Gorkhali Army is victorious everywhere, and soon the rule of the Gorkha King will inevitably extend across northern India-even to Delhi itself (Dabral 'Charana', 2030 BS.).

Amar Singh's prestige spread far and wide. There was a popular belief that he always achieved victory. Poets who visited him during the siege were rewarded according to their wishes. *Ranabahadur Chandrika* further notes: 'Amar Singh, son of the mighty Bhim Singh, through the glory of King Girvan Yuddha Vikram, possessed the wealth and grandeur of a universal monarch, working for the welfare of all' (Dabral 'Charana', 2030 BS.) This clearly shows how renowned and celebrated Amar Singh Thapa was at the time.

Although Amar Singh enjoyed immense prestige among the people, he was unable to storm the Kangara Fort and continued only with the siege. To strengthen his position, he planned to conquer nearby territories and marched toward the fort of Sumerpur, while Kaji Nayan Singh Thapa remained at Kangara. By then, nearly two years had passed since the fort had been encircled. Seeing that it was not wise to maintain a siege indefinitely, Nayan Singh devised a plan to attack the fort through the route of Bhagwanpur. The structure of the fort was such that its outer section was separated by the hill of Malkangara (Malkara) (Gyawali, 2058 B.S). Thus, a direct assault was impossible; victory over the hill was necessary first. Nayan Singh advanced with his troops, leading to a fierce battle with the enemy (Bista, 2020 B.S.). This battle took place in 1808 (Stiller, 1975). During the fighting, Nayan Singh was struck by a bullet. In the absence of their commander, the Nepali forces scattered, and victory could not be achieved. He

died three days later from his wound (Bista, 2020 BS.). This episode raises several questions: Why did Amar Singh merely maintain the siege without launching a direct attack? Why did Nayan Singh attempt the assault without Amar Singh's presence or support? Why did he fail? To understand the answers to these questions, it seems relevant to discuss on certain points.

Shiva Prasad Dabral (2030 B.S.) notes that Sansar Chand once sent a large bribe and a secret letter to Amar Singh through a trusted agent. In the letter, Sansar Chand proposed an alliance. Amar Singh agreed to this secret proposal, which explains why he confined himself to maintaining the siege and spent his days in relative ease. According to him, since Amar Singh had already made a secret treaty with Sansar Chand, he did not assist Nayan Singh. However, later events prove that this accusation was false. For instance, Sansar Chand once met with Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Punjab and offered him 500,000 rupees if he would support him against the Nepalis. Realizing that if Ranjit Singh allied with Sansar Chand, the conquest of Kangara Fort would become extremely difficult, Amar Singh himself met Ranjit Singh and promised to pay him 500,000 rupees simply to remain neutral. Seeing that neutrality would not harm him, Ranjit Singh accepted Amar Singh's proposal (Gyawali, 2000 B.S.). This confirms that if Amar Singh had already allied with Sansar Chand, Sansar Chand would not have needed to seek Ranjit Singh's support against the Nepali Army. Likewise, Amar Singh would not have been willing to pay such a large sum to Ranjit Singh. Later, during the Anglo-Nepal War, the British offered Amar Singh an annual income of 30,000 rupees from certain territories and 24,000 rupees for him and his family if he joined their side. But he refused, declaring that he would fight until the end (Gyawali, 2000 BS.). If Amar Singh did not succumb to such a lucrative offer from the British, it is implausible that he would have accepted a bribe from Sansar Chand and remained inactive. In reality, Amar Singh believed that the fort could not be taken by a sudden frontal assault (Sharma et al., 2049 BS.). Therefore, even after the battle, he continued the siege to block supplies of food, water, and other necessities from reaching the fort (Gyawali, 2000 BS.). This means that his prolonged encirclement was not due to bribery but was a deliberate military strategy. For example, King Prithvi Narayan Shah had also employed the policy of siege to capture Kirtipur, and before attacking the Kathmandu Valley, he imposed blockades.

Regarding why Nayan Singh attacked Kangara Fort without Amar Singh's presence or support, it appears that Nayan Singh wanted to claim the credit for its conquest himself. Thus, he

launched the assault without consulting Amar Singh (Dabral 'Charana', 2030 B.S.). Had he succeeded, the glory of victory would have gone to him, overshadowing Amar Singh's years of effort and denying him the fame he deserved. Naturally, this stirred feelings of jealousy in Amar Singh, and therefore he and his supporters did not assist Nayan Singh (Dabral 'Charana', 2030 B.S.). History provides many examples of wars lost due to disagreements among commanders. Most native and foreign historians agree that there was a difference of opinion between Nayan Singh Thapa and Amar Singh Thapa. Amar Singh believed that the fort could not be taken by a sudden frontal assault, whereas Nayan Singh, full of youthful zeal, insisted on attacking immediately. Thus, historians suggest that their disagreement may explain why Amar Singh did not support Nayan Singh during the Kangara assault (Sharma et al., 2049 BS.). Whatever tensions arose between the two commanders during the war, Amar Singh was deeply saddened by Nayan Singh's death.

Amar Singh's desire to conquer Kangara did not fade. Around that time, on the 6th day of Chaitra Badi 9, 1865 B.S. (1808), a letter arrived from Kathmandu stating: "...Now, according to the arrangements made by Thapa Kaji, consider carefully and quickly carry out the conquest of Kangara..." In this letter, "Thapa Kaji" referred to Amar Singh himself (Naraharinath, 2055 B.S.). Receiving such direct instructions from the royal court, Amar Singh began further preparations for the conquest of Kangara. However, he lacked sufficient troops at that time, so he sent word to Kathmandu requesting reinforcements (Bista, 2020 B.S.). In response to Amar Singh's request, Kathmandu sent additional troops under the leadership of Dalbhanjan Pandey and Rudravir Shahi. With these reinforcements, Amar Singh intensified his efforts to capture Kangara Fort, focusing particularly on cutting off the water supply inside the fort. By this time, Sansar Chand's strength within the fort had greatly diminished. However, as Sansar Chand weakened, some local rulers who had earlier sided with Amar Singh out of resentment toward Sansar Chand began turning against the Nepali Army. For example, King Karmaprakash of Sirmour opposed the Nepalese, leading to the occupation of Sirmour by Amar Singh's forces. Other rulers also shifted to Sansar Chand's side, mainly to avoid the heavy expenses they had been forced to bear in supporting the Nepali campaign (Gyawali, 2000B.S.).

At this critical juncture, when Sansar Chand's position was extremely fragile, the arrival of further reinforcements from Kathmandu under Dalbhanjan Pandey and Rudravir Shahi terrified him. Consequently, he sent a messenger to the Nepali Army proposing a peace treaty. In

his offer, Sansar Chand agreed to pay 900,000 rupees as war indemnity, 500,000 rupees annually as tax, and even to hand over Kangara Fort to the Nepalis (Bista, 2020 B.S.). Amar Singh forwarded this proposal to Kathmandu, noting its advantages for Nepal. Bhimsen Thapa replied that the treaty could be accepted. Yet Amar Singh soon became convinced that Kangara Fort could be captured within one and a half months by force. He informed Kathmandu of this belief, and Bhimsen Thapa responded that if victory could be achieved through battle, then war should be pursued (Bista, 2020 BS.). Thus, Amar Singh prepared to conquer Kangara Fort not through negotiation but through direct military action.

Meanwhile, Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Punjab entered the dispute between Nepal and Kangara. In June 1809, he arrived at Kangara under the pretext of visiting the Jwalamukhi temple. His arrival was not accidental; it was driven by several motives. First, he feared that unchecked Gorkhali ambition would threaten Punjab. Second, he sought to exploit Kangara's vulnerable situation to seize the fort for himself. By then, Ranjit Singh had already signed the 'Treaty of Amritsar' with the British in 1809, which secured his position. Confident of British support, he aimed to expand his territory in this direction. The British, too, wanted to restrain Nepal's expansion through Ranjit Singh. Likely considering these factors, Ranjit Singh advanced toward Kangara's frontier. He recognized that if Nepal succeeded in capturing Kangara, it could easily proceed to conquer Kashmir. Thus, he intervened in the Nepal-Kangara conflict (Vaidya & Mishra, 2054 BS.).

When Sansar Chand, trapped inside Kangara Fort, learned that Ranjit Singh had come to Jwalamukhi, he offered him 500,000 rupees in exchange for military assistance against the Gorkhalis. Amar Singh Thapa, aware of this, countered by promising Ranjit Singh the same amount if he remained neutral and returned to Lahore (Bista, 2020 B.S.). For Ranjit Singh, neutrality was more profitable, he could collect 500,000 rupees from Amar Singh without risking losses in battle. Ranjit Singh, however, tried to exploit Sansar Chand's desperation by demanding that Kangara Fort itself be handed over in return for his support. Sansar Chand refused. Consequently, Ranjit Singh accepted Amar Singh's offer, took the 500,000 rupees, and returned to his capital in Lahore (Bista, 2020 B.S.).

After this, the Nepali Army tightened its siege of Kangara Fort, making survival increasingly difficult for Sansar Chand and his forces. In desperation, Sansar Chand sent a

message to Amar Singh, offering to surrender the fort if he and his family were allowed safe passage out, requesting 22 days to prepare (Bista, 2020 B.S.). Amar Singh, suspicious of Sansar Chand's intentions, replied: "You must come out alone, touch the goddess outside the fort, and swear that you will surrender. Only then will I believe you." Instead of appearing himself, Sansar Chand sent his minister, Bajir Nauranga, to swear the oath. Amar Singh accepted this and opened one of the fort's gate. Cleverly, Sansar Chand exploited the situation. During the day, he sent out unwanted goods in plain sight of the Nepali Army, while at night he secretly smuggled food and supplies back inside. Eventually, disguised as a farmer, Sansar Chand escaped with his family from the fort and fled to Sujanpur (Gyawali, 2000 BS).

After escaping Amar Singh's siege, Sansar Chand once again sought military assistance from Ranjit Singh. This time, Ranjit Singh repeated his earlier demand: Kangara Fort itself must be handed over in exchange for his support. With no other option left, Sansar Chand agreed (Thapa, 2070 BS.). Sansar Chand's proposal to Ranjit Singh was as follows:

I have defended Kangara Fort for many years, but I can no longer hold it. If the Gorkhalis capture this fort, they will extend their rule to Kashmir, Lahore, and Peshawar. If the mountains fall under Gorkha control and the plains under the British, your expansion will be blocked. If disciples of Guru Nanak possess as much strength as those of Guru Gorakhnath, then come forward, I am ready to hand over Kangara Fort to you. (Dabral 'Charana', 2030 BS.)

With the promise of receiving the fort, Ranjit Singh agreed to fight against the Nepali Army. At the same time, Amar Singh's forces were struck by an epidemic, causing many deaths (Gyawali, 2000 B.S.) and their supply of ammunition was running low (Dabral 'Charana', 2030 B.S.). Recognizing Nepal's weakened state, Ranjit Singh mobilized 15,000 troops in August 1809 toward Kangara Fort (Sharma et al., 2049 B.S.; Dabral 'Charana', 2030 B.S.). Amar Singh attempted once more to bribe Ranjit Singh into withdrawing, but his offer was rejected. Ultimately, Ranjit Singh launched an attack on the Nepali Army. Initially, the Nepalese held the advantage, as they occupied higher ground and inflicted heavy losses on the Sikh forces. However, by the fifth day of battle, the Sikh Army managed to fight from the same elevation. At that moment, Sansar Chand's troops inside Kangara Fort opened the gates and joined forces with

the Sikhs (Gyawali, 2000 BS.). Faced with shortages of men and weapons, and now fighting against the combined armies of Sansar Chand and Ranjit Singh, the Nepali Army could no longer resist. The war ended on 24 August 1809 (Gyawali, 2000 BS.).

The conclusion of the war remains debated among historians. Surya Vikram Gyawali (2000 B.S.) wrote that the Nepalis simply stopped fighting without achieving anything. Bal Chandra Sharma (2033 BS.) stated that the Nepali forces were defeated and forced to lift the siege. Tulsi Ram Vaidya and Tirtha Prasad Mishra (2054 BS.) argued that both the Gorkhalis and Sikhs fought fiercely for many days, but neither side achieved decisive victory, and the war ended in mutual agreement. Father Stiller (1975) also noted that the war had no clear outcome, with both commanders agreeing to a settlement: Amar Singh withdrew his forces to the Sutlej, leaving Kangara Fort to Ranjit Singh. From these differing accounts, it is clear that the victor of the war cannot be definitively established. Nevertheless, Amar Singh continued preparations to attempt Kangara's conquest again, repairing old forts and building new ones (Dabral 'Charana', 2030 BS.). This shows that even after the treaty, his determination to capture Kangara remained strong, and the agreement was made more out of necessity than choice.

The Impact of Kangara Fort attack on Nepal's victory campaign

The attack on Kangra Fort in 1809 was a decisive moment that halted Nepal's westward expansion. Despite earlier victories in Kumaon, Garhwal, and Himachal, the nepali army under Amar Singh Thapa failed to capture Kangra due to Sikh intervention, leading to a retreat and the end of Nepal's victory campaign in the region. The defeat at Kangara marked the limit of Nepal's territorial ambitions in Himachal and Punjab. After this defeat Nepal's victory campaign towards western ended forever. The Nepali army, previously undefeated in the hills, suffered a major blow to its reputation. The Sikh Empire emerged as the dominant force in northwestern India, curbing Nepal's influence. Nepal's failure weakened its bargaining position in later conflicts, including with the British East India Company, culminating in the **Treaty of Sugauli (1816)** which drastically reduced Nepal's territory. The defeat dampened morale and demonstrated that Nepal's military strength had limits when facing well-organized regional powers.

Conclusion

The Nepali Army expanded its territory by conquering Kumaon, Garhwal, and other Indian states, reaching as far as the Sutlej River. After that, they planned to cross the Sutlej and capture Kangra, which required taking control of the Kangra Fort. However, the fort was very strong, and its ruler, Raja Sansar Chand, was considered a powerful king. Therefore, it was not easy to capture Kangra Fort as they had hoped. To achieve victory, Amar Singh Thapa made various preparations and strategies. These included winning over the rulers and people of conquered states, surrounding and blockading the fort, and trying to gain the support of Punjab's ruler, Ranjit Singh. But many of his plans and policies did not succeed. Coordination between Amar Singh and Nayan Singh Thapa, who had come from Kathmandu to assist him, was poor, and the attack on Kangra Fort failed. Despite repeated efforts, Amar Singh could not win Ranjit Singh's support. Instead, Ranjit Singh allied with Sansar Chand and fought against the Nepali Army. Meanwhile, disease spread among the Nepali soldiers and unable to fight effectively. Weapons and water supplies were also poorly managed. Even the previously conquered states turned against Nepal and offered no help. The capital failed to provide timely support to the soldiers fighting at Kangra. Because of all these difficulties, the Nepali Army grew weaker and could not capture Kangra Fort. This failure marked a pause in Nepal's campaign of expansion. Without victory at Kangra, the army could not advance further, and their goal of extending Nepal's boundary to Punjab and Kashmir remained unfulfilled. Soon after, Nepal fought a war against the British, which ended with the Sugauli Treaty. That treaty permanently halted Nepal's unification and expansion campaign. Had Kangra Fort been captured, Nepal's situation might have been very different. But Nepali Army's efforts to conquer Kangara demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience. Their bravery and determination became widely recognized among Indian states.

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