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Local Election in Nepal: Means for Ensuring Electoral Accountability

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Abstract

The electoral accountability is considered a mechanism through which voters hold the government responsible for their performance. The main assumption in this article is that the more performance of local representatives as per their promise before elections under prevailing laws likely leads to more electoral accountability. To test this hypothesis, 455 questionnaires were collected from ordinary citizens and 28 interviews were taken with respective Rural Municipalities and Municipality's chief, deputy chief, and an executive from Sindhuli and Surkhet district of Nepal. The result showed that the performance of Surkhet districts' local governments have a better significant relationship with the electoral accountability index rather Sindhuli district. Despite this relationship, people were neither satisfied, nor unsatisfied with the performance of the local representatives. There are a lot of hindering factors associated with the performance of local representatives which include lack of financial resources, lack of knowledge on how to handle local government, lack of employees, lack of infrastructure, etc. Therefore, the study concludes that electoral accountability in Nepal is in the transitional stage.

Keywords

Election, electoral accountability, performances, local bodies, Nepal

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Electoral accountability

The electoral accountability is considered one of the mechanisms through which voters hold the government responsible for their performance (Fumarola, 2016). The notion of periodic election allows sanctioning political parties if they do wrong and reward if they perform as per citizens' mandate. Electoral accountability depends on two sets of conditions: voters' ability to assign responsibility for performance outcomes to incumbents and voters' ability to act upon those assignments of responsibility (Hellwig and Samuels, 2008). The voter's ability to hold governments to account is greatly influenced by the contingent characteristics of the political context (Fumarola, 2016). Schedler (1999) defines the concept of accountability which is equal to *answerability* plus *enforcement*. Answerability is about the obligation of government to provide information and justification for the performances or series of performance carried out by political parties whereas enforcement stands for the sanction. Voters evaluate and judge the performance of political parties whether political parties act according to citizens' mandate or not. It is said that power holders are free to act as they choose without any checks and balances in the absence of answerability. In the absence of enforcement, where there are no consequences for failing to provide a satisfactory account, so the process of demanding and providing an account is undermined.

In European democracies, voters' ability to express dissatisfaction with economic performance is affected by specific characteristics of political context (Fumarola, 2016). Government clarity of responsibility (Hobolt et al, 2013), the existence of available alternatives (Anderson, 2000), the influence of the electoral system (Powell, 2000), pluralistic mass media may contribute to the functioning mechanism of accountability, ensuring information about the political acts promoted by the incumbent and the possibility for voters to identify and potentially to sanction it (Fumarola, 2016, 56). In the absence of the competitive environment for politics would be fatal and other institutional environments would inhibit electoral accountability (Besley, 2006, pp. 124-128). Because conventional assumptions about electoral accountability hold that elections enable voters to sanction governments, it is important to recognize that the power of sanction might, in theory, lead to control or to influence, or to something in between (Maloy, 2015). The wave of democracy is spread throughout the world since 1990. However, there is questionable between democratic accountability and competitive election (Maloy, 2014). Problems of voter judgment may have no solution at all or no institutional solution, but theories of and experiments with deliberative assemblies are laudable efforts to investigate that question (Maloy, 2015).

Federalism and intergovernmental policy making may reduce the voter's ability to hold their government (Cutler, 2004). Landa & Duell (2015) argue that social identities increase the weight of representatives' efforts in voters' reelection decisions. When economic conditions are bad, citizens vote against the ruling party (Lewis-Beck, Michael S., 1991). The majority/minority status of the government, party cohesion, opposition committee chairs, and opposition control affects electoral accountability. Hellwig and Samuels (2008) argue that regime type determines the ways and extent to which election enables voters to reward or sanction incumbents. They reveal that voters have greater potential to hold incumbents to accounts under the separation of powers than under parliamentarism. Micozzo (2012) argues drawing experiences from Argentine Senate that electoral

accountability makes a difference in the election system, career ambition, and legislative performance.

Despite wide theoretical and comparative discussion in government's performance and electoral accountability there lacks systematic observation and analysis in Nepali issue. Nepal has experienced frequent political changes since 1990's (re) democratization. It waited for twenty years for third local election – held in 2017 – since 1997. Local government did not have elected representatives for fifteen years.

It is a general assumption that Nepali political parties prepare a very good manifesto but they the elected representatives hardly work in office following pre-election promises. Does it continue in federal Nepal? Nepal has adopted a federal republic system in 2015 explaining individual and common rights of three different tiers of government: local, provincial and federal governments. This study focus on the level and variances of accountability of local governments in changed context.

In this research paper, electoral accountability refers to the capability of elected government representatives to furnish the activities prescribed in their political manifestos as well as in-laws proactively. It also refers to their sensitiveness towards the needs and aspirations of citizens in general and specifically marginalized communities, women, and children and marginalized groups of the community. The performance of the elected representatives refers to the delivery of health, education, drinking water, communication, light services. It also includes drainage management, up-gradation, and construction of road, vital registration and certification and social allowances.

Political manifestos of Nepalese political parties

All major political parties published written manifestos in 2017 local election. Communist Party of Nepal (United Maoist and Leninist) (CPN-UML) presented the main slogan given as 'prosperous, equality and strong foundation for national development: local to central level's government of UML'. According to UML's commitment, each Nepali Citizen will have a share in hydro-electricity. The connectivity will also be diversified. There will be roads, railways, cable cars, air route etc. Economic development will also be based on tourism development. The agriculture sector will be modernized. Arable farmland will have irrigation facilities. The more additional commitment as per UML manifesto includes 'one province on industrial areas'. Human resource development is also another area of commitment. Three international standards sports stadiums having more than 50 thousand capacities will be constructed. Foreign policy will be based on balanced international relations. Out of total revenue, 50 percent of revenue will go to the local government. Integrated settlement programs will be launched. Smart cities will be formed. Each citizen will get free education. 20 percent of the revenue will be allocated in the education sector. Health insurance facilities will be for all. Fifty percent premium will pay by the government for those who are below the poverty line. The local unit will have a well-equipped hospital having 25 beds in rural municipalities and 50 beds in the municipality. The economic policy is guided by the cooperative. As per its manifesto cooperative in each rural municipalities and employment opportunity for each household (*Gauguma Sahakari: Ghargharma Rojgari*). Nepal will be upgraded from least

developed country to medium level income through increasing per capita income more than 5000\$, 15 thousand MW additional electricity would be generated within 10 years.

The manifesto presented by Nepali Congress (NC), the ruling party during the election, has aimed to develop double-digit economic growth. 95 percent literacy rate will be achieved within 10 years. Less than 3 percent of people will be below the poverty line. There will be four international airports. 32 Lakhs tourist will arrive in Nepal. NC will make a 15 bed fully equipped hospital in each local body. Each ward will be connected by a blacktopped road. At least one bank will be installed in each local body. Integrated service the center will be formed.

Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center) (Maoist) has 'formally' unveiled its election manifesto for the upcoming local polls, promising swift social and economic reforms. The 30-point commitment letter was made public. Though the party had already made its elections commitment public at the local level, it was the first time the manifesto was formally unveiled. In its commitment letter, the party has pledged to give more power to local bodies. The party has also expressed its commitment to introduce various schemes to help the poor families, unemployed youths, farmers and workers. The party has also promised to provide free internet services. It has also declared to work in reforming the land laws to ensure land to the landless people. Similarly, it has also promised to work on developmental activities.

Instead of making big promises, the party has highlighted its role in institutionalizing historical achievements like federalism. The party has chosen its official election slogan as “Maoist Center’s gift: Singha Durbar in village and municipalities”.

Local election provision in Nepal

753 local governments are in operation in Nepal excluding 77 district coordination committees. There are 293 municipalities and 460 rural municipalities in Nepal. In 2017, the local election was held in Nepal after a long gap of 20 years. There were only three local elections held in Nepal since 1990 (restoration of democracy). The first and second local election was held in 1992 and 1997 respectively. First, two local elections were held under the unitary system of government and the last one under a federal system. Decentralization was the central issue during the first local election. Political parties participate in third local election where constitution has guaranteed power and authorities as local government.

As per the constitution, there shall be a village or municipal executives elected on the basis of one person one vote in accordance with the first past the post-election system. Chief of the local body (chairperson and vice-chairperson in case of village municipality and the mayor and deputy mayor in case of the municipality), ward chairperson, women member, Dalit women member and member are elected through the election. The tenure of each elected member would be five years. As per this constitution, political parties should nominate different gender in case of the chief and deputy chief of the local body while contesting the election. This provision makes sure the representation of both men and women in the top two positions. Two women members including Dalit and minority women and two members are elected through direct election. One voter can vote for seven different candidates in seven different positions. According to this provision, there are 35,041 local

representatives in local government who have both executive and legislative powers. There were 14,054,482 (as of February 20, 2017) voters in Nepal: 7,069,714 men, 6,984,625 women and 143 third genders. These voters were increased by 16.2 percent from the last national constituent election 2013.

Table 1 Election Result of Local Election 2017

Positions	UML (%)	NC (%)	Maoist (%)	Others (%)	Total (%)	N
Mayors	42	36	11	11	100	293
Dy Mayors	47	29	15	9	100	293
Chairperson	37	35	16	12	100	460
Vice-chairperson	42	30	15	13	100	460
Ward Chairperson	39	33	16	12	100	6742
Women Members	41	32	15	12	100	6742
Dalit Women Members	41	32	16	11	100	6567
Members	41	33	15	11	100	13484
Total	40	33	16	11	100	35041

Source: Election Commission Nepal, 2017

In 2017, the local election was held in three phases viz. first phase (Province 3,4 & 6), the second phase (1, 5 and 7 provinces) and third phase (Province 2). The result of the election shows that 42 percent of mayors and 47 percent deputy mayors were won by CPN-UML. Likewise, NC won 36 percent mayors and 29 percent deputy mayors and stood second-largest party. Maoist (Center) became third largest party winning 11 percent mayor and 15 percent deputy mayors.

CPN-UML bagged 37 percent chairpersons and 42 percent vice-chairperson of the rural municipalities. Likewise, NC won 35 percent chairperson and 30-percent vice-chairperson in a local election as a second-largest party of the local election. Similarly, the third-largest party in rural municipalities is also Maoist –Center through winning 16 & 15 percent seats of Chairpersons and Vice-chairperson respectively. Likewise, 39 percent ward chairperson's seats are won by UML, 33 percent by NC, 16 percent by Maoist-center and 12 percent by others. In the case of women member and Dalit women, UML won 41 percent seats for each, 32 percent for each by NC, 15 percent for each by Maoist center and rest of 12 percent by other. The same kinds of trends are repeated in the case of members. In totality, 40 percent of seats were bagged by UML, 33 percent seats by NC, 16 percent seats by Maoist-center and 11 percent by others. Out of 11 percent seats, 4 percent seats won by Sanghiya Samajbadi Forum Nepal, 3 percent seats by Rastriya Janata Party Nepal and rest of 4 percent by Nepal Loktantric Forum, Ratriya Prjatantra Party and other fringe political parties. In particular, Sanghiya Samajbadhi Forum Nepal and Rastriya Janata Party Nepal won majority seats in Province No 2. These Terai-based parties were found closely nil in other provinces.

Duties and responsibilities of local government in Nepal

Local government is formed as per constitution 2015 (Part 17 & 18). Right now, there are 753 local governments and 77 district coordination committees. Schedule 8 of the constitution has prescribed the functions that should be carried out by local bodies. There are 22 lists of functions which include police service, cooperatives, and operation of FM, taxations and, management of the local services. Similarly, records keeping and its analysis, basic health services, education services, local market, welfare activities, water supply, disaster management etc. are other functions which should be performed by the local government. Likewise, schedule 9 of the constitution also prescribes 15 types of concurrent power of federal, provincial and local government. On the basis of this constitutional provision, Local Government Operation Act 2017 made details of these kinds of functions. Municipal police service with the objective to enforce the laws can be constituted, operated, managed and set standards by the local government. Cooperative is recognized as one of the economic backbone. Local government can set policies and standards of cooperatives to mobilize local resources. Local government has the power to grant permission for operating up to 100 W local FM. Local government can levy the tax without making any contradiction with federal and provincial laws. These categories of taxation include property tax, house rent tax, land registration tax, vehicle tax, service charge, tourism fees, entertainment tax etc. Local government also formulates policies related to its human resource management. Record keeping and its analysis, designing the master plan for physical development, its implementation, monitoring and, evaluation; delivering health, education, etc are other vital functions of local government. Likewise, disaster management, the welfare of its citizens, management of natural resources, reduction of poverty, vital registration etc are other functions of local government.

Likewise, Inter-government Financial Management 2017 also categorizes the tax system separately for all central government, the provincial government and local government. As per this act, local government can be levied the direct tax which includes property tax, house rent tax, house land registration tax, vehicle tax, land tax, entertainment tax, advertisement tax and, business tax. Similarly, local government can also levy indirect tax such as service fee, tourist fee and, punishment fee. Local government can get 25 percent of total revenue raised from the natural resource. The natural resource here refers to mountaineering, electricity, forest, mining and water and the other resource.

Power, functions and, responsibilities of executives: Chief of village municipal or municipality shall call for meeting under his/her chairmanship to set plans, policies and, programs. He/she shall put forward agendas in the meeting. The chief executive shall allow preparing the budget and presenting it in the meeting. The chief of the local government will depute the deputy chief and executive officer. He/she need to handle the grievances of local people. Similarly, the deputy chief of the local government has to act as a coordinator of the judicial committee. He/she coordinates and supervises the function of local NGOs and 'consumer interest protection group'. He/she presents the monitoring and evaluation report of projects and the program in the meeting. Likewise, Ward chair is a prime position in the local government. The ward chair has to set plans, policies and, the program at his/her ward. He/she should supervise, monitor and evaluate the programs which have launched within

his/her ward. He/she is at the bottom where everything has to implement. Sole burden goes to Ward chairs and they are supported by ward members.

Research methodology

This study was conducted in Sindhuli and Surkhet districts: two out of 75 districts of Nepal. Both districts had a unique feature. Both districts touch Terai and hilly ecological regions of Nepal. Sindhuli represents from the Eastern-part of Nepal had slightly less populous than Surkhet which is from the Western-part of Nepal. Both districts are different in terms of demographic compositions, literacy rate and, others. Regarding local governments, Sindhuli has 9 local units (7 rural municipalities and 2 municipalities) whereas Surkhet has 10 local units (4 rural municipalities and 6 municipalities). For the details comparison, see annex 1. Survey was conducted in randomly selected fourteen different local governments (five Municipalities and nine Rural Municipalities) of Sindhuli and Surkhet districts (6 from Sindhuli district and 8 from Surkhet districts). Four hundred fifty-five respondents (213 from Sindhuli and 242 from Surkhet) who visited local government for service have agreed to participate in survey during February 4-6, 2018 in Sindhuli district and January 15-17 in Surkhet district. The limit for respondents in each local government is thirty (Annex 2 &3).

In addition to this, 28 interviews with Chairpersons, Vice-chairpersons and Executive Officers of rural municipalities (two from three) and Mayor, Deputy Mayors and Executive officers of Municipalities (here too, two from three) conducted through open-ended questionnaire. To determine the level of electoral accountability, simple percentage tool was also used. To find out the relationship between the performances of local government with electoral accountability, Pearson's correlation technique was employed. The result was also validated through the interview with the authorities of local governments.

Findings

Electoral accountability

To find out the level of electoral accountability at the local level in Nepal, questions such as the capability of the local leader to carry-out the job as promised during the electoral campaign and prescribed laws; their reactivity towards citizens' need and aspiration, fairness for treatment, the satisfaction of local people, setting the priority of the function etc. were asked to the respondents.

Table 2. Electoral Accountability in Nepal

Variables	Sindhuli			Surkhet		
	Agree	Disagree	N	Agree	Disagree	N
I found local body's elected leaders are capable person to run local body.	69	31	207	30	70	227
I found their behavior is proactive towards ordinary citizens.	68	32	209	54	46	230
They treat citizens equally, impartially and fairly.	67	33	208	59	41	228

Employees of local bodies are sensitive towards citizens' needs and aspirations.	67	33	204	60	40	222
I found local leaders and employees are working as per rules and regulations of local body.	69	31	200	56	44	214
I am satisfied with local leaders and employees working style.	67	33	205	58	42	226
I found local leaders and employees give priority to women.	74	26	204	62	38	227
I found local leaders and employees give priority to elderly people.	79	21	211	62	38	223
I found local leaders and employees give priority to socially marginalized community.	67	33	201	43	57	224
I found local leaders and employees are working as per choices of local people.	65	35	202	58	42	221
I found citizens are holding local leaders and employees.	63	37	208	57	43	217
I found they advise the process of work to be done precisely.	62	38	208	62	38	213

Source: Field Study, 2018

About two-third respondents of Sindhuli argued that local leaders are capable to run the local level. However, the respondents of Surkhet doubt their capability. Relatively, leaders' pro-activeness towards ordinary citizen relatively better in Sindhuli district comparing to Surkhet district. The same kind of observation was found in their fairness, impartiality and equal treatment. The follow up of rules and regulations was found a bit of doubt in both cases. Two-third of respondents in Sindhuli told the leaders follows the rules and regulation whereas only 56 percent of respondents claimed so in Surkhet district. The level of satisfaction was in medium level in both districts. Priority for women, children, elderly people and the marginalized community was relatively better in Sindhuli district than Surkhet district. More than one-fifth percent respondents viewed that people were able to hold locally elected representatives. In sum, the level of electoral accountability relatively found better situation in Sindhuli district rather than in Surkhet district.

Local government's performance and electoral accountability index

The opinion on commitment in pre-election promise (presented in manifesto by major political parties) and Local Government Operation Act, 2017 was asked to the respondents. As per their commitment, basic services such as health, education, toilet, drinking water, road, peace and security, vital registration, communication and light will make available to the people and access to all citizens. While testing their relationship with electoral accountability, some of the services which have significant relationship with the performance of local government are found. This was tested by Pearson Coefficient correlation methods. The health service delivery which was measured in terms of their accessibility, immunization, delivery by skill births attendants, had a significant relationship

with electoral accountability in Surkhet. However, some of the performances of these indicators were not have a significant relationship with electoral accountability index in Sindhuli district.

In the same line, delivery of education was also same nature in both districts. Surkhet district has better situation than in Sindhuli district. However, the issue of drop rate in school education was not addressed by the elected representatives in both districts. The data showed the relationship between drop rate and electoral accountability index had insignificant relationship. The availability of trained teachers and accessibility of disadvantaged groups both had significant relationship with the electoral accountability index in both districts.

In both districts, toilets, drinking water, houses of local inhabitant, cooking stove, house foundations etc had insignificant relationship with electoral accountability index. These services which were promised by elected representatives were not delivered by them at the significant level.

Table 3 Local government performance and electoral accountability

	Sindhuli			Surkhet		
	Pearson coefficient	Sig	N	Pearson coefficient	Sig	N
Health institutions are easily accessible.	-0.038	0.633	164	.198**	0.016	147
Children below five years in local body	0.052	0.519	157	.222***	0.008	142
Accessible for immunization	0.131*	0.094	163	.234***	0.005	145
Pregnancy check up	0.102	0.209	154	0.152*	0.07	144
Delivery by skilled birth attendants	.160**	0.048	152	0.106	0.205	144
Schools are easily accessible.	-0.07	0.377	163	.207**	0.013	145
Admission rate at the schools	0	0.998	159	.207**	0.012	146
Not admitted students.	0	0.997	161	.235***	0.004	147
Drop rate at schools	0.012	0.885	159	0.062	0.464	144
Availability of appropriate class room	.183**	0.02	160	0.103	0.22	144
Availability of trained teachers	.252***	0.001	159	.163**	0.049	147
Accessibility to DAG at school	.231***	0.004	156	.230***	0.005	149
Toilet	-0.022	0.776	165	0.08	0.337	148
Drinking water	0.021	0.792	165	0.037	0.658	146
Houses of local inhabitant	-0.057	0.47	165	0.096	0.244	149
Cooking stove/fuel	-0.095	0.225	164	0.02	0.81	148
House foundation	-0.096	0.223	162	0.15	0.068	149
Communication	-0.039	0.618	163	.185**	0.023	151
Light	-0.021	0.793	162	.201**	0.014	148
Drainage system at your localities	-0.006	0.941	153	.233***	0.005	147
Status of road	0.075	0.355	156	.240***	0.003	150
Peace and security	0.154*	0.053	159	.253***	0.002	150
Vital registrations	0.114	0.148	162	.205**	0.013	148
Certification of relation	0.089	0.263	160	.267***	0.001	149

Approval of map of the house	.178 ^{**}	0.032	146	0.124	0.128	151
Other certification	.252 ^{***}	0.001	159	.187 ^{**}	0.023	148
Social security	0.132 [*]	0.096	161	.191 ^{**}	0.019	151
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).						
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).						
*. Correlation is significant at the .10 level (2-tailed)						

Source: Field study, 2018

Communication, light, drainage system, the status of road, vital registrations, certification of relationship etc had significant relationship with electoral accountability index in Surkhet but not in Sindhuli District. On the contrary to this, approval of the map of the houses has significant relationship with electoral accountability in Sindhuli district but not in Surkhet district. Peace and security maintenance, other certification and distribution of social security allowances had a significant relationship with electoral accountability index.

The result from ordinary citizens' remarks showed that some of the performances were better in Surkhet district rather in Sindhuli district. They viewed that lack of financial resources, lack of knowledge, lack of human resource as well as the lack of rules and regulations hindered for better performance of the local representatives are major reasons for variances.

The local government of Nepal was formed in 2017. These were led by elected representative after 20 years of long intervals. They had not formed financial base for the running local government, were dependent on central grants. The local representatives also did not have technical ideas to lead the local government. The supportive staffs were also found not sufficient as per requirement. Those who were in job were not capable to translate policy into realities through plans, policy, program and projects. Because of newly established local government, there were required hundreds of rules and regulations, were not formulated. Some of the performances were also hampered due to the lack of rules and regulation. Another important reason which was outlined by an employee, local representatives were also not much interested in the areas where they did not get benefits personally. Another executive officer outlined the reasons that hampered the performance of local government to ensure electoral accountability included more expectation of people, lack of financial resources, lack skilled human resources, insufficient infrastructure, lack of coordination between and among employees and local representatives.

Conclusion

Electoral accountability is a vital-indicator whether democracy is functioning as per citizens' need and aspirations. Citizens need to hold elected representatives otherwise they act what they like. Elected representatives should give the answer whether they act according to their commitment made before election and existing rules and regulations. They should be able to sanction their promise and commitment when they come in power. Nepal formed the local government through the constituent assembly. There are 753 local governments. In 2017, the local election was held after 20 years long gap. From the elections, about 40 percent seats of local government won by UML, 33 percent by NC,

16 percent by Maoist Center and rest 11 percent by others. As the largest party in the local election, the major share of electoral accountability goes to UML. Translation of UML's manifesto under prevailing laws is a prime indicator of electoral accountability. From field study, it showed that elected representatives in Sindhuli district are accountable than Surkhet districts' representatives. However, both the districts' representatives are neither best nor bad. While testing, the relationship between performance and electoral accountability index, Surkhet district has a relatively better situation than Sindhuli district. Almost all performance except toilet, drinking water, building house etc has a significant relationship with electoral accountability index in Surkhet district. Outlined reasons not having desired electoral accountability at the local level as identified from the interview include lack of required laws, lack of human resource, lack of infrastructure, newly formed local government, and lack of coordination between and among employees and representatives etc. There is also a hidden factor not being serious about their performance at the local level include deceived attitude of the local representative. They have invested a lot of money in the election. They wanted to collect it during the tenure. Such factors have been hampering electoral accountability at the local level in Nepal. Therefore, it can be concluded that the local electoral accountability in Nepal is in the transitional state. Local representatives, employees and people are learning electoral accountability at the local level in Nepal.

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Annex 1. Comparison of Sindhuli and Surkhet District

Variables	Sindhuli District	Surkhet District
a. Population(number)	296192	350804
Male(number)	142123	169421
Female(Number)	154069	181383
b. Caste and ethnicity		
Ethnic groups (in percent)	64	24
Dalits (in percent)	12	25
Brahman/Chhetri (in percent)	23	50
Madhesi (in percent)	1	1
Others	>1	>1
c. Literate (in number)	165389	233794
Male (in number)	90721	125511
Female (in number)	74668	108283
d. Literacy rate (in percent)	60.53	73.12
d. Area (Sq. km)	2491	2451
e. Population density(Per sq. km)	119	143
h. Households (in number)	57544	72830
i. Rural municipality	7	4
ii. j. Municipality	2	6

Source: CBS, 2014

Annex 2. Respondents from each local body

Name of rural municipalities and municipalities	Name of district		Total
	Sindhuli	Surkhet	
Barahtal Rural Municipality	0	30	30
Bheriganga Municipality	0	32	32
Birendranagar Municipality	0	30	30
Chingad Rural Municipality	0	29	29
Golanjor Rural Municipality	30	0	30
Gurbhakot Municipality	0	30	30
Kamalamai Municipality	63	0	63
Lekbeshi Municipality	0	30	30
Marin Rural Municipality	30	0	30
Panchpuri Municipality	0	32	32
Phikal Rural Municipality	30	0	30
Simta Rural Municipality	0	29	29
Sunkoshi Rural Municipality	30	0	30
Tinpatan Rural Municipality	30	0	30
Total	213	242	455

Source: Field Survey, 2018

Annex 3. Characteristics of respondents

		Sindhuli	Surkhet
Types of respondents	Ordinary citizen	60	46
	Political cadre	7	9
	Local level employee	16	16
	Ethnic group	7	14
	Marginalized groups and Dalits	3	4
	Social workers or mobilizer	6	6
	Others	0	6
Gender	Male	58	50
	Female	42	50
Religion	Hindu	95	81
	Muslim	0	8
	Christian	1	7
	Buddhist	4	4

Literacy	Illiterate	8	4
	Literate	92	96
Occupation	Working	38	18
	Self-employed	22	25
	Unemployed	20	15
	Retired	2	2
	Student	8	30
	House wife/home maker	10	10
Monthly income	Upto Rs 10,000	42	32
	Rs 10001-20000	24	35
	Rs. 20001-30000	28	29
	Rs 30001-40000	4	3
	Rs 40001-50000	1	1
	Rs 50001 above	1	1
	Total	100/213	100/242

Source: Field Study, 2018